Matrix Representations and Extension of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution by Xu, Haiyan
Matrix Representations and Extension of the




presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfilment of the




Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2009
c© Haiyan Xu 2009
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of
the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.





The graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) provides a convenient and
effective means to model and analyze a strategic conflict. Standard practice is to
carry out a stability analysis of a graph model, and then to follow up with a
post-stability analysis, two critical components of which are status quo analysis
and coalition analysis. In stability analysis, an equilibrium is a state that is
stable for all decision makers (DMs) under appropriate stability definitions or
solution concepts. Status quo analysis aims to determine whether a particular
equilibrium is reachable from a status quo (or an initial state) and, if so, how to
reach it. A coalition is any subset of a set of DMs. The coalition stability
analysis within the graph model is focused on the status quo states that are
equilibria and assesses whether states that are stable from individual viewpoints
may be unstable for coalitions. Stability analysis began within a simple
preference structure which includes a relative preference relationship and an
indifference relation. Subsequently, preference uncertainty and strength of
preference were introduced into GMCR but not formally integrated.
In this thesis, two new preference frameworks, hybrid preference and multiple-
level preference, and an integrated algebraic approach are developed for GMCR.
Hybrid preference extends existing preference structures to combine preference
uncertainty and strength of preference into GMCR. A multiple-level preference
framework expands GMCR to handle a more general and flexible structure than
any existing system representing strength of preference. An integrated algebraic
approach reveals a link among traditional stability analysis, status quo analysis,
and coalition stability analysis by using matrix representation of the graph model
for conflict resolution.
To integrate the three existing preference structures into a hybrid system, a
new preference framework is proposed for graph models using a quadruple
relation to express strong or mild preference of one state or scenario over another,
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equal preference, and an uncertain preference. In addition, a multiple-level
preference framework is introduced into the graph model methodology to handle
multiple-level preference information, which lies between relative and cardinal
preferences in information content. The existing structure with strength of
preference takes into account that if a state is stable, it may be either strongly
stable or weakly stable in the context of three levels of strength. However, the
three-level structure is limited in its ability to depict the intensity of relative
preference. In this research, four basic solution concepts consisting of Nash
stability, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, and sequential
stability, are defined at each level of preference for the graph model with the
extended multiple-level preference. The development of the two new preference
frameworks expands the realm of applicability of the graph model and provides
new insights into strategic conflicts so that more practical and complicated
problems can be analyzed at greater depth.
Because a graph model of a conflict consists of several interrelated graphs, it
is natural to ask whether well-known results of Algebraic Graph Theory can help
analyze a graph model. Analysis of a graph model involves searching paths in a
graph but an important restriction of a graph model is that no DM can move
twice in succession along any path. (If a DM can move consecutively, then this
DM’s graph is effectively transitive. Prohibiting consecutive moves thus allows
for graph models with intransitive graphs, which are sometimes useful in
practice.) Therefore, a graph model must be treated as an edge-weighted, colored
multidigraph in which each arc represents a legal unilateral move and distinct
colors refer to different DMs. The weight of an arc could represent some
preference attribute. Tracing the evolution of a conflict in status quo analysis is
converted to searching all colored paths from a status quo to a particular
outcome in an edge-weighted, colored multidigraph. Generally, an adjacency
matrix can determine a simple digraph and all state-by-state paths between any
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two vertices. However, if a graph model contains multiple arcs between the same
two states controlled by different DMs, the adjacency matrix would be unable to
track all aspects of conflict evolution from the status quo. To bridge the gap, a
conversion function using the matrix representation is designed to transform the
original problem of searching edge-weighted, colored paths in a colored
multidigraph to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph with no
color constraints. As well, several unexpected and useful links among status quo
analysis, stability analysis, and coalition analysis are revealed using the
conversion function.
The key input of stability analysis is the reachable list of a DM, or a coalition, by
a legal move (in one step) or by a legal sequence of unilateral moves, from a status
quo in 2-DM or n-DM (n > 2) models. A weighted reachability matrix for a DM
or a coalition along weighted colored paths is designed to construct the reachable
list using the aforementioned conversion function. The weight of each edge in a
graph model is defined according to the preference structure, for example, simple
preference, preference with uncertainty, or preference with strength. Furthermore,
a graph model and the four basic graph model solution concepts are formulated
explicitly using the weighted reachability matrix for the three preference structures.
The explicit matrix representation for conflict resolution (MRCR) that facilitates
stability calculations in both 2-DM and n-DM (n > 2) models for three existing
preference structures. In addition, the weighted reachability matrix by a coalition
is used to produce matrix representation of coalition stabilities in multiple-decision-
maker conflicts for the three preference frameworks.
Previously, solution concepts in the graph model were traditionally defined
logically, in terms of the underlying graphs and preference relations. When status
quo analysis algorithms were developed, this line of thinking was retained and
pseudo-codes were developed following a similar logical structure. However, as
was noted in the development of the decision support system (DSS) GMCR II,
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the nature of logical representations makes coding difficult. The DSS GMCR II,
is available for basic stability analysis and status quo analysis within simple
preference, but is difficult to modify or adapt to other preference structures.
Compared with existing graphical or logical representation, matrix representation
for conflict resolution (MRCR) is more effective and convenient for computer
implementation and for adapting to new analysis techniques. Moreover, due to
an inherent link between stability analysis and post-stability analysis presented,
the proposed algebraic approach establishes an integrated paradigm of matrix
representation for the graph model for conflict resolution.
vi
Acknowledgments
My first and foremost acknowledgement is to the University of Waterloo, which
has not only provided a nurturing environment for my husband and me, but also, is
bringing hope and opportunities to my daughter. Two years ago, my husband was
awarded his PhD degree by the University of Waterloo. From this fall, my daughter
will start her undergraduate study in this amazing university. Today, my journey
at the University of Waterloo is coming to an end. This university continues to
provide my family with vast knowledge and countless opportunities; it is my sincere
hope that my family can make positive contributions to the University of Waterloo
in the future.
I next would like to express my genuine gratitude to my supervisors, Professor
Keith W. Hipel and Professor D. Marc Kilgour. I am extremely grateful for their
guidance for my smooth transition from a background in mathematics to a
specialization in engineering. In fact, all my progress in Engineering is owing to
their help and support. It is almost impossible to express in words how much
help they have provided.
I would also like to convey my thanks to Professor Jian Chen from Tsinghua
University, the most famous university in China. I am honored that Professor Chen
agreed to be my external examiner. I really appreciate my PhD comprehensive
committee members, Professor Xinzhi Liu, Professor Paul Calamai, and Professor
Gordon J. Savage, who have provided extensive help in improving my English and
refining my research. Their valuable comments and suggestions have improved my
work greatly.
I wish to extend my gratitude to my friends in the Faculty of Engineering and
Faculty of Mathematics for their sincere friendship and professional support. In
addition, from other departments and universities, I am especially thankful for
assistance from Joan Kilgour, Mary Mcpherson, Kevin W. Li, and Ye Richard
Chen. I have benefited greatly from their patient instructions and constructive
vii
advice.
Sincere thanks go to the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council
of Canada and Ontario Graduate Scholarship for providing me with full financial
support throughout my PhD study. I also wish to express my appreciation to
the Department of Systems Design Engineering for providing me with a friendly
research environment.
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my family. I am greatly indebted
to my parents for their unchanging love and constant encouragement. Thanks for
my husband Ju Jiang for his patience, support, and understanding throughout
these years of our marriage. My daughter, Yangzi Jiang, is probably the most
important and special person in my life. Thanks to her for bringing me much joy
and happiness during these hard years.
viii
Dedication
I dedicate this dissertation to my daughter−Yangzi Jiang.
ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Motivation for New Preference Structures . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Motivation for Novel Algebraic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Background and Literature Review 10
2.1 Definitions from Algebraic Graph Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Literature Review . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Simple Preference, Uncertain Preference, and Strength of
Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Reachable Lists for Three Preference Structures . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2.1 Reachable Lists of a DM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2.2 Reachable Lists of a Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for Simple Preference 22
2.2.4 Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for Preference with
Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.5 Solution Concepts in the Graph Model with Strength of
Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.6 Status Quo Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
x
List of Figures                                                                                 xvii 
                                                                                     
List of Tables                                                                                    xx 
                                                                                                          
List of Acronyms                                                                             xxiv 
Contents
2.2.7 Coalition Stability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.8 The Decision Support System GMCR II . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Degree of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Hybrid Preference for the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 33
3.1 Combining Preference Uncertainty and Strength of Preference . . . 33
3.2 Stability Analysis in the Graph Model for Hybrid Preference . . . . 35
3.2.1 Reachable Lists of Coalition H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2 Stabilities in the Graph Model for Hybrid Preference . . . . 36
3.2.2.1 Stabilities, Indexed a, for Hybrid Preference . . . . 36
3.2.2.2 Stabilities, Indexed b, for Hybrid Preference . . . . 37
3.2.2.3 Stabilities, Indexed c, for Hybrid Preference . . . . 38
3.2.2.4 Stabilities, Indexed d, for Hybrid Preference . . . . 38
3.2.3 Strong Stabilities under Hybrid Preference for Multiple
Decision Makers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.3.1 Strong Stabilities, Index a, for Hybrid Preference
with Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.3.2 Strong Stabilities, Index b, for Hybrid Preference
with Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.3.3 Strong Stabilities, Index c, for Hybrid Preference
with Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.3.4 Strong Stabilities, Index d, for Hybrid Preferences
with Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.4 Weak Stabilities, Index l, for Hybrid Preference with
Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.5 Interrelationships among Stabilities for Hybrid Preference . . 42
3.3 Computational Stability Analysis and Status Quo Analysis . . . . . 45
3.4 Application: Gisborne Conflict with Hybrid Preference . . . . . . . 48
xi
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 Multiple levels of Preference in the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution 56
4.1 Multiple Levels of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Multiple Levels of Preference in the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2.1 Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference in Two DM
Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2.1.1 General Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference 60
4.2.1.2 Stabilities at Level k for Multiple Levels of Preference 61
4.2.2 Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference in Multiple DM
Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.2.1 Legal Sequences of Unilateral Moves and Unilateral
Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.2.2 General Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference 67
4.2.2.3 Stabilities at Level k for Multiple Levels of Preference 67
4.3 Interrelationships among the Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Application: GDU Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5 Novel Algebraic Approach to Searching Weighted Colored Paths 81
5.1 Extended Definitions in a Weighted Colored Multidigraph . . . . . 81
5.2 The Proposed Rule of Priority to Label Colored Arcs . . . . . . . . 86
5.3 New Algebraic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3.1 A Conversion Function for Finding Colored Paths . . . . . . 87
5.3.2 Computer Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.3.3 Constructing Weighted Reachability Matrix using Weighted
Colored Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
xii
5.4 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4.1 Application 1: Transportation Network . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4.2 Application 2: Graph Model for Conflict Resolution . . . . . 100
5.4.2.1 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Simple Preference 100
5.4.2.2 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Preference with
Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.2.3 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Strength of
Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.2.4 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Hybrid Preference 106
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6 Matrix Representation for Stability Analysis in the Graph Model109
6.1 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for Simple Preference . 110
6.1.1 Matrix Representation of Essential Components for
Stabilities for Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.1.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for Two-DMs
under Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.1.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for n-DMs
under Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.1.4 Interrelationships among the Solution Concepts . . . . . . . 116
6.1.5 Applications for Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.1.5.1 Superpower Nuclear Confrontation . . . . . . . . . 118
6.1.5.2 Rafferty-Alameda Dams Conflict . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for Preference with
Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.1 Matrix Representation of Essential Components for
Stabilities under Uncertain Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for Two-DMs
with Preference Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
xiii
6.2.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for n-DMs with
Preference Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.2.3.1 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index a, for
Preference with Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2.3.2 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index b, for
Preference with Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2.3.3 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index c, for
Preference with Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2.3.4 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index d, for
Preference with Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2.4 Applications including Preference Uncertainty . . . . . . . . 136
6.2.4.1 Sustainable Development Game . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.2.4.2 Lake Gisborne Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for Strength of Preference143
6.3.1 Matrix Representation of Essential Components for
Stabilities with Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for Two-DMs
with Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.3.2.1 Matrix Representation of Stabilities . . . . . . . . . 147
6.3.2.2 Matrix Representation of Strong Stabilities . . . . 147
6.3.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for n-DMs with
Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.3.3.1 Matrix Representation of Stabilities . . . . . . . . . 148
6.3.3.2 Matrix Representation of Strong Stabilities . . . . 149
6.3.4 Weak Stabilities for Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3.5 Applications including Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . 152
6.3.5.1 Sustainable Development Conflict . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.3.5.2 Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) Conflict . . . . . . 153
xiv
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7 Matrix Representations for Status Quo Analysis and Coalition
Analysis 158
7.1 Matrix Representation for Status Quo Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.1.1 Status Quo Analysis: Adjacency Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.1.2 Application: Status Quo Analysis using State-by-State
Approach to the Elmira Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.1.3 Status Quo Analysis: Edge Consecutive Matrix . . . . . . . 166
7.1.3.1 Application: Status Quo Analysis of the Elmira
Conflict for Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.1.3.2 Application: Status Quo Analysis of the Gisborne
Conflict for Preference with Uncertainty . . . . . . 173
7.1.3.3 Application: Status Quo Analysis of the GDU
Conflict for Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . 176
7.2 Matrix Representations for Coalition Stability Analysis . . . . . . . 179
7.2.1 Extension of Coalition Stability in the Graph Model . . . . . 181
7.2.1.1 Coalition Stability in the Graph Model with
Preference Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.2.1.2 Coalition Stability in the Graph Model with
Strength of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.2.2 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities . . . . . . . . 184
7.2.2.1 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities for
Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.2.2.2 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities for
Preference with Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.2.2.3 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities for
Preference with Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.2.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
xv
7.2.3.1 Coalition Stability Analysis for the Elmira Conflict
including Simple Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.2.3.2 Coalition Stability Analysis for the Gisborne
Conflict with Preference Uncertainty . . . . . . . . 187
7.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8 Conclusions and Future Work 191
8.1 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191





1.1 Outline of this thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 The procedure for applying GMCR [16]. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Relations among subsets of S and reachable lists from s. . . 34
3.2 Interrelationships among stabilities indexed l for hybrid
preference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Interrelationships for stability GS and strong stability SGS
for all indexes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Graph model for the Gisborne conflict [46]. . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 The Gisborne conflict evolution from states s1 to s4. . . . . . 53
4.1 Relations among subsets of S and reachable lists from s. . . 61
4.2 Nash stability at level k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 General metarationality at level k. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4 Symmetric metarationality at level k+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5 Sequential stability at level k. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.6 Interrelationships among four stabilities at level k. . . . . . 72
4.7 The legal sequence of UM from state sk. . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.8 The graph model for the GDU conflict [28]. . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.1 The colored multidigraph G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Labeling edges for the graph G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 ak and ah are consecutive in order akah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xvii
5.4 Transformed graphs of G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5 The process of finding all colored paths or the shortest
colored path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6 A transportation network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.7 Graph transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.1 Interrelationships among the four solution concepts [16]. . . 116
6.2 The graph model of the superpower nuclear confrontation
conflict [16]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.3 The graph model of the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict. . 122
6.4 Graph model for the sustainable development conflict [46]. 137
6.5 Graph model for the Gisborne conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.6 The labeled graph model for the GDU conflict. . . . . . . . . 154
7.1 A graph model for the Elmira conflict [29,43]. . . . . . . . . 163
7.2 The weighted colored graph for the Elmira conflict. . . . . . 169
7.3 Conversion graph for finding evolutionary UM paths for
the Elmira conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.4 Graph conversion for finding evolutionary UI paths for the
Elmira conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.5 Evolutionary paths by UIs with status quo state s2. . . . . . 173
7.6 The conversion graphs for finding the evolutionary UI paths
for the Gisborne conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.7 The conversion graphs for finding the evolutionary UIUUM
paths for the Gisborne conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.8 Transformation of the graph model for the GDU conflict. . 177
7.9 The reduced graph allowing WIs only for the GDU conflict. 179
7.10 The GDU conflict evolution from the status quo s1 to state
s9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
xviii
8.1 Future objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
xix
List of Tables
1.1 Current status of the graph model for conflict resolution
(extend from [44]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Three types of preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Subsets of S with respect to three structures of preferences
for DM i [16, 27,28,46] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Unilateral movements for DM i in various preference
structures [16, 27,28,46] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Scale of relative preference [58] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 The pseudocode for constructing RH(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 The pseudocode for constructing R+,++,UH . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Options and feasible states for the Gisborne conflict [46] . . 51
3.4 Certain preferences information for the Gisborne model
(extended from [46]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Stability results of the Gisborne conflict with hybrid
preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 The comparison of stability results for two types of
preference structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Degree of relative preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Subsets of S for DM i with respect to multiple levels of
preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
xx
4.3 Reachable lists by DM i at some level of preference . . . . . 60
4.4 Feasible states for the GDU model [28] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Four levels of preferences for DMs in the GDU conflict
(extended from [28]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Stability results of the GDU conflict for the graph model
with four levels of preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 The comparison of stability results for three versions of
preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1 Pseudo code of the proposed algorithm for finding colored
paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 The nonzero entries of matrix LJr for the transportation
network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.1 Options and feasible states for the superpower nuclear
confrontation conflict [16] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 Stability results of the superpower nuclear confrontation . . 120
6.3 Feasible states for the Rafferty-Alameda dams Model [29] . 121
6.4 Unilateral moves and preference functions for the Rafferty-
Alameda dams model [29] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.5 Weights of edges by N\{1} for Rafferty-Alameda dams
conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.6 UM and UI reachability matrices by H = N\{i} for the
Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.7 Stability results of the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict . . . 127
6.8 The construction of stability matrices for two-DMs with
preference uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.9 Options and feasible states for the sustainable development
conflict [31] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
xxi
6.10 Stability results of the sustainable development game with
uncertain preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.11 Preference information for the Gisborne conflict [46] . . . . 140
6.12 Weight matrices for H = N\{1} for the Gisborne conflict . . 141
6.13 UM reachability matrices by N\{i} for i = 1, 2, 3 for the
Gisborne conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.14 UIUUM reachability matrices by N\{i} for i = 1, 2, 3 for the
Gisborne model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.15 Stability results of the Gisborne model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.16 The construction of stability matrices for two-DM models
with strength of preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.17 Stability results of the sustainable development conflict
with strength of preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.18 Preferences for DMs in the GDU conflict [28] . . . . . . . . . 153
6.19 Weight matrix of coalition H = N\{1} by the legal UM and
WI sequences for the GDU conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.20 Stability matrices for n-DM conflicts with strength of
preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.21 Stability results of the GDU conflict with strength of
preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.1 Options and feasible states for the Elmira model [29, 43] . . 163
7.2 Preferences for DMs in the Elmira conflict [29] . . . . . . . . 164
7.3 Stability results of the Elmira conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.4 UM status quo matrices for the Elmira conflict . . . . . . . . 166
7.5 UI status quo matrices for the Elmira conflict . . . . . . . . 167
7.6 The results of status quo analysis for the Elmira conflict . . 168
7.7 UM and UI weight matrices for the Elmira conflict . . . . . 170
xxii
7.8 UM, UI, and UIUUM Weight matrices for the Gisborne
conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.9 Weight matrix, UM weight matrix, and WI weight matrix
for the GDU conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.10 Coalition stability matrices for H = N\{i} for the Elmira
conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
7.11 Conservative stability matrices of coalition H = N\{i} for
i = 1, 2, 3 for the Gisborne model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.12 Aggressive stability matrices of coalition H = N\{i} for i =
1, 2, 3 for the Gisborne model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
xxiii
Acronyms Description of acronyms
DM Decision Maker
DSS Decision Support System
GMCR Graph Model for Conflict Resolution






UIUUM Unilateral Improvement or Unilateral Uncertain Move
WI Unilateral Mild Improvement or Strong Improvement (Weak Improvement)
WIUUM Weak Improvement or Unilateral Uncertain Move
MRCR Matrix Representation for Conflict Resolution
MRSC Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts
MRSCU Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts with Preference Uncertainty
MRSCS Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts with Strength of Preference
MRSQA Matrix Representation of Status Quo Analysis
MRCSA Matrix Representation of Coalition Stability Analysis
MRCR-DSS A Decision Support System for the Implementation of MRCR




Strategic conflict arises in diverse contexts, including environmental management
and the economic, political, and personal relationships among individuals and
organizations. The problem of how to solve strategic conflict has been
investigated within many disciplines including international relations, psychology,
and law, as well as from mathematical and engineering perspectives [5, 16, 35, 59].
Among the formal methodologies that address strategic conflict, the graph model
for conflict resolution (GMCR) [41] provides a remarkable combination of
simplicity and flexibility. The graph model provides an effective means to model
and analyze stabilities and then encourage follow-up or post-stability
analysis–status quo analysis and coalition analysis. To analyze a strategic conflict
means to investigate the interaction of two or more decision makers (DMs) to
identify possible outcomes.
1.1 Research Motivation
A graph model for a strategic conflict comprises a finite set of DMs, N , a set
of feasible states, S, and, for each DM i ∈ N , a preference relation on S and a
directed graph Gi = {S,Ai}. In each directed graph, S is the vertex set, and each
oriented arc in Ai ⊆ S×S indicates that DM i can make a legal move (in one step)
from the initial state to the terminal state of the arc. Obviously, preferences play
an important role in decision analysis. In the original graph model, only a relative
preference relation  and an indifference relation ∼ are available to represent
a particular DM’s simple preference for one state over another [16]. The graph
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model has recently been developed in two new directions—preference uncertainty
and preference strength. To enhance GMCR’s applicability, more integrated and
general preference structures need to be developed. Because a graph model of a
conflict consists of several interrelated graphs, it is natural to utilize results of
Algebraic Graph Theory to analyze a graph model.
1.1.1 Motivation for New Preference Structures
Preferences that involve incomplete information have been addressed in a
significant amount of research such as preference with uncertainty and strength
of preference. However, existing structures address preference uncertainty and
preference strength separately, so they cannot model complex strategic conflicts
arising in practical applications. How to expand the realm of applicability of
GMCR and provide more insights into strategic conflicts? In this thesis, a
mechanism that is more general and flexible than existing two frameworks of
preference with uncertainty and strength of preference is introduced into the
paradigm of GMCR to combine together preference uncertainty and preference
strength.
The original graph model uses “simple preference {,∼}” to represent a DM’s
relative preference between two states. This model is called a two-level preference
structure. Furthermore, a preference framework called “strength of preference”
that includes two new binary relations, “greatly preferred ” and “mildly preferred
>”, expressing a DM’s strong or mild preference for one state over another, with
the indifference relation ∼, is referred to as a three-level preference structure.
As a result of the development of extensive research expressing preference
information by degree of strength, existing preference structures in the graph
model are limited in their ability to depict the intensity of relative preference.
How to handle more specific preference information which lies between relative
and cardinal preferences in terms of information content? How to gain better and
more realistic insights into strategic conflicts? A multiple-level preference ranking
structure is developed to expand earlier 2-level and 3-level structures to an
unlimited number of levels of preference. In addition, this new preference
structure is incorporated into GMCR for studying multi-objective decision
making in conflict situations more realistically.
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1.1.2 Motivation for Novel Algebraic Approach
In the graph model, stability analysis (individual stability analysis) is defined
using logical structures that refer to the underlying graphs and preference
relations [16]. Subsequently, Kilgour et al. [43] developed coalition stability
analysis based on Nash stability but pseudo-code was furnished retaining a
logical structure. However, as was noted in the development of the DSS GMCR
II, the nature of logical representations makes coding difficult. The new
preference structure proposed by Li et al. [46] to represent uncertainty in DMs’
preferences included some extensions of the four stability definitions, and
algorithms were outlined but never developed. Status quo analysis for simple
preference and preference with uncertainty were developed by Li et al. [47, 48],
but only in the form of pseudo-codes following a similar logical structure, which
have never been implemented in a practical decision support system. The work
of [27, 28] integrated strength of preference information into the four basic
solution concepts consisting of Nash stability, general metarationality (GMR),
symmetric metarationality (SMR), and sequential stability (SEQ), but, again,
proved difficult to code and was never integrated into GMCR II. Table 1.1 shows
the current status of available individual stability and coalition stability analyses
and status quo analysis, as well as the development of effective algorithms and
codes to implement these stabilities and status quo analysis, which would be
essential if they are to be applied to practical problems [44].
How to develop a unique representation of conflict resolution that is easy to
code and easy to adapt to new procedures? How to design a comprehensive
decision support system for conflict analysis to include individual stability and
coalition stability analyses and status quo analysis? These are essential
motivations to develop an integrated algebraic approach for the graph model for
conflict resolution. An important restriction of a graph model is that no decision
maker can move twice in succession along any path. Hence, a graph model can
be treated as an edge-weighted, colored multidigraph in which each arc represents
a legal unilateral move and distinct colors refer to different DMs. Moreover, arc
weights can be used to represent some preference attribute. Thus, tracing the
evolution of a conflict in status quo analysis with some preference structure is
converted to searching all colored paths assigned specific weights. Generally, the
adjacency matrix represents a simple digraph and determines all paths between
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Table 1.1: Current status of the graph model for conflict resolution (extend
from [44])
Preference informationStability and post-stability analysesAlgorithms? In GMCR II ?
Individual stability analysis Yes Yes
Simple preference Status quo analysis Yes Yes
Coalition stability analysis Yes Yes
Individual stability analysis No No
Preference with Status quo analysis Yes No
uncertainty Coalition stability analysis No No
Individual stability No No
Strength of Status quo analysis No No
preference Coalition stability analysis No No
any two vertices, but is not readily extendable to colored multidigraphs. How to
transform the original problem of searching edge-colored paths in a colored
multidigraph to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph?
A conversion function using matrix representation can establish a relationship
between a colored multidigraph and a simple digraph with no color constraints.
Based on the conversion function, an inherent link among status quo analysis,
individual stability analysis, and coalition stability analysis is revealed. Because
edge weights in a graph model are used to represent preference attributes, a
weight matrix can be designed to represent various preference structures.
Therefore, the above analysis provides the possibility of establishing an
integrated paradigm using matrix representation for stability analysis and
post-stability analysis in a graph model. The explicit matrix representation for
conflict resolution (MRCR) is developed to ease the coding of logically-defined
individual and coalition stability definitions and status quo analysis. Another




This research has two key objectives: the first is to propose two new preference
frameworks to enhance the applicability of GMCR; the second is to develop an
integrated algebraic approach for stability analysis, status quo analysis, and
coalition stability analysis for three preference structures, simple preference,
preference with uncertainty, and strength of preference.
The specific goals are presented as follows:
1. To extend the graph model for conflict resolution including hybrid preference:
• Propose a new preference structure for the graph model that can represent
DMs’ preference uncertainty and strength of preference;
• Extend the four basic solution concepts to models with hybrid preference;
• Extend status quo analysis from models with simple preference and
preference with uncertainty to models with hybrid preference.
2. To extend the graph model for conflict resolution to include multiple levels of
preference:
• Propose a new preference framework for the graph model that can represent
multiple levels of preference;
• Propose appropriate results of the four basic stability definitions for graph
models with multiple levels of preference;
• Investigate the relationships among these new stability definitions;
• Employ these new stability definitions to analyze a model for presenting the
significance of multiple levels of preference.
3. To develop an algebraic approach to searching edge-weighted, colored paths in
a weighted colored multidigraph:
• Propose a procedure (the Rule of Priority) to label colored multidigraphs;
• Design a conversion function that transforms the problem of searching edge-
colored paths in a colored multidigraph to the standard problem of finding
paths in a simple digraph;
5
• Use the conversion function to find all colored paths between any two vertices
of a colored multidigraph;
• Develop an algorithm for searching edge-weighted, colored paths between
any two vertices in a weighted colored multidigraph;
• Construct a weighted reachability matrix of a coalition by weighted colored
paths to reveal the link among individual stability analysis, status quo
analysis, and coalition stability analysis.
4. To develop matrix representation of solution concepts (MRSC) in multiple-
decision-maker graph models:
• Construct weight matrices to represent preference information for simple
preference, preference with uncertainty, strength of preference, and hybrid
preference;
• Establish the equivalence of weighted reachability matrices for a DM or a
coalition by the weighted colored paths and reachable lists of a DM or a
coalition by various legal unilateral moves;
• Develop explicit matrix representations of the four basic solution concepts for
graph models with simple preference (MRSC), preference with uncertainty
(MRSCU), and strength of preference (MRSCS) based on their weighted
reachable matrices.
5. To propose matrix representation for status quo analysis (MRSQA) to track
the evolution of a conflict:
• Show how to input efficiently the weight matrices that represent simple
preference, preference with uncertainty, and strength of preference;
• Show that weighted edges by 0 or 1 can be used to indicate allowable
unilateral moves;
• Show that the algorithm for searching edge-weighted, colored paths can be
used to trace the evolution of a conflict under some constraints on unilateral
moves.
6. To develop matrix representation of coalition stability analysis (MRCSA):
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• Extend coalition stabilities to models including preference uncertainty and
strength of preference;
• Construct coalition stability matrices for simple preference, preference with
uncertainty, and strength of preference based on the weighted reachability
matrix of the coalition;
• Develop an explicit algebraic form conflict model that facilitates coalition
stability calculations for the aforementioned three preference structures.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The outline of this thesis is presented in Fig. 1.1 to describe the existing research
and the main objectives in this work.
This chapter presents the motivation and objectives of this research. Chapter
2 includes some definitions from Algebraic Graph Theory and a brief overview
of the graph model for conflict resolution including stability analysis, status quo
analysis, and coalition analysis for existing preference structures. In Chapter 3,
two new preference frameworks, hybrid preference and multiple-level preference,
are proposed for a graph model. The four basic solution concepts and status quo
analysis for simple preference are extended to graph models incorporating hybrid
preference of uncertainty and strength. To illustrate this method, a model of the
conflict over proposed bulk water exports from Lake Gisborne in Newfoundland
is extended to hybrid preference. Then the possible resolutions and evolution of
this conflict are calculated using the extended stability and status quo analyses.
In Chapter 4, the graph model for conflict resolution is extended to multiple-level
preference. The redefined solution concepts are then applied to the expanded
Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) conflict to show how the procedure works.
In Chapter 5, a new algebraic approach to constructing the reduced weighted
edge consecutive matrix is developed for finding all edge-weighted, colored paths
within a weighted colored multidigraph. Then, weight matrices are used to
represent simple preference, preference with uncertainty, strength of preference,
and hybrid preference. Finally, the reduced weighted edge consecutive matrix is
used to obtain weighted reachability matrices that are equivalent to the reachable
lists of a coalition by legal unilateral moves within the four preference










































































Figure 1.1: Outline of this thesis.
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preference, and hybrid preference. Furthermore, logical stability definitions are
presented using matrix representations for three existing preference structures in
Chapter 6. Following is the proposed algebraic approach that is employed to
solve real applications for status quo analysis and coalition stability analysis in






2.1 Definitions from Algebraic Graph Theory
A graph is a pair (V,E) of sets satisfying E ⊆ V × V . A multidigraph [13]
G = (V,A, ψ) is a set of vertices (nodes) V and a set of oriented edges (arcs) A
with ψ : A → V ×V . If a ∈ A satisfies ψ(a) = (u, v), then we say that a has initial
vertex u and terminal vertex v. A multidigraph may contain a, b ∈ A such that
a 	= b and ψ(a) = ψ(b), in which case a and b are said to be multiple arcs. If there
exists a ∈ A such that ψ(a) = (u, v), then u is said to be adjacent to v and (u, v) is
said to be incident from u and incident to v. Hence, (u, v) is called in-incident to v
and out-incident to u. When G is drawn, it is common to represent the direction
of an edge with an arrowhead. We generally assume loop-free graphs; i.e., for any
a ∈ A, if ψ(a) = (u, v), then u 	= v.
It should be pointed out that a multidigraph with no multiple edges can be
called a simple digraph [13].
Definition 2.1. For a multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ), edge a ∈ A and edge b ∈ A
are consecutive (in the order ab) iff ψ(a) = (u, v) and ψ(b) = (v, s), where
u, v, s ∈ V .
Definition 2.2. For a multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ), the line digraph L(G) =
(A,LA) of G is a simple digraph with vertex set A and edge set LA={d = (a, b) ∈
A × A : a and b are consecutive (in the order ab)}.
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Definition 2.3. For a multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ), a path from vertex u ∈ V to
vertex s ∈ V is a sequence of vertices in G starting with u and ending with s, such
that consecutive vertices are adjacent.
Note that in this thesis a path may contain the same vertex more than once [8].
The length of a path is the number of edges therein.
Important matrices associated with a digraph include the adjacency matrix and
the incidence matrix [24]. Let m = |V | denote the number of vertices and l = |A|
be the number of edges of the directed graph G. Then,
Definition 2.4. For a multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ), the adjacency matrix is the
m × m matrix J with (u, v) entry
J(u, v) =
{
1 if (u, v) ∈ A,
0 otherwise,
where u, v ∈ V .
Definition 2.5. For a multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ), the incidence matrix is the




−1 if a = (v, x) for some x ∈ V,
1 if a = (x, v) for some x ∈ V,
0 otherwise,
where v ∈ V and a ∈ A.
According to the signed entries, the incidence matrix can be separated into the
in-incidence matrix and the out-incidence matrix.
Definition 2.6. For a multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ), the in-incidence matrix Bin
and the out-incidence matrix Bout are the m × l matrices with (v, a) entries
Bin(v, a) =
{





1 if a = (v, x) for some x ∈ V,
0 otherwise,
where v ∈ V and a ∈ A.
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It is obvious that Bin = (B + abs(B))/2 and Bout = (abs(B) − B)/2, where
abs(B) denotes the matrix in which each entry equals the absolute value of the
corresponding entry of B. Definitions 2.2 to 2.6 are adapted from [24].
Definition 2.7. For two m×m matrices M and Q, the Hadamard product for
the two matrices is the m × m matrix H = M ◦ Q with (s, q) entry
H(s, q) = M(s, q) · Q(s, q).
Let “ ∨ ” denote the disjunction operator (“or”) on two matrices. Assuming
that H and G are two m × m matrices, the disjunction operation on matrices H
and G is defined by:
Definition 2.8. For two m × m matrices H and G, disjunction matrix of H
and G is the m × m matrix M = H ∨ G with (u, v) entry
M(u, v) =
{
1 if H(u, v) + G(u, v) 	= 0,
0 otherwise.
Definition 2.9. The sign function, sign(·), maps an m ×m matrix with (u, v)




1 M(u, v) > 0,
0 M(u, v) = 0,
−1 M(u, v) < 0.
2.2 Graph Model for Conflict Resolution:
Literature Review
To analyze a strategic conflict means to investigate the interaction of two or more
decision makers (DMs) to identify possible outcomes. There are many models
available for strategic conflicts, and many ways to analyze a model, including the
strategic-form game [53], the option form [34], and the closely-related tabular form
[22, 23]. In 1987, the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) was proposed
by Kilgour et al. [41] to provide a simple, flexible, structure modeling strategic
conflicts and insightful methods for analyzing the model. One advantage of the
graph model is that it incorporates a range of stability definitions (or solution
concepts) that models human behavior in strategic conflicts. See [44] for a recent
summary of work on the graph model. Compared with the other ways to represent
strategic conflicts, the graph model has several advantages, including its ability to
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• handle irreversible moves,
• model common moves easily,
• provide a flexible framework for defining, comparing, and characterizing
solution concepts, and
• adapt easily in practice.
This thesis concerns the graph model.
As Fig. 2.1 shows, the graph model provides a methodology for modeling and
analyzing strategic conflicts. The modeling stage includes identification of the
decision makers (DMs), the states, the state transitions controlled by each DM,
and each DM’s relative preferences over the states. A DM may be an individual
or a group, such as an industrial or governmental organization. Usually, a DM
is modeled as having one or more options, each of which may or may not be
selected, and a state is defined as a particular selection of options by all DMs. The
analysis stage includes the determination of whether a state is stable from each
DM’s viewpoint for a range of solution concepts. States that are stable for all DMs
according to a given solution concept are called equilibria. The analysis stage also
includes follow-up analyses such as status quo analysis, coalition stability analysis,
and sensitivity analysis [16].
In a graph model, a stability definition (solution concept) is a procedure for
determining whether a state is stable for a DM, and represents the situation in
which the DM would have no incentive to move away from the state unilaterally.
An equilibrium of a graph model, or a possible resolution of the conflict it
represents, is a state that all DMs find stable under an appropriate stability
definition. To represent various decision styles and contexts, at least seven
solution concepts have been formulated for graph models, including Nash
stability [51, 52], general metarationality (GMR) [34], symmetric metarationality
(SMR) [34], sequential stability (SEQ) [22], limited-move stability
(LS) [16, 40, 78], non-myopic stability (NM) [6, 7, 39], and Stackelberg’s
equilibrium concept [61]. In this thesis, four basic solution concepts consisting of
Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ are considered because these definitions can be
employed with both intransitive and transitive preferences. In 1989, Wang et
al. [63] redefined the four basic solution concepts in hypergames. Recently, Zeng


































Figure 2.1: The procedure for applying GMCR [16].
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graph model and Li et al. [46] extended the four basic solution concepts to
models having preference uncertainty. Hamouda et al. [27, 28] proposed new
solution concepts that take strength of preference (strong or mild) into account.
This thesis focuses mainly on the analysis stage: identifying stable states based
on the four basic solution concepts and carrying out status quo analysis and
coalition stability analysis.
2.2.1 Simple Preference, Uncertain Preference, and
Strength of Preference
Obviously, preference information plays an important role in decision analysis.
Each DM has preferences among the possible states that can arise. Ordinal
preferences, ranking states from most to least preferred (ties allowed), or cardinal
preferences using the values of a real-valued preference function on the states are
required by some models. The graph model requires only relative preference
information for each DM, but can of course use cardinal information; moreover, it
can handle both intransitive and transitive preferences. In the original graph
model, simple preference [16] of DM i is coded by a pair of relations {i,∼i} on
S, where s i q indicates that DM i prefers s to q and s ∼i q means that DM i is
indifferent between s and q (or equally prefers s and q). Note that, for each i, i
is assumed irreflexive and asymmetric, and ∼i is assumed reflexive and
symmetric. Also, {i,∼i} is complete, i.e., for any s, q ∈ S, either s i q, s ∼i q,
or q i s. The conventions that s i q is equivalent to either s i q or s ∼i q, and
that s ≺i q is equivalent to q i s, are convenient. This completes the definition
of the graph model as used until around 2000, and represents the structures
encoded in the Decision Support System (DSS) GMCR II [18,19].
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to obtain accurate preference information in
practical cases, so models that allow preference uncertainty can be very useful.
Moreover, as pointed out by [20,21], conflicts among the attributes of alternatives
can cause preference uncertainty. To incorporate preference uncertainty into the
graph model methodology, Li et al. [46] proposed a new preference structure in
which DM i’s preferences are expressed by a triple of relations {i,∼i, Ui} on S,
where s i q indicates strict preference, s ∼i q indicates indifference, and sUiq
means DM i may prefer state s to state q, may prefer q to s, or may be indifferent
between s and q. If for any relation R and any states k, s, and q, kRs and sRq
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imply kRq, then R is transitive. For example, strict preference  is transitive
in many graph models, though in some cases it is intransitive. In this research,
transitivity of preferences is not required, and all results hold whether preferences
are transitive or intransitive. For example, the uncertain preference relation, U , is
often intransitive.
Another triplet relation {i, >i,∼i} on S that expresses strength of preference
(strong or mild preference) was developed by Hamouda et al. [27,28]. For s, q ∈ S,
s i q denotes DM i strongly prefers s to q, s >i q means DM i mildly prefers s
to q, and s ∼i q indicates that DM i is indifferent between states s and q. Table
2.1 summarizes the three existing types of preferences for DM i.
Table 2.1: Three types of preferences
Expression Properties of preference
Preference type of AsymmetricSymmetricReflexive and Complete
preference symmetric
Simple preference {i,∼i} i ∼i {i,∼i}
Preference with uncertainty {i,∼i, Ui} i Ui ∼i {i,∼i, Ui}
Preference with strength {i, >i,∼i} i, >i ∼i {i, >i,∼i}
Note that {i, >i,∼i} is complete, i.e., if s, q ∈ S, then exactly one of the following
relations holds: s i q, q i s, s >i q, q >i s, and s ∼i q.
The state set S can be divided into a set of subsets based on preference
relative to a fixed state s ∈ S. These subsets are essential components in stability
analysis. The descriptions of these subsets for the three types of preferences are
presented in Table 2.2.
Let s ∈ S and i ∈ N . Based on different structures of preferences, DM i can
identify different subsets of S. The details are presented as follows:
• For simple preference, DM i can identify three subsets of S: Φ+i (s), Φ=i (s),
and Φ−i (s) [16].
• For preference with uncertainty, DM i can identify four subsets of S: Φ+i (s),
Φ=i (s), Φ
−




Table 2.2: Subsets of S with respect to three structures of preferences
for DM i [16,27,28,46]
Subsets of S Description
Φ++i (s) = {q : q i s} States strongly preferred to state s by DM i
Φ+mi (s) = {q : q >i s} States mildly preferred to state s by DM i
Φ+i (s) = {q : q i s} States preferred to state s by DM i
Φ=i (s) = {q : q ∼i s} States equally preferred to state s by DM i
Φ−i (s) = {q : s i q} States less preferred than state s for DM i
Φ−mi (s) = {q : s >i q} States mildly less preferred than state s for DM i
Φ−−i (s) = {q : s i q} States strongly less preferred to state s by DM i
ΦUi (s) = {q : q Ui s} States uncertainly preferred to state s by DM i





i (s), and Φ
−−
i (s) [27,28].
For ease of use, some additional notation is defined by Φ−−,−,=i (s) = Φ
−−
i (s) ∪
Φ−mi (s) ∪ Φ=i (s), where ∪ denotes the union operation. Note that in the graph
model with strength of preference, s i q iff either s >i q or s i q. Therefore,
the two preference frameworks of preference with uncertainty and preference with
strength expand simple preference.
2.2.2 Reachable Lists for Three Preference Structures
2.2.2.1 Reachable Lists of a DM
Let i ∈ N , s ∈ S, and let m = |S| be the number of the states in S. Notation ∩
denotes the intersection operation. Recall that each arc of Ai ⊆ S × S indicates
that DM i can make a unilateral move (in one step) from the initial state to the
terminal state of the arc. The reachable lists of DM i’s from state s ∈ S for
different preference structures are defined as follows.
• Simple preference [16]:
17
(i) Ri(s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai} denotes DM i’s reachable list from state s
by a unilateral move (UM);
(ii) R+i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and q i s} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a unilateral improvement (UI);
(iii) R=i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and q ∼i s} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by an equally preferred move;
(iv) R−i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and s i q} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a unilateral disimprovement.
• Preference with uncertainty [46]:
(i) RUi (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and qUis} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a unilateral uncertain move (UUM);
(ii) R+,Ui (s) = R
+
i (s) ∪ RUi (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and q i s or qUis}
denotes DM i’s reachable list from state s by a unilateral improvement or
unilateral uncertain move (UIUUM).
• Strength of preference [27,28]:
(i) R+mi (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and q >i s} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a mild unilateral improvement;
(ii) R++i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and q i s} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a strong unilateral improvement;
(iii) R−mi (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and s >i q} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a mild unilateral disimprovement;
(iv) R−−i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and s i q} denotes DM i’s reachable list
from state s by a strong unilateral disimprovement;
(v) R+,++i (s) = R
+m
i (s)∪R++i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and q >i s or q i s}
denotes DM i’s reachable list from state s by a mild unilateral move or strong
unilateral move called a weak move (WI).
From the above definitions, these reachable lists from state s by DM i can be
summarized as presented in Table 2.3.
The reachable list from state s, Ri(s), represents DM i
′s unilateral moves
(UMs). Ri(s) is partitioned according to the different preference structures as
follows [16,27,28,46]:
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Table 2.3: Unilateral movements for DM i in various preference
structures [16, 27,28,46]
Type of movements Description
R++i (s) = Ri ∩ Φ++i (s) All strong unilateral improvements from state s for DM i
R+mi (s) = Ri ∩ Φ+mi (s) All mild unilateral improvements from state s for DM i
R+i (s) = Ri ∩ Φ+i (s) All unilateral improvements (UIs) from state s for DM i
R=i (s) = Ri ∩ Φ=i (s) All equally preferred states reachable from state s by DM i
R−i (s) = Ri ∩ Φ−i (s) All unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i
R−mi (s) = Ri ∩ Φ−mi (s) All mild unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i
R−−i (s) = Ri ∩ Φ−−i (s)All strong unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i
RUi (s) = Ri ∩ ΦUi (s) All states reachable by DM i from state s for which
DM i’s preference relative to s is uncertain
• For simple preference, Ri(s) = R+i (s) ∪ R=i (s) ∪ R−i (s).
• For preference with uncertainty, Ri(s) = R+i (s) ∪ R=i (s) ∪ R−i (s) ∪ RUi (s).
• For preference with strength, Ri(s) = R++i (s) ∪ R+mi (s) ∪ R=i (s) ∪ R−mi (s) ∪
R−−i (s).
2.2.2.2 Reachable Lists of a Coalition
Any subset H of DMs in the set N is called a coalition. If |H| > 0, then the
coalition H is non-empty. If |H| > 1, then the coalition H is non-trivial. Below,
a coalition H ⊆ N is assumed to be non-trivial. For a two-DM model, DM i’s
opponent is one DM, j, so DM j’s reachable lists from s are the states reachable
by one step moves. In an n-DM model (n > 2), the opponents of a DM constitute
a group of two or more DMs. Therefore, the definition of a legal sequence of UMs
is given first.
A legal sequence of UMs for a coalition of DMs is a sequence of states linked
by unilateral moves by members of the coalition, in which a DM may move more
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than once, but not twice consecutively. (If a DM can move consecutively, then this
DM’s graph is effectively transitive.)
Let the coalition H ⊆ N satisfy |H| ≥ 2 and let the status quo state be s ∈ S.
We now define RH(s) ⊆ S, the reachable list of coalition H from state s (by a legal
sequence of UMs). The following definitions are taken from [16]:
Definition 2.10. A unilateral move by H is a member of RH(s) ⊆ S, defined
inductively by
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ Rj(s), then s1 ∈ RH(s) and j ∈ ΩH(s, s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ RH(s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ Rj(s1), then, provided ΩH(s, s1) 	= {j},
s2 ∈ RH(s) and j ∈ ΩH(s, s2).
Note that this definition is inductive: first, using (1), the states reachable from
s are identified and added to RH(s); then, using (2), all states reachable from
those states are identified and added to RH(s); then the process is repeated until
no further states are added to RH(s) by repeating (2). Because RH(s) ⊆ S, and
S is finite, this limit must be reached in finitely many steps.
To interpret Definition 2.10, note that if s1 ∈ RH(s), then ΩH(s, s1) ⊆ N is the
set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1. (If s1 	∈ RH(s), it is assumed
that ΩH(s, s1) = ∅.) Suppose that ΩH(s, s1) contains only one DM, say j ∈ N .
Then any move from s1 to a subsequent state, say s2, must be made by a member
of H other than j; otherwise DM j would have to move twice in succession. On
the other hand, if |ΩH(s, s1)| ≥ 2, any member of H who has a unilateral move
from s1 to s2 may exercise it. It should be pointed out that it is possible s ∈ RH(s)
according to Definition 2.10, but the trivial case will not be discussed in research.
A legal sequence of UIs for a coalition can be defined similarly, leading to the
list of coalitional UIs, as follows.
Definition 2.11. Let s ∈ S, H ⊆ N, and H 	= ∅. A unilateral improvement by
H is a member of R+H(s) ⊆ S, defined inductively by
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ R+j (s), then s1 ∈ R+H(s) and j ∈ Ω+H(s, s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ R+H(s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ R+j (s1), then, provided Ω+H(s, s1) 	= {j},
s2 ∈ R+H(s) and j ∈ Ω+H(s, s2).
Definition 2.11 is identical to Definition 2.10 except that all moves are required
to be UIs, i.e. each move is to a state strictly preferred by the mover to the current
state. Similarly, Ω+H(s, s1) includes all last movers in a UI by coalition H from state
s to state s1.
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The reachable lists of coalition H from state s by the legal sequences of UMs
and UIs were defined above for simple preference. Li et al. [46] and Hamouda
et al. [28] extended the legal sequences of UMs and UIs and reachable lists of
coalition H to preference including possible uncertainty and strength, respectively.
To extend the definitions of the reachable lists for a coalition to take preference
uncertainty and strength of preference into account, legal sequence of coalitional
UIUUMs and legal sequence of coalitional WIs must be defined first, respectively.
A legal sequence of UIUUMs is a sequence of allowable unilateral improvements or
unilateral uncertain moves by a coalition, with the usual restriction that a member
of the coalition may move more than once, but not twice consecutively. Similarly,
a legal sequence of WIs is a sequence of allowable mild unilateral improvements or
strong unilateral improvements by a coalition, with the same restriction that any
member in the coalition may move more than once, but not twice consecutively.
The following formal definitions for reachable lists of coalition H by the legal
sequence of UIUUMs and by the legal sequence of WIs are respectively taken
from [46] and [28]:
Definition 2.12. Let s ∈ S and H ⊆ N where |H| ≥ 2. A unilateral improvement
or unilateral uncertain move (UIUUM) by H is a member of R+,UH (s) ⊆ S, defined
inductively by
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ R+,Uj (s), then s1 ∈ R+,UH (s) and j ∈ Ω+,UH (s, s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ R+,UH (s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ R+,Uj (s1), then, provided Ω+,UH (s, s1) 	= {j},
s2 ∈ R+,UH (s) and j ∈ Ω+,UH (s, s2).
Definition 2.13. Let s ∈ S and H ⊆ N where |H| ≥ 2. A weak improvement
(WI) by H is a member of R+,++H (s) ⊆ S, defined inductively by:
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ R+,++j (s), then s1 ∈ R+,++H (s) and j ∈ Ω+,++H (s, s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ R+,++H (s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ R+,++j (s1), then, provided Ω+,++H (s, s1) 	= {j},
s2 ∈ R+,++H (s) and j ∈ Ω+,++H (s, s2).
Like Definitions 2.10 and 2.11, Definitions 2.12 and 2.13 are inductive
definitions. The roles and interpretations of R+,UH (s) and Ω
+,U
H (s, s1), as well as
R+,++H (s) and Ω
+,++
H (s, s1) are likewise analogous.
Within an n-DM model (n ≥ 2), DM i’s opponents, N\{i}, where \ refers to
“set subtraction”, consist of a group of one or more DMs. In order to analyze
the stability of a state for DM i ∈ N , it is necessary to take into account possible
responses by all other DMs j ∈ N\{i}. The essential inputs of stability analysis are
21
reachable lists of coalition N\{i} from state s, RN\{i}(s) and R+N\{i}(s) for simple
preference, RN\{i}(s) and R
+,U
N\{i}(s) for preference with uncertainty, and RN\{i}(s)
and R+,++N\{i}(s) for preference with strength.
2.2.3 Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for Simple
Preference
The four basic solution concepts, Nash stability, general metarationality (GMR),
symmetric metarationality (SMR), and sequential stability (SEQ) in the graph
model for simple preference are taken from [16]. Let i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
Definition 2.14. State s is Nash stable for DM i iff R+i (s) = ∅.
State s ∈ S is GMR for DM i iff whenever DM i makes any UI from s, then
its opponent can move to hurt i or sanction i in response.
Definition 2.15. State s is GMR for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2.
SMR is a more restrictive stability definition than GMR. SMR is similar to
GMR except that DM i expects to have a chance to counterrespond to its
opponent’s response to i’s original move [16].
Definition 2.16. State s is SMR for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s i s2 and s i s3 for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
SEQ is similar to GMR, but includes only sanctions that are “credible”. A
credible action is a unilateral improvement.
Definition 2.17. State s is SEQ for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at
least one s2 ∈ R+N\{i}(s1) with s i s2.
When n = 2, the DM set N reduces to {i, j} in Definitions 2.14 to 2.17. For
example, the reachable list RN\{i}(s1) of N\{i} from s1, reduces to reachable list
Rj(s1) of j from s1.
2.2.4 Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for
Preference with Uncertainty
Based on the extended preference structure (including uncertainty), Li et al. [46]
defined Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability to capture a DM’s incentives to leave
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the status quo state and sensitivity to sanctions. Four types of stability definitions
were proposed, indexed a, b, c, and d, according to whether the DM would move
to a state of uncertain preference and whether the DM would be sanctioned by
a responding move to a state of uncertain preference, relative to the status quo.
This range of extensions is needed, according to [46], to address the diversity of
possible risk profiles in the face of uncertainty. A DM may be conservative or
aggressive, avoiding or accepting states of uncertain preference, depending on the
level of satisfaction with the current position.
In the definitions indexed a, DM i has an incentive to move to states with
uncertain preferences relative to the status quo, but, when assessing possible
sanctions, will not consider states with uncertain preferences [46]. Let i ∈ N and
|N | = n in the following definitions taken from [46].
Definition 2.18. State s is Nasha stable for DM i iff R
+,U
i (s) = ∅.
Definition 2.19. State s is GMRa for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2.
Definition 2.20. State s is SMRa for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s i s2 and s i s3 for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 2.21. State s is SEQa for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ R+,UN\{i}(s1) with s i s2.
For stabilities indexed b, DM i would move only to preferred states from a
status quo and would be sanctioned only by less preferred or equally preferred
states relative to the status quo. Note that the definitions are different from those
discussed in Section 2.2.3 for simple preference, since the current definitions are
utilized to analyze conflict models with preference uncertainty.
Definition 2.22. State s is Nashb for DM i iff R
+
i (s) = ∅.
Definition 2.23. State s is GMRb for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2.
Definition 2.24. State s is SMRb for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s i s2 and s i s3 for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 2.25. State s is SEQb for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ R+,UN\{i}(s1) with s i s2.
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For definitions indexed c, DM i would move to preferred states and states having
uncertain preference relative to the starting state. With respect to sanctions, DM
i does not want to end up at states that are less preferred or equally preferred
relative to state s, and states having uncertain preference relative to state s.
Definition 2.26. State s is Nashc for DM i iff R
+,U
i (s) = ∅.
Definition 2.27. State s is GMRc for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2 or sUis2.
Definition 2.28. State s is SMRc for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s i s2 or sUis2 and s i s3 or sUis3 for
any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 2.29. State s is SEQc for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ R+,UN\{i}(s1) with s i s2 or sUis2.
For the last set of stabilities, indexed by d, a DM is not willing to move to
a state with uncertain preference relative to the status quo, but is deterred by
sanctions to states that have uncertain preference relative to the status quo.
Definition 2.30. State s is Nashd for DM i iff R
+
i (s) = ∅.
Definition 2.31. State s is GMRd for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2 or sUis2.
Definition 2.32. State s is SMRd for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s i s2 or sUis2 and s i s3 or sUis3 for
any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 2.33. State s is SEQd for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists
at least one s2 ∈ R+,UN\{i}(s1) with s i s2 or sUis2.
When n = 2, the DM set N reduces to {i, j} in Definitions 2.18 to 2.33. For
example, the reachable list R+,UN\{i}(s1) of N\{i} from s1 by the legal sequences of
UIUUMs reduces to the reachable list R+,Uj (s1) of j from s1 by one step UIUUMs.
From the solution concepts indexed a, b, c, and d presented above, it can be
seen that a solution concept indexed a represents the stability for the most
aggressive DMs. Firstly, the DM is aggressive in deciding whether to move from
the status quo, being willing to accept the risk associated with moves to states of
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uncertain preference. In addition, when evaluating possible moves, the DM is
deterred only by sanctions to states that are less preferred than the status quo
and does not see states of uncertain preference (relative to the status quo) as
sanctions. For the definitions indexed b, uncertainty in preferences is not
considered by a DM. The definitions indexed c incorporate a mixed attitude
toward the risk associated with states of uncertain preference. Specifically, the
DM is aggressive in deciding whether to move from the status quo, but is
conservative when evaluating possible moves, being deterred by sanctions to
states that are less preferred or have uncertain preference relative to the status
quo. Finally, the definition indexed d represents stability for the most
conservative DMs, who would move only to preferred states from a status quo,
but would be deterred by responses that result in states of uncertain
preference [46].
2.2.5 Solution Concepts in the Graph Model with Strength
of Preference
Hamouda et al. [27] first integrated strength of preference information into the
graph model and extended the four basic solution concepts to handle strength of
preference for 2-DM graph models. Lately, they further extended the four solution
concepts to multiple-decision-maker graph models [28].
Four standard solution concepts are given below in which strength of preference
is not considered in sanctioning. However, the standard stabilities are different
from those defined in [16], though they are presented using the same notation,
because stability definitions for simple preference cannot analyze conflict models
having strength of preference. Let i ∈ N and s ∈ S for next definitions taken
from [28].
Definition 2.34. State s is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashi , iff
R+,++i (s) = ∅.
Definition 2.35. State s is GMR for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s).
Definition 2.36. State s is SMR for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
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Definition 2.37. State s is SEQ for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++N\{i}(s1) such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s).
With strength of preference introduced into the graph model, stability
definitions can be strong or weak, according to the level of sanctioning. Strong
and weak stabilities only include GMR, SMR, and SEQ because Nash stability
does not involve sanctions.
Definition 2.38. State s is strongly GMR (SGMR) for DM i, denoted by s ∈
SSGMRi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such
that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s).
Definition 2.39. State s is strongly SMR (SSMR) for DM i, denoted by s ∈
SSSMRi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such
that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 2.40. State s is strongly SEQ (SSEQ) for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSSEQi ,
iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++N\{i}(s1) such that
s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s).
Definitions 2.38 to 2.40 are adapted from [28] in which Nash stability is excluded
from SGMR, SSMR, and SSEQ. The definition of weak stability is presented next.
Definition 2.41. Let s ∈ S and i ∈ N . State s is weakly stable for DM i iff s is
stable, but not strongly stable for some stability definition.
Based on the individual stability analysis, DMs can request additional follow
up analyses to generate valuable decision guidance. The follow-up analyses include
status quo analysis, coalition analysis, and sensitivity analyses.
2.2.6 Status Quo Analysis
When a conflict is modeled as a graph model, a point in time must be selected
first; the current (or initial) state of the conflict is then referred to as the status
quo [47]. Two fundamental steps are involved in analyzing a graph model, stability
analysis and post-stability (or follow-up) analysis. When the stability of a state
is assessed at the stability stage, it is not a concern whether this state is actually
achievable from the status quo state. As a follow-up analysis, status quo analysis
is to determine whether a particular equilibrium is reachable from the status quo
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and, if so, how to reach it. Thus, in contrast to stability analysis, which identifies
states that would be stable if attained, status quo analysis provides a dynamic and
forward-looking perspective, identifying states that are attainable, and describing
how to reach them [47,48].
Let i ∈ N and H ⊆ N and let k ≥ 1 be an integer. New notation is required,
as follows:
• SQ denotes the status quo state;
• The state sets, S(k)i (s), S(k,+)i (s), and S(k,+U)i (s), denote the states reachable
from SQ = s in legal sequences of exactly k UMs, UIs, and UIUUMs,
respectively, with last mover DM i;
• The state sets, V (k)H (s), V (k,+)H (s), and V (k,+U)H (s), denote the sets of states
reachable from SQ = s in legal sequences of at most k UMs, UIs, and
UIUUMs by H, respectively; (if H = N , then V
(k)




V (k,+)(s), and V
(k,+U)
H (s) = V
(k,+U)(s).)
• The arc sets, A(k)i (s), A(k,+)i (s), and A(k,+U)i (s), denote the arcs controlled
by DM i that are final arcs in legal sequences of at most k UMs, UIs, and
UIUUMs, respectively, from SQ = s.





UI arc set and UIUUM arc set, respectively. For s ∈ S, let Ai(s), A+i (s), and
A+,Ui (s) denote the respective subsets of these three arc sets with initial state s.













The following algorithm permits all UMs for simple preference:
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Algorithm for status quo analysis in the graph model with legal UMs [47]
1. Let h = 0, S(0)i (SQ) = {SQ}, V (0)(SQ) = {SQ}, and A(0)i (SQ) = ∅ (for i ∈ N)
















i (SQ) if S
(h)








i (SQ) and s
′ ∈ Ri(s)} otherwise.



















Otherwise, go to 2.
Although [47] indicates that the process must stop in a finite number of
iterations, this condition is not explained in detail. If the algorithm stops at step






i (SQ)). Similarly, an algorithm that permits only UIs can be
found in [47].
The following algorithm permits only UIUUMs for preference with uncertainty.
Algorithm for status quo analysis in the graph model with legal UIUUMs [48]
1. Let h = 0, S(0,+U)i (SQ) = {SQ}, V (0,+U)(SQ) = {SQ}, and A(0,+U)i (SQ) = ∅ (for i ∈ N)
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(h,+U)









′ ∈ R+,Ui (s)} otherwise.

























i (SQ)) presents the status quo diagram
permitted UIUUMs in the graph model when the above algorithm stops at
iteration step k. Although the algorithms were developed for status quo analysis
for simple preference and preference with uncertainty but have never been
integrated into GMCR II.
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Using status quo diagrams, significant information about the conflict under
investigation can be obtained. Specifically, if an equilibrium is in the diagram,
the analysis provides a path from the status quo to the reachable equilibrium; if
not, the DMs have no way to control the conflict to the equilibrium. Status quo
analysis can provide guidance for DMs and analysts by identifying how to attain
reachable equilibria from a status quo state [47,48].
2.2.7 Coalition Stability Analysis
Coalition H is a subset of DMs with |H| ≥ 2. For an equilibrium, no DM has the
incentive to move away from it, but a coalition may sometimes be able to move
away from the equilibrium to a better state for all members of the coalition. Hence,
analysts can detect equilibria that are vulnerable to coalition moves in strategic
conflicts [43].
Coalitions and coalition stability have been widely studied in the area of
conflict analysis. For example, inspired by Aumann [3], Kilgour et al. [43]
proposed coalition stability based on Nash stability within the framework of the
GMCR. Then, Inohara and Hipel [36, 37] extended the above Nash coalition
stability to GMR, SMR, and SEQ coalition stabilities. However, to make coding
easier, these extensions were based on a transitive graph that allows the same
DM to move twice in succession, which is inconsistent with the standard
restriction in the graph model. For example, in the work of [36, 37, 43], the
reachable list of a coalition, RH(s), may include states reachable only by
consecutive moves of the same DM. Additionally, these coalition stabilities were
defined logically within a simple preference structure. The Simple preference
structure is often inadequate for modeling the complex strategic conflicts that
arise in practical applications. The following coalition stabilities based on Nash
stability are taken from [43].
Definition 2.42. For s1 ∈ RH(s), s1 is a coalition improvement by H from state
s iff, for every i ∈ H, satisfies s1 i s.
A coalition improvement s1 by H indicates a threat, or potential threat, to the
stability of state s.
Definition 2.43. State s is unstable for coalition H iff there exists a coalition
improvement by H from s.
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Even if state s is stable for each DM i ∈ N , the instability of s for coalition H
makes s impossible to become a resolution for a conflict.
Definition 2.44. State s ∈ S is stable for coalition H ⊆ N (| H |≥ 2) iff, for
every s1 ∈ RH(s), there exists i ∈ H with s i s1.
Definition 2.45. State s ∈ S is coalitionally stable iff s is stable for every coalition
H ⊆ N (| H |≥ 2).
Note that if the reachable list RH(s) of H from state s in the above definitions is
adapted to use the definition in Section 2.2.2, then a transitive graph is extended
to a general graph.
2.2.8 The Decision Support System GMCR II
Although the graph model for conflict resolution has many advantages, it is
difficult to apply to real problems without computational assistance, even to
small models. For this purpose, the basic decision support system (DSS) GMCR
I was developed in [42]. However, GMCR I only includes a basic analysis engine,
so that a model must be converted to the GMCR I data format first, which is a
difficult conversion process. The DSS GMCR II [32, 54], including modeling and
analysis procedures, later replaced GMCR I. GMCR II, is written in Visual
C++, a computer implementation of the graph model for conflict resolution, and
is described by [16,18,19].
The DSS GMCR II offers model management and stability analysis and includes
some basic coalition analysis and status quo analysis for simple preference. At
present, GMCR II allows for status quo analysis, but does not implement it fully.
A consistent and effective set of status quo analysis definitions and algorithms was
proposed by [47,48] but has not been included in GMCR II.
Sensitivity analyses in GMCR II are carried out by varying the model input
in the following categories: options, state transitions, preferences, DMs (including
addition and deletion), and solution concepts, including changing individual
stabilities into coalition stabilities. Although sensitivity analyses are a popular
technique in solving engineering problems, in GMCR II, few papers focus on
sensitivity analyses. If a conflict analytical result is very sensitive to variations of
some parameters, the result may not provide useful guidance in real applications,
so sensitivity analysis should be an important research topic in conflict analyses.
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2.3 Degree of Preference
Obviously, preferences play an important role in decision analysis. How to obtain
individual preference information has already been ascertained by extensive
research, such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach [57] and some
approaches used by modeling preference relations of consumers in
microeconomics [49]. Normally, for the graph model only a relative preference
relation, “ preferred”, and an equal relation, “∼ indifferent” are needed to
represent a particular DM i’s preference for one state with respect to another to
calibrate a specific model [16]. This type of preference is called a two-level
preference in this thesis. Different definitions for strength of preference can be
found in [4, 15]. Dyer and Sarin [15] indicate the relations between strength of
preference and risky behavior. In 2004, Hamouda et al. [27] proposed “strength
of preference” that includes two new binary relations, “ strongly preferred”,
and, “> mildly preferred”, to express DM i’s strong and mild preferences for one
state over another, respectively, as well as an equal relation. This is referred to as
a three-level preference.
However, the 3-level structure is limited in its ability to depict the intensity of
relative preference. For example, in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [58],
strength of preference is reflected a scale from 1 to 9. Table 2.4 presents an
interpretation for strength at levels 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 in the AHP approach and
motivates the extension of the three-level model to a multiple-level model that can
capture a range of degrees. In related, but quite different research, significant effort
has been devoted to representing preference information by degree or strength. For
example, Wang et al. [64] presented a probability method to represent preferences
with certain degrees or strength.
2.4 Summary
After reviewing the background of Graph Theory and the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution, we know that a graph model of a conflict consists of several interrelated
graphs and preference relations, and three types of preference structures have been
developed and introduced into the graph model for conflict resolution. To enhance
the applicability of GMCR, in Chapters 3 and 4, the three preference frameworks
are extended to a hybrid system in which preference uncertainty and strength
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Table 2.4: Scale of relative preference [58]
Intensity of Definition Description
relative preference
1 Equally important Two events are equally preferred.
3 Moderately important The first event is slightly
preferred to the second.
5 Quite important The first event is much more
preferred than the second.
7 Demonstrably important The first event is very strongly
preferred to the second.
9 Extremely important The first event is extremely
preferable to the second.
of preference are combined together and a system of multiple levels of preference.
Previously, individual and coalition stabilities in the graph model were traditionally
defined logically, in terms of the underlying graphs and preference relations. Status
quo analysis follows a similar logical structure. However, as was noted in the
development of the DSS GMCR II, the nature of logical representations makes
coding difficult. A new algebraic system based on Algebraic Graph Theory to




Hybrid Preference for the Graph
Model for Conflict Resolution
3.1 Combining Preference Uncertainty and
Strength of Preference
A hybrid preference framework is proposed for strategic conflict analysis to
integrate preference strength and preference uncertainty into the paradigm of the
graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) under multiple decision makers.
This structure offers decision makers a more flexible mechanism for preference
expression, which can include strong or mild relative relationship of one state
over another, an indifference relation, and uncertain preference between two
states.
To date, only three types of preference structures–simple preference,
preference possibly including uncertainty, and preference having strength–have
been integrated into GMCR. To integrate the three existing preference
frameworks into a hybrid system, a new preference framework {i, >i,∼i, Ui} is
defined using a quadruple relation in a graph model for DM i. The preference
structure {i, >i,∼i, Ui} is complete, i.e. if s, q ∈ S, then exactly one of the
following relations holds: s i q, q i s, s >i q, q >i s, s ∼i q, and sUiq. Note
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i (s), and R
−−
i (s), where these subsets and reachable lists
from state s are defined in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The relationships
among the subsets of state set S and the reachable lists from state s for DM i are
portrayed in Fig. 3.1.
The reachable list from state s for DM i in one step, Ri(s), represents DM i
′s
various unilateral moves (UMs) for hybrid preference, so Ri(s) = R
++
i (s)∪R+i (s)∪
R=i (s)∪RUi (s)∪R−i (s)∪R−−i (s). For ease of use, the notation with respect to UMs
and subsets of the state set S for hybrid preference is presented as follows:
• R+,++,Ui (s) = R+i (s) ∪ R++i (s) ∪ RUi (s) stands for mild unilateral
improvements, strong unilateral improvements, or unilateral uncertain
moves called weak improvements or unilateral uncertain moves (WIUUMs)
from state s for DM i;
• Φ−−,Ui (s) = Φ−−i (s) ∪ ΦUi (s); and
• Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s) = Φ−−i (s) ∪ Φ−i (s) ∪ Φ=i (s) ∪ ΦUi (s).
Note that the assumption of transitivity of preferences is not required, and thus
the results in this research hold for both transitive and intransitive preferences.
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3.2 Stability Analysis in the Graph Model for
Hybrid Preference
To analyze the stability of a state for DM i ∈ N for hybrid preference, it is
necessary to take into account possible responses by all other DMs j ∈ N\{i}.
Therefore, the previous definitions for legal sequences of decisions in the graph
model with preference uncertainty [46] and with preference of strength [28] must
first be extended to take combining preference uncertainty and preference strength
into account.
3.2.1 Reachable Lists of Coalition H
The legal sequences of UMs, UIs, and UIUUMs are defined in Subsection 2.2.2.
For hybrid preference, a legal sequence of WIUUMs for a coalition of DMs is a
sequence of states linked by weak improvements or unilateral uncertain moves by
members of the coalition, in which a DM may move more than once, but not twice
consecutively.
Let H ⊆ N be any subset of DMs. Within hybrid preference, the definition
of the reachable list RH(s) for coalition H by the legal UMs starting at state s is
similar to Definition 2.10 in Subsection 2.2.2. The definition of R+,++H (s) in hybrid
preference is similar to Definition 2.13. Let coalition H ⊆ N satisfy |H| ≥ 2 and
let the status quo state be s ∈ S. We now define reachable list R+,++,UH (s) for
coalition H with the explicit hybrid preference.
Definition 3.1. Let R+,++,Uj (s) = R
+
j (s) ∪ R++j (s) ∪ RUj (s) for any j ∈ H. A
weak improvement or unilateral uncertain move by H is a member of
R+,++,UH (s) ⊆ S, defined inductively by:
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ R+,++,Uj (s), then s1 ∈ R+,++,UH (s) and j ∈ Ω+,++,UH (s, s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ R+,++,UH (s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ R+,++,Uj (s1), then, provided
Ω+,++,UH (s, s1) 	= {j}, s2 ∈ R+,++,UH (s) and j ∈ Ω+,++,UH (s, s2).
Note that this definition is inductive: first, using (1), the states reachable by
a single DM of coalition H in one step WIUUM from s are identified and added
to R+,++,UH (s); then, using (2), all states reachable from those states are identified
and added to R+,++,UH (s); then the process is repeated until no further states are
added to R+,++,UH (s) by repeating (2). Because R
+,++,U
H (s) ⊆ S, and S is finite,
this limit must be reached in a finite number of steps.
35
To interpret Definition 3.1, note that if s1 ∈ R+,++,UH (s), then Ω+,++,UH (s, s1) ⊆
N is the set of all last DMs in legal sequence of WIUUMs from s to s1. (If s1 	∈
R+,++,UH (s), it is assumed that Ω
+,++,U
H (s, s1) = ∅.) Suppose that Ω+,++,UH (s, s1)
contains only one DM, say j ∈ N . Then any move from s1 to a subsequent state,
say s2, must be made by a member of H other than j; otherwise DM j would
have to move twice in succession. On the other hand, if |Ω+,++,UH (s, s1)| ≥ 2,
any member of H who has a mild unilateral improvement or strong unilateral
improvement (weak improvement) or unilateral uncertain move from s1 to s2 may
exercise it.
For the simple preference structure, a state s is either stable or unstable [16].
For the framework with strength of preference, if a state s is stable, then it is
either strongly stable or weakly stable based on sanctioning strength [27, 28]. Li
et al. [46] proposed solution concepts with preference uncertainty that are
separately classified into four extensions, indexed a, b, c, and d, according to the
incentives to leave the status quo state and the motivation to avoid states of
uncertain preference relative to the status quo. Since possible uncertainty is
included in DMs’ preferences, a range of extensions of stability definitions is
needed to address DMs’ attitudes with distinct risk profiles in face of uncertainty.
For example, a DM will make a conservative or aggressive decision depended on
the DM’s current status “satisfied” or “unsatisfied” [46].
According to the proposed new preference structure, the hybrid versions of
solution concepts refer to stabilities, strong stabilities, and weak stabilities indexed
a, b, c, and d, respectively. In the following stabilities, strength of preference is not
considered in sanctioning.
3.2.2 Stabilities in the Graph Model for Hybrid Preference
The stability definitions in the graph model for two DM conflicts with hybrid
preference are special cases of the definitions proposed in the next subsection, the
details are not given here.
3.2.2.1 Stabilities, Indexed a, for Hybrid Preference
For stabilities indexed a, DM i is willing to move to states that are mildly preferred
or strongly preferred, as well as states having uncertain preference relative to the
status quo but does not wish to be sanctioned by a strongly less preferred, mildly
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less preferred, or equally preferred state relative to the status quo. The definitions
given below assume that s ∈ S and i ∈ N .
Definition 3.2. State s is Nasha for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashai , iff
R+,++,Ui (s) = ∅.
Definition 3.3. State s is GMRa for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRai , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s).
Definition 3.4. State s is SMRa for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRai , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.5. State s is SEQa for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQai , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s).
It should be pointed out that the same notation for stabilities indexed a for
preference with uncertainty presented in Subsection 2.2.4 is used for hybrid
preference. However, they have different meaning, since current definitions can
analyze conflict models including hybrid preference. The following definitions are
still presented using the same notation as those including preference uncertainty.
3.2.2.2 Stabilities, Indexed b, for Hybrid Preference
For stabilities indexed b, DM i will move only to mildly or strongly preferred states
from a status quo, but does not want to be sanctioned by a strongly less preferred,
mildly less preferred, or equally preferred state relative to the status quo.
Definition 3.6. State s is Nashb for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashbi , iff R+,++i (s) =
∅.
Definition 3.7. State s is GMRb for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRbi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s).
Definition 3.8. State s is SMRb for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRbi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.9. State s is SEQb for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQbi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s).
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The above definitions indexed b which exclude uncertainty in preference are
different from those discussed by Hamouda et al. [28], since current definitions
are utilized to analyze conflict models under combining preference uncertainty and
strength of preference.
3.2.2.3 Stabilities, Indexed c, for Hybrid Preference
For definitions indexed c, DM i can move to mildly preferred, strongly preferred
states, as well as states having uncertain preference relative to the starting state.
With respect to sanctioning, DM i does not want to be ended up at states that are
mildly less preferred, strongly less preferred, or equally preferred, as well as states
having uncertain preference relative to state s.
Definition 3.10. State s is Nashc for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashci , iff
R+,++,Ui (s) = ∅.
Definition 3.11. State s is GMRc for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRci , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s).
Definition 3.12. State s is SMRc for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRci , iff for
every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈
Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.13. State s is SEQc for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQci , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s).
3.2.2.4 Stabilities, Indexed d, for Hybrid Preference
For the last set of stabilities, indexed d, a DM is not willing to move to a state
with uncertain preference relative to the status quo, but is deterred by sanctions
to states that have uncertain preference relative to the status quo.
Definition 3.14. State s is Nashd for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashdi , iff R+,++i (s) =
∅.
Definition 3.15. State s is GMRd for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRdi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s).
Definition 3.16. State s is SMRd for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRdi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
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Definition 3.17. State s is SEQd for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQdi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−−,−,=,Ui (s).
When n = 2, the DM set N becomes to {i, j} in Definitions 3.2 to 3.17, and
the reachable lists for H = N \ {i} by legal sequences of UMs and WIUUMs from
s1, RN\{i}(s1) and R
+,++,U
N\{i} (s1), degenerate to Rj(s1) and R
+,++,U
j (s1), DM j’s
corresponding reachable lists from s1.
If the binary relation  denotes > or  in this research, i.e., s  q iff either
s > q or s  q, then Definitions 3.2 to 3.17 are identical with Definitions 2.18 to
2.33 in Chapter 2 proposed by Li et al. [46]. On the other hand, when each DM
does not consider including uncertain preference in stability analysis, the above
definitions reduce to the standard stability definitions from Definitions 2.34 to
2.37 in Chapter 2 developed by Hamouda et al. [28].
3.2.3 Strong Stabilities under Hybrid Preference for
Multiple Decision Makers
With the hybrid preference framework introduced into the graph model, stable
states can be classified into strongly stable or weakly stable according to strength
of the possible sanctions and indexed a, b, c, or d by a DM’s attitudes toward
the risk associated with uncertain preferences. Strong and weak stabilities include
only GMR, SMR, and SEQ because Nash stability does not involve sanctions.
3.2.3.1 Strong Stabilities, Index a, for Hybrid Preference with
Strength of Preference
Definition 3.18. State s is strongly GMRa (SGMRa) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSGMRai , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s).
Definition 3.19. State s is strongly SMRa (SSMRa) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSMRai , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1),
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.20. State s is strongly SEQa (SSEQa) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSEQai , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s).
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The above definitions indexed a represent strong stabilities for the most
aggressive DMs. Firstly, DM i is aggressive in deciding whether to move from the
status quo, since the DM considers moving to mildly or strongly preferred states,
as well as states having uncertain preference relative to the status quo. This
means that DM i is willing to accept the risk associated with moves from the
status quo to states of uncertain preferences. In addition, when evaluating
possible moves, DM i is strongly deterred by sanctions to states that are strongly
less preferred relative to status quo state s.
3.2.3.2 Strong Stabilities, Index b, for Hybrid Preference with Strength
of Preference
For the following definitions indexed b, DM i would move only to mildly or
strongly preferred states and be deterred by sanctions to strongly less preferred
states relative to the status quo.
Definition 3.21. State s is strongly GMRb (SGMRb) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSGMRbi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s).
Definition 3.22. State s is strongly SMRb (SSMRb) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSMRbi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1),
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.23. State s is strongly SEQb (SSEQb) for DM i, denoted by s ∈
SSSEQbi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1) such
that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s).
3.2.3.3 Strong Stabilities, Index c, for Hybrid Preference with Strength
of Preference
The definitions indexed c refer to a DM’s mixed attitudes toward the risk associated
with uncertain preferences. Specifically, DM i is aggressive in deciding whether
to move from the status quo, but is conservative when evaluating possible moves,
because DM i is deterred by sanctions to states that are strongly less preferred
and states that have uncertain preference relative to the status quo.
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Definition 3.24. State s is strongly GMRc (SGMRc) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSGMRci , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s).
Definition 3.25. State s is strongly SMRc (SSMRc) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSMRci , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1),
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.26. State s is strongly SEQc (SSEQc) for DM i, denoted by s ∈
SSSEQci , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s).
3.2.3.4 Strong Stabilities, Index d, for Hybrid Preferences with
Strength of Preference
Definition 3.27. State s is strongly GMRd (SGMRd) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSGMRdi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s).
Definition 3.28. State s is strongly SMRd (SSMRd) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSMRdi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1),
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 3.29. State s is strongly SEQd (SSEQd) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSEQdi , iff for every s1 ∈ R+,++i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+,++,UN\{i} (s1)
such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s).
The above definitions indexed d indicate that DM i would move only to mildly
or strongly preferred states, but is deterred by sanctions that could move i to
strongly less preferred states and states that have uncertain preference relative to
the status quo. Therefore, definitions indexed d represent strong stabilities for the
most conservative DMs.
When n = 2 and the DM set N reduces to two DMs {i, j}, the reachable
lists of coalition N \ {i} by the legal sequences of UMs and WIUUMs from state
s1, RN\{i}(s1) and R
+,++,U
N\{i} (s1), reduce to the reachable lists from s1 by DM j,
Rj(s1) and R
+,++,U
j (s1). Thus, Definitions 3.2 to 3.29 reduce to the definitions
presented in [68] for two DM conflicts. Therefore, if one considers neither strength
nor uncertainty in preferences, the above definitions will reduce to Definitions 2.14
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to 2.17 proposed by Fang et al. [16] for simple preference. When DMs’ preferences
do not include uncertainty, Definitions 3.18 to 3.29 reduce to the strong stability
definitions 2.38 to 2.40 defined by Hamouda et al. [28]; when DM i’s preferences do
not include strength, they reduce to Definitions 2.18 to 2.33 for the graph model
with preference uncertainty developed by Li et al. [46].
3.2.4 Weak Stabilities, Index l, for Hybrid Preference with
Strength of Preference
Let l denote one of the four extensions indexed a, b, c, and d, i.e., l = a, b, c, or d.
In the following theorems, the symbol GS denotes a solution concept, GMR, SMR,
or SEQ. Then GSl refers to the GS solution concept indexed l, SGS refers to the
strong solution concept of GS, and WGS refers to the weak solution concept of
GS (defined below). The symbol s ∈ SGSli denotes that s ∈ S is stable for DM
i according to stability GS indexed l. Similarly, s ∈ SSGSli denotes that s ∈ S is
strongly stable for DM i according to strong stability SGS indexed l. A state is
weakly stable iff it is stable, but not strongly stable. The formal weak stability
concept is defined next.
Definition 3.30. Let s ∈ S and i ∈ N . State s is weakly stable WGSl for DM
i according to stability WGS indexed l, denoted by s ∈ SWGSli , iff s ∈ SGSli and
s /∈ SSGSli .
3.2.5 Interrelationships among Stabilities for Hybrid
Preference
In 1993, Fang et al. [16] determined relationships among Nash, GMR, SMR, and
SEQ for the simple preference structure. Following this research direction, Li et
al. [46] and Hamouda et al. [28] established interrelationships among stability
definitions with preference uncertainty and with strength of preference,
respectively.
The following interrelationships among proposed stabilities for hybrid
preference are similar to those clarified by Fang et al. [16]. Let l = a, b, c, or d.
Then, the inclusion relationships among the four stabilities indexed l for hybrid







Figure 3.2: Interrelationships among stabilities indexed l for hybrid
preference.
Under the hybrid preference, the interrelationships of stabilities, strong
stabilities, and weak stabilities are as follows:
Theorem 3.1. Let l = a, b, c, or d and i ∈ N . The interrelationships among
stability GS, strong stability SGS, and weak stability WGS indexed l for DM i are
SWGSli = S
GSl
i − SSGSli .
This result is obvious from Definition 3.30.
Based on definitions 3.2 to 3.29, the interrelationships among the four stabilities
of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ and the three strong stabilities of SGMR, SSMR,
and SSEQ, indexed l for hybrid preference are given next.
Theorem 3.2. Let l = a, b, c, or d and i ∈ N . The interrelationships among the
four stabilities and the three strong stabilities indexed l are
SNashli ⊆ SSSMRli ⊆ SSMRli ⊆ SGMRli ,
SNashli ⊆ SSSEQli ⊆ SSEQli ⊆ SGMRli ,
and
SNashli ⊆ SSGMRli ⊆ SGMRli .
The proof of Theorem 3.2 easily follows from the above definitions. Note that
there is no necessary inclusion relationship between SSSMRli and S
SSEQl
i , i.e., it
may or may not be true that SSSMRli ⊇ SSSEQli , or that SSSMRli ⊆ SSSEQli .
Theorem 3.3. The interrelationships among Nash stabilities indexed a, b, c, and










SNashai ⊆ SNashbi .
This result is obvious from the above Nash stability definitions.
Theorem 3.4. Let i ∈ N . The interrelationships among stabilities GS and SGS
indexed a, b, c, and d are
SGSai ⊆ SGSbi ⊆ SGSdi , SGSai ⊆ SGSci ⊆ SGSdi ,
and
SSGSai ⊆ SSGSbi ⊆ SSGSdi , SSGSai ⊆ SSGSci ⊆ SSGSdi .





Figure 3.3: Interrelationships for stability GS and strong stability SGS
for all indexes.
The inclusion relations about GS are similar with those regarding SGS, so we
only provide the proofs about SGS. We first prove inclusion relations SSSMRai ⊆
SSSMRci ⊆ SSSMRdi .
Proof: If state s ∈ SSSMRai , this implies that if R+,++,Ui (s) 	= ∅ and s1 ∈
R+,++,Ui (s), then there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−i (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2). Since Φ−−i (s) ⊆ Φ−−,Ui (s), then s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2). Therefore, if state s ∈ SSSMRai , then state
s ∈ SSSMRci .
If state s ∈ SSSMRci , this implies that if s1 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s), then there exists
at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) for all
s3 ∈ Ri(s2). Since R+,++i (s) ⊆ R+,++,Ui (s), then s ∈ SSSMRci implies that if s1 ∈
R+,++i (s), then there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1), such that s2 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s)
and s3 ∈ Φ−−,Ui (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2). Therefore, SSSMRci ⊆ SSSMRdi .
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The inclusion relations SSSMRai ⊆ SSSMRci ⊆ SSSMRdi is proved. Other inclusion
relations about SGMR and SSEQ can be proved, similarly. So
SSGSai ⊆ SSGSci ⊆ SSGSdi .
The proof of the inclusion relations
SSGSai ⊆ SSGSbi ⊆ SSGSdi
can be similarly proved. 
3.3 Computational Stability Analysis and Status
Quo Analysis
In n-DM models, RH(s), the reachable list of coalition H by the legal UMs
starting at s, and R+,++,UH (s), the reachable list of coalition H by the legal
WIUUMs starting at s, are key inputs to stability analysis in the hybrid
preference framework. Although Li et al. [46] and Hamouda et al. [28] proposed
definitions for related sets R+,UH and R
+,++
H , no algorithms for them have been
developed.
As a follow-up analysis, status quo analysis traces conflict evolution from a
status quo state to any specific outcome. It usually focuses on whether possible
equilibria are reachable from the status quo, and if so, how to reach them. Thus,
status quo analysis provides useful forward-looking insights into a strategic conflict,
helping DMs and analysts to identify how to attain a reachable equilibria from a
status quo state. GMCR II [18, 19] allows for status quo analysis, but does not
implement it. Subsequently, [47, 48] developed status quo analysis definitions and
the corresponding pseudo codes, but did not induce strength of preference. In this
section, the algorithms for the essential inputs of stability analysis and status quo
analysis are developed for hybrid preference.
Let i ∈ N and H ⊆ N and let k ≥ 1 be an integer. With the notation defined
in Section 2.2.6, some new notation for hybrid preference is as follows:
• S(k,+,++,U)i (s) stands for states reachable from SQ = s in exactly k legal
WIUUMs by the DMs in H with last mover DM i;
• V (k,+,++,U)H (s) denotes states reachable from SQ = s in at most k legal
WIUUMs by H;
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• A(k,+,++,U)i (s) indicates arcs with last mover DM i in sequences of at most
k (k > 1) legal WIUUMs by the DMs in H from SQ = s. Let A+,++,Ui (s)
denote the sets of arcs associated with DM i in one step WIUUM from state




In the status quo analysis, if a DM moves twice in succession, the DM is deemed
to make illegal moves. The following Theorem 3.5 asserts that if there does not
exist any new appropriate arc in the graph model, then corresponding joint moves
will stop.
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H (s) = V
(k,+,++,U)
H (s) and R
+,++,U
H (s) = V
(k,+,++,U)
H (s).
Proof: The proofs of three statements (1), (2), and (3) are similar. We prove
(3) that explicitly shows the hybrid preference structure.

















j (s)) ∪ V (k,+,++,U)H (s), then, there






j (s) such that q ∈ R+,++,Ui (s1). Clearly, this implies that arc
































is clear that if V
(k+1,+,++,U)












i (s), then the legal WIUUMs will stop after k legal WIUUMs
from state s. i.e., R+,++,UH (s) = V
(k,+,++,U)
H (s). (1) and (2) can be similarly
verified. 





A+,++i |, and |
⋃
i∈H
A+,++,Ui | respectively denote the
cardinalities of UM arcs, WI arcs, and WIUUM arcs in a directed graph associated
with the DMs in H. Then, the following lemma can be easily derived using Theorem
3.5.
Lemma 3.1. Let δ1, δ2, and δ3 respectively stand for the number of iteration steps
required to construct RH(s), R
+,++
H (s), and R
+,++,U
H (s) for any s ∈ S. Then












Let l1 = |
⋃
i∈H
Ai|, l2 = |
⋃
i∈H
A+,++i |, and let l3 = |
⋃
i∈H
A+,++,Ui |. By Theorem 3.5
and Lemma 3.1, the following theorem can be proved.
Theorem 3.6. Let s ∈ S, H ⊆ N, and H 	= ∅. Then the reachable lists of H by
the legal sequences of UMs, WIs, and WIUUMs from state s, RH(s), R
+,++
H (s),
and R+,++,UH (s), can be respectively expressed by
(1) RH(s) = V
(l1)
H (s);
(2) R+,++H (s) = V
(l2,+,++)
H (s);
(3) R+,++,UH (s) = V
(l3,+,++,U)
H (s).
Proof: The proofs of equations (1), (2), and (3) can be carried out similarly.
Here, we prove (3) including explicit hybrid preferences. Based on Theorem 3.5,
R+,++,UH (s) = V
(δ3,+,++,U)
H (s). It is obvious that no new arc is produced by legal





H (s). Therefore, (3) is proved.
(1) and (2) can be similarly proved. 
The following algorithm presented in Table 3.1 implements constructions of
the state set and arc set, V
(k)
H (s) and A
(k)
i (s), which include all states reachable
by coalition H in at most k legal UMs starting at state s and all arcs with last
mover DM i in sequences of at most k legal UMs from SQ = s for k = 1, 2, · ·
·, δ1. Obviously, Table 3.1 also provides the construction of the reachable list of
H from state s, RH(s), using Theorem 3.6. The arcs, A
(k)
i (s) for k = 1, 2, · ·
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·, δ1, sufficiently track the evolution of a conflict permitting all UMs from state
s. Similarly, the computational implementation of the state set V
(k,+,++,U)
H (s) and
the arc set A
(k,+,++,U)
i (s) can be accomplished by using the following algorithms
described in Table 3.2. Therefore, the algorithms designed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2
operationalize the key inputs of stability analysis, RH(s) and R
+,++,U
H (s), and the
evolution paths of status quo analysis for hybrid preference.
If UMs have no strength of preference to be considered, then the state set
R+,++,UH (s) reduces to R
+,U
H (s) defined by Li et al. [46]. If no uncertain preference
is associated with UMs, R+,++,UH (s) reduces to R
+,++
H (s), introduced by Hamouda
et al. [28]. Obviously, the developed results for hybrid preference expand the
existing stability analysis [16,28,46] and status quo analysis [47,48].
3.4 Application: Gisborne Conflict with Hybrid
Preference
Lake Gisborne is located near the south coast of the Canadian Atlantic province
of Newfoundland and Labrador. In June 1995, a local division of the McCurdy
Group of Companies, Canada Wet Incorporated, proposed a project to export
bulk water from Lake Gisborne to foreign markets. On December 5, 1996, this
project was registered with the government of Newfoundland and Labrador. At
the time of registration, no policy existed on bulk water exports. However, this
proposal immediately aroused considerable opposition from a wide variety of lobby
groups. In addition to unpredictable harmful impacts on local environment and
First Nations culture, a critical issue is its potential implication of making water a
tradeable “commodity” that is thus subject to WTO (World Trade Organization)
and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). Therefore, if the Lake
Gisborne bulk water export project was successfully executed, the water policy in
Canada might have to undergo a significant shift as any firm would be able to follow
the suit. As such, the Federal Government of Canada sided with the opposing
groups by introducing a policy to forbid bulk water export from major drainage
basins in Canada. The mounting pressure eventually forced the government of
Newfoundland and Labrador to introduce a new bill to ban bulk water export
from Newfoundland and Labrador, which effectively terminated the Gisborne water
export project. (See details in [17,46]).
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Table 3.1: The pseudocode for constructing RH(s)
Initialize //initialize the necessary parameters
H : any subset of DMs;
h: the number of H;
m: the number of states;
s : the status quo state;
δ1: the max step we want to calculate;




i (s) = Ri(s), i = 1, · · · , h
V
(k)
i (s) = S
(k)






(s, q), (s, q) for i = 1, · · · , h
loop 1
k = k + 1

























i (s) = A
(k−1)
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j (s), and s2 ∈ Ri(s1)}

























Table 3.2: The pseudocode for constructing R+,++,UH
Initialize //initialize the necessary parameters
H : any set of DMs;
h: the number of H;
m: the number of states;
s : status quo state;
δ3: the max step we want to calculate;




i (s) = R
+,++,U
i (s), i = 1, · · · , h
V
(k,+,++,U)
i (s) = S
(k,+,++,U)






(s, q) for i = 1, · · · , h
loop 1
k = k + 1



































j (s), and s2 ∈ R+,++,Ui (s1)}

























Nevertheless, several support groups remain interested in the project, and the
provincial government might restart the project at an appropriate time in the
future due to its urgent need for cash. This prospect introduces uncertainty into
the preferences of the provincial government for the Gisborne conflict model. This
conflict is modeled using three DMs: DM 1, Federal (Fe); DM 2, Provincial
(Pr); and DM 3, Support (Su); and a total of three options, as shown in Table
3.3. The following is a summary of the three DMs and their options [46]:
• Federal government of Canada (Federal): its option is to continue a
Canada-wide accord on the prohibition of bulk water export or not,
• Provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador (Provincial): its
option is to lift the ban on bulk water export or not, and
• Support groups (Support): its option is to appeal for continuing the
Gisborne project or not.
Table 3.3: Options and feasible states for the Gisborne conflict [46]
Federal
1. Continue N Y N Y N Y N Y
Provincial
2. Lift N N Y Y N N Y Y
Support
3. Appeal N N N N Y Y Y Y
State number s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
In the Lake Gisborne conflict model, the three options together determine 8
possible states as listed in Table 3.3, where a “Y” indicates that an option is
selected by the DM controlling it and an “N” means that the option is not chosen.
The graph model of this conflict is depicted based on the 8 feasible states by Fig.
3.4, in which a label on an arc indicates which DM controls the moves between the
two states connected by the arc.
In this section, the extended stability definitions with hybrid preference are
applied to an extended Lake Gisborne conflict. Li et al. [46] introduced
uncertainty into the preferences of the Provincial Government for the Gisborne




















Figure 3.4: Graph model for the Gisborne conflict [46].
uncertainty and strength in the Gisborne dispute. The preference information for
this conflict over the feasible states is given in Table 3.4. We assume that state s7
is strongly less preferred to all other states by the Federal Government, the
Support Groups consider state s2 to be strongly less preferred relative to all other
states, and the Provincial Government strongly prefers state s2 to state s6. Note
that DM Provincial only knows that it mildly prefers state s3 to s7, state s4 to
s8, state s1 to s5, and strongly prefers state s2 to s6. This DM is uncertain for
preference relations between other any two states. It is obvious that DM
Provincial’s preference information includes uncertainty and strength.
Additionally, this representation of preference information presented in Table 3.4
implies that the preferred relations, > and , are transitive. For instance, since
s5 > s3 and s3  s7, then s5  s7. However, in general, the preference structure
presented in this research does not require the transitivity of preference relations
and, hence, the developed results can be used to handle intransitive preferences.
The stable states and equilibria under the hybrid preference structure are
summarized in Table 3.5, in which a check mark (
√
) opposited a given state and
an index means that this state is stable for the indicated DM, solution concept
and associated index (a, b, c, or d), “Eq” is an equilibrium for a corresponding
solution concept, and 1, 2, and 3 denote three DMs, Federal, Provincial, and
Support, respectively. In fact, if analysts are not willing to take the risk to
switch the current strategy to another strategy having uncertain preference
relative to the initial strategy, and are conservative when considering sanctions,
52
Table 3.4: Certain preferences information for the Gisborne model
(extended from [46])
DMs Certain preferences
Federal s2 > s6 > s4 > s8 > s1 > s5 > s3  s7
Provincial s3 > s7, s4 > s8, s1 > s5, s2  s6, only
Support s3 > s4 > s7 > s8 > s5 > s6 > s1  s2
then they would consider selecting equilibria with index d as resolutions for
decision making. On the other hand, if developers are very aggressive, they
would like to find the stable states under index a. Table 3.6 compares stability
results for preference with uncertainty only and hybrid preference of uncertainty
and strength. State s is a strong equilibrium for some stability if s is strongly
stable for all DMs under the stability. By Table 3.6, we select states s4 and s6 as





























Figure 3.5: The Gisborne conflict evolution from states s1 to s4.
The aim of stability analysis in this research is to find strong equilibria of
a graph model associated with some index according to DM’s attitudes toward
the risk associated with uncertain preferences. Status quo analysis examines the
dynamics of a conflict model and assesses whether predicted equilibria are reachable
from the status quo. Therefore, by taking a status quo analysis into account,
additional insights are revealed about the attainability of any potential resolution.
Fig. 3.5 shows the evolution of the Gisborne conflict by legal WIUUMs from statu
quo state state s1 to the desirable equilibrium s4.
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Table 3.5: Stability results of the Gisborne conflict with hybrid preference
State Nash GMR SMR SEQ SGMR SSMR SSEQ WGMR WSMR WSEQ
1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq 1 2 3 Eq
a
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s1 c √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8 c √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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Table 3.6: The comparison of stability results for two types of preference
structures
Preference structure States Analysis method Analysis result
s4 and s6 see Chapter 2 Equilibria under extensions b and
Preference with d for Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ
uncertainty s8 see Chapter 2 Equilibrium under extensions b
and d for GMR, SMR and SEQ
s4 and s6 see Chapter 3 Strong equilibria under extensions b
Hybrid and d for Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ
preference s8 see Chapter 3 Weakly stable under extensions
b and d for SMR and SEQ
3.5 Summary
A hybrid preference framework is developed in this chapter for strategic conflict
analysis to integrate preference strength and preference uncertainty into GMCR for
multiple decision makers [68,70]. The hybrid system is more general than existing
models, which consider preference strength and preference uncertainty separately.
Within the hybrid preference structure, the hybrid versions of four basic stabilities
are defined and algorithms are developed to calculate efficiently the essential inputs
of the stabilities and status quo analysis. The new stability concepts under the
hybrid preference structure can be used to model complex strategic conflicts arising
in practical applications, and can provide new insights for the conflicts.
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Chapter 4
Multiple levels of Preference in
the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution
A multiple-level preference ranking structure is developed within the paradigm of
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to study multi-objective decision
making in conflict situations more realistically. In this structure, a decision
maker may have multiple levels of preference for one state or scenario over
another; for example, if state A is preferred to state B, it may be mildly preferred
at level 1, more strongly preferred at level 2, · · ·, or maximally preferred at level
r, where r > 0 is a fixed parameter. The number of levels, r, is unrestricted in
this system, thereby extending earlier two-level (r = 1) and three-level (r = 2)
structures. Multilevel versions of four stability definitions, Nash stability, general
metarationality, symmetric metarationality, and sequential stability, are defined
for the graph model with this extended preference structure and the relationships
among them are investigated. A specific case study, including multiple decision
makers and multiple levels of preference, is carried out to illustrate how the new
solution concepts can be applied in practice.
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4.1 Multiple Levels of Preference
The simple preference structure {,∼} [16] and the structure with strength of
preference {, >,∼} [27, 28] are referred to as two levels of preference and three
levels of preference, respectively. As a result of the development of a significant
amount of research expressing preference information by degree of strength [58,64],
the existing preference structures in the graph model would be unable to depict
the intensity of relative preference. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to extend the
existing two levels of preference and three levels of preference in the graph model
to an unlimited number of levels of preference, which in this thesis are referred to
as degrees of preference.
Table 4.1: Degree of relative preference
Degree of strength Description Notation
d = 0 Equally preferred ∼
d = 1 Moderately preferred >
d = 2 Strongly preferred 
d = 3 Very strongly preferred ≫
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
d = r Preferred at level r
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
> · · · >
A set of new and more general binary relations
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
> · · · > for d = 1, 2, · · ·, r, as
listed in Table 4.1, are proposed in this research to represent DM i’s preference
at each level d. With the introduction of these new binary relations, the three
levels of preference in the graph model are extended from a triplet relations, to
an r + 1-level relations for DM i over the set of states, which is expressed as
{∼i, >i,i, · · ·,
ri} on S, where
ri denotes
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
> · · · >i, i.e., DM i has preference by
degree r for comparing states with respect to preference. For instance, s ≫i q
means that DM i very strongly prefers state s to state q. It is assumed that the
preference relations of each DM i ∈ N have the following properties:
(i)
di for d = 1, 2, · · ·, r, is asymmetric;
(ii) ∼i is reflexive and symmetric; and
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(iii) {∼i, >i,i, · · ·,
ri} is strongly complete, i.e. if s, q ∈ S, then exactly one
of the following relations holds: s
di q, q
di s, for d = 1, 2, · · ·, r, or s ∼i q.
Preference information can be either transitive or intransitive. If k
di s and s
di q
imply k
di q, then the preference
di is transitive. Otherwise, preferences are
called intransitive. Note that the assumption of transitivity of preferences is not
required in the following definitions so that the results in this research hold for
both transitive and intransitive preferences. When all preferences for a given DM
i are transitive, the preferences are said to be ordinal and, hence, the states in
a conflict can be ordered or ranked from most to least preferred, where ties are
allowed. Sometimes this ranking of states according to preference is referred to as
a “preference ranking”.
For the new preference structure, DM i can identify 2r+1 subsets of S: Φ
+(r)
i (s),
· · ·, Φ+(1)i (s), Φ=i (s), Φ−(1)i (s), · · ·, and Φ−(r)i (s). Here, Φ+(d)i (s) and Φ−(d)i (s) for
d = 0, 1, · · ·, r, are defined and described in Table 4.2. The set Ri(s) denotes the
unilateral moves (UMs) of DM i from s ∈ S, and is also called i’s reachable list from
s. It contains all states to which DM i can move, unilaterally and in one step, from
state s. Similarly, the set R+i (s) = {q ∈ S : q ∈ Ri(s) and q
di s for d = 1, 2, ···, r}
contains DM i’s unilateral improvements (UIs) from state s at various levels of
preference. All reachable lists from state s at each level of preference for DM
i are expressed by R
+(r)
















i (s) for d = 0, 1, · · ·, r, are described in Table 4.3. Additionally, the
relations among the subsets of S, Φ
+(d)
i (s) and Φ
−(d)
i (s) for d = 0, 1, · · ·, r, and
the corresponding reachable lists from state s for DM i, R
+(d)
i (s) and R
−(d)
i (s) for
d = 0, 1, · · ·, r, are depicted in Fig. 4.1.
4.2 Multiple Levels of Preference in the Graph
Model for Conflict Resolution
Incorporating this extended multiple levels of preference into the graph model for
conflict resolution results in multilevel versions of the four basic solution concepts,
Nashk, GMRk, SMRk, and SEQk for k = 0, 1, · · ·, r. The stability definitions in
a 2-DM conflict model are presented next.
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Table 4.2: Subsets of S for DM i with respect to multiple levels of
preference
Degree of strength Subsets of S Description
Φ
+(r)
i (s) = {q : q
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
> · · · >i s} States preferred to state
d = r s at level r by DM i
Φ
−(r)
i (s) = {q : s
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
> · · · >i q} States less preferred to state s
at level r by DM i
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
Φ
+(3)
i (s) = {q : q ≫i s} States very strongly preferred
d = 3 to state s by DM i
Φ
−(3)
i (s) = {q : s ≫i q} States very strongly less
preferred to state s by DM i
Φ
+(2)
i (s) = {q : q i s} States strongly preferred
d = 2 to state s by DM i
Φ
−(2)
i (s) = {q : s i q} States strongly less preferred
to state s by DM i
Φ
+(1)
i (s) = {q : q >i s} States moderately preferred
d = 1 to state s by DM i
Φ
−(1)
i (s) = {q : s >i q} States moderately less preferred
to state s by DM i
d = 0 Φ
(0)
i (s) = Φ
=
i (s) = {q : q ∼i s} States equally preferred
to state s by DM i
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Table 4.3: Reachable lists by DM i at some level of preference
Type of movement Description
R
+(d)
i (s) = Ri(s) ∩ Φ+(d)i (s) All unilateral improvements of degree
d from state s for DM i
Ri(s)
−(d)(s) = Ri(s) ∩ Φ−(d)i (s) All unilateral disimprovements of degree
d from state s for DM i
R
(0)
i (s) = R
=
i (s) = Ri(s) ∩ Φ=i (s) All equally preferred states reachable
from state s by DM i
4.2.1 Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference in Two
DM Conflicts
First, in the solution concepts given below, strength of preference is not considered
in sanctioning, so the following solution concepts are called general stabilities. This
idea is analogous to the concept of standard stability proposed by Hamouda et
al. [27]. For all of the definitions given in this section, assume that N = {i, j} and
s ∈ S.
4.2.1.1 General Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference
Definition 4.1. State s is general Nash stable (SNash) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SGNashi , iff R+i (s) = ∅.
Definition 4.2. State s is general GMR (GGMR) for DM i, denoted by s ∈






Definition 4.3. State s is general SMR (GSMR) for DM i, denoted by s ∈










i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 4.4. State s is general SEQ (GSEQ) for DM i, denoted by s ∈


































































Figure 4.1: Relations among subsets of S and reachable lists from s.
Note that, in this research, the meaning of R+i (s) differs from that of Fang
et al. [16]; there, it denotes all one-level unilateral improvements from s by DM
i, whereas here, it includes all unilateral improvements, no matter how many
levels. For three levels of preference, stabilities are divided into strongly and weakly
stable according to the strength of the possible sanction, i.e., if a particular state
s is general stable, then s is either strongly stable or weakly stable [28]. Within
multiple levels of preference, the general stabilities are constituted by stabilities at
each level of preference.
4.2.1.2 Stabilities at Level k for Multiple Levels of Preference
Firstly, definitions are given in this research for different strengths of Nash stability.
Even though unilateral improvements do not exist under Nash stability, the idea
of strength of stability can still be captured using the level of preference for the
most preferred states to which the DM could unilaterally move. All these states
must be less preferred than the initial state. A special connection is required for
the case when no movements of any type exist for the DM. If DM i has no any
unilateral move at all levels of preference from state s, state s is extremely stable.
We proposed the stability next.
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Definition 4.5. If Ri(s) = ∅, then state s is super stable for DM i at any level
of preference, denoted by s ∈ SSuperi .
Definition 4.6. State s is Nash stable (Nash0) at level 0 for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SNash0i , iff R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅.
Definition 4.7. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r, state s is Nash stable (Nashk) at level k for





i (s)) = ∅ and R−(k)i (s) 	= ∅.
The k-th level Nash stability is depicted in Fig. 4.2. The super stability is
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Figure 4.2: Nash stability at level k
When multiple-level preference is incorporated into the graph model, GMR,
SMR, and SEQ stabilities at different levels can be distinguished according to the
strength of the sanction. For DM i, if a UI from state s is sanctioned in exactly
k levels below s and all other UIs from state s are sanctioned in at least k levels
below s, then the status quo s is called general metarational at level k. Its formal
definition is given below.
Definition 4.8. State s is general metarational (GMR0) at level 0 for DM i,
denoted by s ∈ SGMR0i , iff either R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for
















i (s)) = ∅.
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Definition 4.9. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is general metarational (GMRk)





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅
and R
−(k)
i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one





i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈ R+i (s) and







i (s)) = ∅.
If all of DM i’s UIs from a state are sanctioned at the highest level r (exactly
r levels below the state), then the state is called general metarational at level r.
Its formal definition is given below.
Definition 4.10. State s is general metarational (GMRr) at level r for DM





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(r)i (s) 	= ∅,
or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ Rj(s1) with
s2 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s).
For DM i, if a UI from a state is sanctioned at level k below the state and all
other UIs from the particular state are sanctioned at a level of at least k below
the state, and these corresponding sanctions cannot be avoided by any
counterresponse, then the state is called SMR stable at level k. Its formal
definition is given below.
Definition 4.11. State s is symmetric metarational (SMR0) at level 0 for
DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMR0i , iff either R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅





















i (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2)∪Ri(s′2).
Symmetric metarationality at level k (0 < k ≤ r) for DM i consists of SMRk+
and SMRk− that are defined next.
Definition 4.12. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is symmetric metarational






R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(k)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at





i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈ R+i (s)
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i (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2) ∪ Ri(s′2).




i ∩ SGMRki − SSMRk+i .
Equivalently,
Definition 4.13. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is symmetric metarational
(SMRk−) at level k for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRk−i , iff s ∈ SGMRki and











i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2), as well as there exists







2) ∩ Φ(−d)i (s) 	= ∅ for at
least one d ∈ {0, · · ·, (k − 1)}.
Definition 4.14. State s is symmetric metarational (SMRr+) at level r for





i (s)∪R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(r)i (s) 	= ∅,
or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ Rj(s1) with
s2 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s) for any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 4.15. State s is symmetric metarational (SMRr−) at level r for
DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRr−i , iff R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there





i (s) for all
s3 ∈ Ri(s2), as well as there exists s′1 ∈ R+i (s) and for every s′2 ∈ Rj(s1)∩Φ−(r)i (s),
Ri(s
′
2) ∩ Φ(−d)i (s) 	= ∅ for at least one d ∈ {0, · · ·, (r − 1)}.
Sequential stability at level k is similar to the stability of GMR at the same
level. The only modification is that all DM i’s UIs are subject to credible sanctions
by DM i’s opponent. Its formal definition is given below.
Definition 4.16. State s is sequential stable (SEQ0) at level 0 for DM i,
denoted by s ∈ SSEQ0i , iff either R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for
















i (s)) = ∅.
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Definition 4.17. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is sequentially stable (SEQk) at





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅ and
R
−(k)
i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one





i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈ R+i (s) and







i (s)) = ∅.
Definition 4.18. State s is sequentially stable (SEQr) at level r for DM i,





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(r)i (s) 	= ∅, or
R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+j (s1) with
s2 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s).
4.2.2 Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference in
Multiple DM Conflicts
In an n-DM model, where n ≥ 2, the opponents of a DM can be thought of as a
coalition of one or more DMs. To calculate the stability of a state for DM i ∈ N ,
it is necessary to examine possible responses by all other DMs j ∈ N \ {i}, which
may include sequential responses. To extend the graph model stability definitions
to stability definitions in n-DM models with multiple levels of preference, the
definition of a legal sequence of decisions for three levels of preference [28] must
first be extended to take multiple levels of preference into account.
4.2.2.1 Legal Sequences of Unilateral Moves and Unilateral
Improvements
A legal sequence of UMs in a graph model with multiple levels of preference for
a coalition of DMs is a sequence of states linked by unilateral moves controlled
by members of the coalition, in which a DM may move more than once, but not
twice in succession. (If a DM can move in succession, then this DM’s graph is
effectively transitive. Prohibiting consecutive moves thus allows for graph models
with intransitive graphs, which are sometimes useful in practice.) When H = {i},
a legal sequence of UMs for the coalition H reduces to a unilateral move of DM i.
Let the coalition H ⊆ N satisfy |H| ≥ 2 and let the status quo state be s ∈ S.
We now define RH(s) ⊆ S, the reachable list of coalition H from state s by a
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legal sequence of UMs in a graph model with multiple levels of preference. The
following definitions are adapted from [16,28]:








j (s)) for any j ∈ H. A unilateral move by H is a member of RH(s) ⊆ S,
defined inductively by:
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ Rj(s), then s1 ∈ RH(s) and j ∈ ΩH(s, s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ RH(s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ Rj(s1), then, provided ΩH(s, s1) 	= {j},
s2 ∈ RH(s) and j ∈ ΩH(s, s2).
Note that Definition 4.19 is analogous to Definition 2.10, but, here, unilateral
moves include the states that are reachable from state s by multiple levels of
preference (may more than three levels) listed in Table 4.3.
In a graph model with multiple levels of preference, a legal sequence of UIs for
coalition H is a sequence of states linked by unilateral improvements including
each-level UIs controlled by members of the coalition H with the usual restriction
that a member of the coalition may move more than once, but not twice
consecutively. The formal definition is given below.





j (s) for any j ∈ H. A unilateral
improvement by H is a member of R+H(s) ⊆ S, defined inductively by:





j (s), then s1 ∈ R+H(s) and j ∈ Ω+H(s)(s, s1);





j (s1), then, provided
Ω+H(s)(s, s1) 	= {j}, s2 ∈ R+H(s) and j ∈ Ω+H(s, s2).
Definition 4.20 is identical to Definition 4.19 except that each move is to a state
strictly preferred with some degree of preference by the mover to the current state.
Similarly, Ω+H(s, s1) includes all last movers in a legal sequence of UIs by coalition
H from state s to state s1. Specifically, this definition is inductive: first, using
(1), the states reachable by a single DM in H from s by one step UIs in multiple
levels of preference are identified and added to R+H(s); then, using (2), all states
reachable from those states are identified and added to R+H(s); then the process
is repeated until no further states are added to R+H(s) by repeating (2). Because
R+H(s) ⊆ S, and S is finite, this limit must be reached in finitely many steps.
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4.2.2.2 General Stabilities for Multiple Levels of Preference
Super stability and Nash stability definitions are identical for both the 2-DM and
the n-DM models because these stabilities do not consider the opponents’
responses. Let i ∈ N and s ∈ S for the following Definitions.
Definition 4.21. State s ∈ S is GGMR for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGGMRi , iff for






Definition 4.22. State s ∈ S is GSMR for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGSMRi , iff for











i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 4.23. State s ∈ S is GSEQ for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGSEQi , iff for






4.2.2.3 Stabilities at Level k for Multiple Levels of Preference
Similar to 2-DM conflicts, solution concepts for n-DM conflicts can be defined
as different-level stabilities, according to degrees of preference. Nash stability
definitions in multiple DM conflicts are the same as those in 2-DM cases. Therefore,
only the extended GMR, SMR, and SEQ are defined here. For DM i, if a UI from
state s is sanctioned by the legal sequence of UMs of i’s opponents in exactly k
levels below s and all other UIs from state s are sanctioned in at least k levels below
s, then the status quo s is called general metarational at level k. The process is
portrayed in Fig. 4.3 and the formal definition is given below.
Definition 4.24. State s is GMR0 for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMR0i , iff either
R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at





i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈
R+i (s) and s
′









Definition 4.25. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is GMRk for DM i, denoted by





i (s)∪R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(k)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and
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Figure 4.3: General metarationality at level k.
If all of DM i’s UIs from a state are sanctioned at exactly r levels below the
state, then the state is called general metarational at level r. Its formal definition
is given below.





i (s)∪R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(r)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s)
there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s).
For DM i, if a UI from a state is sanctioned by the legal sequence of UMs of
i’s opponents at level k and all other UIs from the particular state are sanctioned
at level at least k, and these corresponding sanctions cannot be avoided by any
counterresponse, then the state is called symmetric metarational at level k. The
stability of SMR at level k is portrayed in Fig. 4.4 and the formal definition is
given below.
Definition 4.27. State s is SMR0 for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMR0i , iff either
R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at
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i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈
R+i (s) and s
′
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Figure 4.4: Symmetric metarationality at level k+.
Symmetric metarationality at level k (0 < k ≤ r) for DM i consists of SMRk+
and SMRk− that are defined next.
Definition 4.28. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is SMRk+ for DM i, denoted by





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(k)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅





i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈ R+i (s) and s′2 ∈ RN\{i}(s′1) such that













any s3 ∈ Ri(s2) ∪ Ri(s′2).




i ∩ SGMRki − SSMRki .
Equivalently,
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Definition 4.29. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is SMRk− for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSMRk−i , iff s ∈ SGMRki and R+i (s) 	= ∅, and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists










i (s) for all








2) ∩ Φ(−d)i (s) 	= ∅ for at least one d ∈ {0, · · ·, (k − 1)}.





i (s)∪R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(r)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s)
there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s) and s3 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s) for
any s3 ∈ Ri(s2).
Definition 4.31. State s is SMRr− for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRr−i , iff R+i (s) 	=
∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s2 ∈
Φ
−(r)





i (s) for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2), as well as there exists s′1 ∈ R+i (s)
and for every s′2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) ∩ Φ−(r)i (s), Ri(s′2) ∩ Φ(−d)i (s) 	= ∅ for at least one
d ∈ {0, · · ·, (r − 1)}.
The only modification between GMRk and SEQk is that all DM i’s UIs are
subject to credible sanctions by the legal sequence of UIs of DM i’s opponents.
Fig. 4.5 depicts sequential stability at level k. Its formal definition is given below.
Definition 4.32. State s is sequentially stable (SEQ0) at level 0 for DM i,
denoted by s ∈ SSEQ0i , iff either R+i (s) = ∅ and R(0)i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for
















i (s)) = ∅.
Definition 4.33. For 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, state s is sequentially stable (SEQk) at





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅ and
R
−(k)
i (s) 	= ∅, or R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one





i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈ R+i (s) and
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Figure 4.5: Sequential stability at level k.
Definition 4.34. State s is sequentially stable (SEQr) at level r for DM i,





i (s) ∪ R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(r)i (s) 	= ∅, or
R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every s1 ∈ R+i (s) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+N\{i}(s1) with
s2 ∈ Φ−(r)i (s).
When n = 2, the DM set N becomes to {i, j} in Definitions 4.24 to 4.34, and
the reachable lists for H = N \ {i} by legal sequences of UMs and UIs from s1,
RN\{i}(s1) and R+N\{i}(s1), degenerate to Rj(s1) and R
+
j (s1), DM j’s corresponding
reachable lists from s1. Obviously, Definitions 4.8 to 4.18 are special cases of
Definition 4.24 to 4.34, so we use the same notation for two DM cases and n-DM
situations.
4.3 Interrelationships among the Solution
Concepts
In 1993, Fang et al. [16] established relationships among the four basic stabilities
of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ for two levels of preference. Then, Hamouda et








Figure 4.6: Interrelationships among four stabilities at level k.
The inclusion relations among the multilevel versions of the four solution concepts
are presented as follows.
Theorem 4.1. The interrelationships among the four basic stabilities at level k
are
SNashki ⊆ SSMRk+i ⊆ SGMRki , SSMRk−i ⊆ SGMRki , and SNashki ⊆ SSEQki ⊆ SGMRki ,
for 0 ≤ k ≤ r.
Proof: When k = 0, the results are obvious. Assume that 0 < k ≤ r. If





i (s)∪R+i (s) = ∅ and R−(k)i (s) 	= ∅. This implies that state
s ∈ SSMRk+i using Definitions 4.28 and 4.30. Hence, if s ∈ SNashki for 0 ≤ k ≤ r,
then s ∈ SSMRk+i , which implies SNashki ⊆ SSMRk+i .
Using Definitions 4.24 to 4.30, if s ∈ SSMRk+i , it is obvious that s ∈ SGMRki for
0 ≤ k ≤ r. Therefore, inclusion relations SNashki ⊆ SSMRk+i ⊆ SGMRki now follow.
Based on Definitions 4.29 and 4.31, the relation S
SMRk−
i ⊆ SGMRki is obvious.
Relations SNashki ⊆ SSEQki ⊆ SGMRki can be similarly verified. 
Let 0 ≤ k ≤ r. The inclusion relationships presented by Theorem 4.1 are
depicted in Fig. 4.6.
Theorem 4.2. Let 0 ≤ h, q ≤ r. When h 	= q, the relationships between stabilities
at h level and at q level are
SNashhi ∩ SNashqi = ∅, (4.1)






i = ∅, SSMRh−i ∩ S
SMRq−
i = ∅, SSMRh+i ∩ SSMRh−i = ∅, and (4.3)
SSEQhi ∩ SSEQqi = ∅. (4.4)
Proof: We first prove equation (4.1). Assume that h > q. If there exists
s ∈ SNashhi ∩ SNashqi , then s ∈ SNashhi and s ∈ SNashqi . Therefore,





i (s)) = ∅ and R−(h)i (s) 	= ∅ as s is Nashh stable. Since
h − 1 ≥ q, R−(q)i (s) = ∅. This contradicts the hypothesis that s is Nashq stable.
Therefore, (4.1) holds.
Now, equation (4.2) is verified. If s ∈ (SNashhi ∪ SNashqi ), equation (4.2) is
obvious. Assume that h > q and s 	∈ (SNashhi ∪ SNashqi ). If there exists s ∈
SGMRhi ∩ SGMRqi , then s ∈ SGMRhi and s ∈ SGMRqi . Since s is GMRq stable,






i (s) and there exists at least one s
′
1 ∈ R+i (s) and s′2 ∈ RN\{i}(s′1) such







i (s)) = ∅. This implies that for all












i (s) as h > q. This contradicts
with the hypothesis that s is GMRh stable. Therefore, (4.2) follows now.
The proofs of (4.3) and (4.4) can be similarly carried out. 
The interrelationships among general stabilities, super stability, and stabilities
at each level are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. The interrelationships among general stabilities, super stability,
and stabilities at each level are
SGNashi = (S
Super

















i ∪ SSMRd−i )), and (4.7)
SGSEQi = (S
Super




Proof: Equation (4.5) is obvious. Equation (4.6) is verified first. The
inclusion relation SGGMRi ⊇ (SSuperi ) ∪ (
r⋃
d=0
SGMRdi ) is obvious. We will prove that
73
the inclusion relation SGGMRi ⊆ (SSuperi ) ∪ (
r⋃
d=0
SGMRdi ) holds. For any
s ∈ SGGMRi , based on Definition 4.21, if s ∈ (SSuperi ∪ SGNashi ), then the above
inclusion relation is true.
Let |R+i (s)| = l denote the cardinality of R+i (s). Assume that s 	∈ (SSuperi ∪
SGNashi ). Then, for any s ∈ SGGMRi , R+i (s) 	= ∅ and for every sk ∈ R+i (s) (k =











i (s)}. It is obvious that s′k ∈ Qk. Hence,
Qk 	= ∅. Let z ∈ Qk and be DM i’s least preferred in the state set Qk. Since





i (s)), there exists 0 ≤ rk ≤ r such that z ∈ Φ−(rk)i (s) for





i (s)) = ∅. This
process is portrayed in Fig. 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: The legal sequence of UM from state sk.
Let rm = min{rk : k = 1, · · ·, l}. Then, 0 ≤ rm ≤ r. It is easy to follow that if
s ∈ SGGMRi and R+i (s) 	= ∅, then s ∈ SGMRrmi . In fact, for every sk ∈ R+i (s), there






i (s), and s
′
m ∈ RN\{i}(sm) with s′m ∈ Φ−(rm)i (s). Based on the rule of





i (s)) = ∅
so that s ∈ SGMRrmi . From the above discussion, equation (4.6) is proved.
Hence, equations (4.7) and (4.8) can be similarly proved. 
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i , and S
SEQ
i denote all stable states for Nash, GMR,
SMR, and SEQ, respectively, in the graph model for simple preference [16]. When
r = 1, stabilities having multiple-level preference degenerate to the stabilities
presented in [16], including two levels of preference. Specifically,










i , and S
Super
i ∪ SSEQ0i ∪ SSEQ1i = SSEQi .
Let SSGMRi , S
SSMR
i , and S
SSEQ
i denote all strongly stable states for strongly
GMR, SMR , and SEQ, respectively, in the graph model with strength of preference
[27,28]. When r = 2, stabilities having multiple levels of preference degenerate to
the stabilities presented in [27,28]. Specifically,
Theorem 4.5. For the multiple levels of preference, when r = 2, SGMR2i \SNash2i =
SSGMRi , S
SMR2+
i \SNash2i = SSSMRi , and SSEQ2i \SNash2i = SSSEQi .
The stabilities at level 2 in the graph model with three levels of preference
degenerate to the corresponding strong stabilities presented in [27, 28], except for
the states that are Nash stable, because Hamouda et al. [27,28] have not included
Nash stable states into strongly GMR, SMR, and SEQ.
The above two theorems can be easily proved using the corresponding
definitions.
4.4 Application: GDU Conflict
In this section, the four-level versions of stability definitions are applied to the
Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) conflict to illustrate how the procedure works.
The history of this conflict dates back to the nineteenth century. In order to
irrigate land in the northeastern section of North Dakota, an irrigation project
was proposed by the United States Support (USS) regarding construction of
a crucial canal and holding reservoir to transfer water from the Missouri River
Basin to the Hudson Bay Basin [16]. Because the irrigation runoff finally flow
into the Canadian province of Manitoba via the Red and Souris rivers, which will
cause environmental damage, this proposal immediately aroused the Canadian
Opposition (CDO). In order to resolve this conflict, the International Joint
Commission (IJC) consisting of representatives from the governments of USA
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and Canada plays an important role for taking an unbiased attitude and making
recommendations on this project [16, 28]. This irrigation project for the water
diversion is called the Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) project. A conflict arose
among US, Canada and IJC for the GDU project (see the book [16] and the
paper [28] for more details).
Table 4.4: Feasible states for the GDU model [28]
USS
1. Proceed Y Y N Y N Y N Y N
2. Modify N N Y N Y N Y N Y
CDO
3. Legal N N N Y Y N N Y Y
IJC
4. Completion N Y Y Y Y N N N N
5. Modification N N N N N Y Y Y Y
State number s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
Fang et al. [16] analyzed the environmental dispute over the GDU project and
established a graph model with two levels of preference for this conflict. Recently,
Hamouda et al. [28] carried out a strategic study of this conflict using an extended
graph model which includes three levels of preference. The graph model for the
GDU conflict is comprised of three DMs: 1. USS, 2. CDO, and 3. IJC; and five
options: 1. Proceed−Proceed with the project regardless of Canada’s concerns; 2.
Modify−Modify the project to reduce impacts on Canada; 3. Legal−Legal action
based on Boundary Waters Treaty; 4. Completion−Recommend completion of
the project as originally planned; and 5. Modification−Recommend modification
of the project to reduce impacts on Canada [28]. A state is defined as a selection
of options for each DM using some principle. In the GDU conflict, five options are
combined to form 25 possible states. Usually, however, not all option combinations
are feasible or logical. After all infeasible states are eliminated, only nine states
are identified as being feasible and listed in Table 4.4 in which a “Y” indicates that
an option is selected by the DM controlling it and an “N” means that the option
is not chosen.
The graph model of the GDU conflict is shown in Fig. 4.8, in which labels on












Figure 4.8: The graph model for the GDU conflict [28].
model is knowledge of each DM’s preference ranking of the feasible states. We
extend the graph model introduced in [28] to have four levels of preference in the
GDU conflict. The preference information for this conflict over the feasible states
is given in Table 4.5. We assume that state s8 is very strongly less preferred to
all other states for USS, and the DM, CDO considers states s1, s2, and s6 to be
equally preferred and very strongly less preferred relative to all other states. Note
that this representation of preference information presented in Table 4.5 implies
that the preferred relations, >, , and ≫ are transitive. For instance, since
s9 > s7 and s7 ≫ s8, then s9 ≫ s8. However, in general, the preference structure
presented in this research does not require the transitivity of preference relations,
and hence can handle intransitive preferences.
Table 4.5: Four levels of preferences for DMs in the GDU conflict
(extended from [28])
DM Preference
USS s2 > s4 > s3 > s5 > s1 > s6 > s9 > s7 ≫ s8
CDO {s3 ∼ s7} > {s5 ∼ s9} > {s4 ∼ s8} ≫ {s1 ∼ s2 ∼ s6}
IJC {s2 ∼ s3 ∼ s4 ∼ s5 ∼ s6 ∼ s7 ∼ s8 ∼ s9}  s1
Formally, stability analysis determines the stability of each state for each DM
according to some solution concept. Here, four-level versions of five stability
definitions of super stability, Nash stability, Nashk, GMRk, SMRk, and
sequential stability, SEQk, for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 are employed to analyze the GDU
conflict. An equilibrium indexed k, which represents a likely resolution to the
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conflict, is a state that is stable for every DM according to some stability
definition at level k. Note that the super stable states are treated as Nash stable
at the highest level when determining an equilibrium in the graph model with
multiple levels of preference. Here, we analyze DM 2’s SMRk stability at state s5
for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 as an example. Since R+2 (s5) = {s3} and RN\{2}(s3) = {s2} with
s5 ≫2 s2 and s5 >2 s4 for R2(s2) = {s4}, state s5 is stable for SMR3− using
Definition 4.31. Other cases can be analyzed similarly. The stability results for
the GDU conflict are summarized in Table 4.6, in which “
√
” for a given state
under a DM means that this state is stable at a given level for the given DM;
“
√k+” and “√k−” for a given state under a DM means that this state is SMRk+
or SMRk− stable for the given DM; and “
√k” for a state under “Eq” signifies
that this state is an equilibrium for a corresponding solution concept at level k.
Note that U, C, and I displayed in Table 4.6 denote the three DMs, USS, CDO,
and IJC, respectively.
Table 4.7 provides stability results for different structures of preference. When
stabilities are analyzed using two levels of preference, states s4, s7, and s9 are
equilibria [16]; if preference information is provided using three levels of preference,
then states s7 and s9 are equilibria [28]; there is only one equilibrium state s9
for four levels of preference. If state s4 is selected as a resolution for the GDU
conflict, this means that IJC recommends completing the GDU project regardless
of Canada’s concerns, so USS proceeds with this project. It is obvious that this
resolution cannot really resolve this conflict. State s7 means that the USS follows
the IJC recommendation to modify this project, but Canada does not take legal
action based on the Boundary Waters Treaty. The strategy of state s9 is the same
as that of state s7 except that Canada chooses legal procedures. Compared with
states s7 and s9, equilibrium s9 is a more reasonable resolution for resolving this
conflict. Therefore, the multilevel versions of stability analysis provide new insights
and valuable guidance for decision analysts.
Although the example of the GDU conflict shown in Table 4.4 and Fig. 4.8
is a small model with three DMs, five options, and nine feasible states, a graph
model structure can handle any finite number of states and DMs, each of whom
can control any finite number of options [18]. As pointed out by Fang et al. [19], an
available decision support system (DSS) for stability analysis of a graph model with
two levels of preference can work well. Theorem 4.4 reveals the relation of stabilities
between two levels of preference [16] and multiple levels of preference. This theorem
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Table 4.6: Stability results of the GDU conflict for the graph model with




Nash GMR SMR SEQ







√ √ √ √ √3+ √3+ √ √
0
1





√ √ √3+ √
0
1





√ √ √3+ √
0
1












√ √ √ √3− √3+ √ √
0
1





√ √ √3+ √
0
1



















√ √ √ √ √ √3 √3+ √3− √3+ √ √ √ √3
Table 4.7: The comparison of stability results for three versions of
preference
Version of preference Equilibria Analysis method
Two levels of preference s4, s7, s9 see [16]
Three levels of preference s4, s9 see [28]
Four levels of preference s9 this paper
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indicates the possibility of developing an effective algorithm to implement the
multilevel versions of the four stabilities within a DSS, which would be essential if
the proposed stability analysis is applied to larger practical problems.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a multiple-level preference framework is developed for the graph
model methodology to handle multiple levels of preference, which lie between
relative and cardinal preferences in terms of information content [74]. Multilevel
versions of four solution concepts consisting of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ are
defined in the graph model for multiple levels of preference. Specifically, solution
concepts at level k are defined as Nashk, GMRk, SMRk, and SEQk for
k = 1, · · ·, r, where r is the maximum number of levels of preference between two
states. The proposed stability definitions extend existing definitions based on two
levels and three levels of preference, so that more practical and complicated
problems can be analyzed at greater depth. To date, new stability definitions are
defined by logical representation, so algorithms to implement these new
stabilities are difficult to develop. A new algebraic system to ease the coding of
logically-defined stability definitions is proposed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 5
Novel Algebraic Approach to
Searching Weighted Colored
Paths
An algebraic approach to finding all edge-weighted, colored paths within a
weighted colored multidigraph is developed in this chapter. Generally, an
adjacency matrix can determine a simple digraph and all paths between any two
vertices. However, the adjacency matrix is not readily extendable to the context
of a colored multidigraph. To bridge the gap, a conversion function is proposed
to transform the original problem of searching edge-colored paths in a colored
multidigraph to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph with no
color constraints. To date, for general graph classes, searching for particular
paths, such as Hamilton paths [2, 56], Euler paths, and shortest path routing
between two vertices, can be solved efficiently. Some algorithms to search colored
paths for colored simple graphs are available [1], but there exist very limited
algorithms to search colored paths for colored multidigraph classes.
5.1 Extended Definitions in a Weighted Colored
Multidigraph
A multidigraph G = (V,A, ψ) defined in Section 2.1 is a set of vertices (nodes) V
and a multiset of oriented edges (arcs) A with ψ : A → V ×V . Let m = |V | denote
the number of vertices and l = |A| be the number of edges in a multidigraph G.
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Definition 5.1. A colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c) is a multidigraph
(V,A, ψ) and a set of colors N , and a function c : A → N such that c(a) ∈ N is
the color of a ∈ A, provided that multiple edges of (V,A, ψ) are assigned different
colors , i.e., if a 	= b, but ψ(a) = ψ(b), then c(a) 	= c(b).
If a ∈ A such that ψ(a) = (u, v) and c(a) = i for i ∈ N , then a can be written
as a = di(u, v). The line digraph of G = (V,A,N, ψ, c), L(G), is a simple digraph
and each vertex in L(G) corresponds to an edge in the multidigraph G. Hence,
coloring edges in G is equivalent to assigning colors to vertices in L(G).
Definition 5.2. For a colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c), the reduced line
digraph Lr(G) = (A,LAr) of G is a simple vertex-colored digraph with vertex set
A and edge set LAr={d = (a, b) ∈ A × A : a and b are consecutive (in the order
ab) and c(a) 	= c(b)}.
Definition 5.3. A weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w) is a colored
multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c) together with a map w : A → R+0 (the set of non-
negative real numbers).
Thus an arc a ∈ A, a = di(u, v), carries a weight w(a), representing some
attribute of the move from node u to node v along the arc a, which is assigned color
i. A network, for instance, is a multidigraph with weighted edges. Let H ⊆ N be
a subset of the color set N in the following definitions. An edge-weighted, colored
path is defined as follows:
Definition 5.4. Let H ⊆ N . For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w),
an edge-weighted, colored path by H from vertex u ∈ V to vertex v ∈ V ,
PA
(W )
H (u, v), is a path from u to v in the multidigraph (V,A, ψ) in which any two
consecutive edges have different colors and each edge a on the path carries a weight
w(a) ≥ 0 and c(a) = i ∈ H.
Definition 5.5. For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), the
shortest colored path between two vertices is the colored path that
minimizes the sum of the weights of its constituent edges.
Definition 5.6. Let H ⊆ N . For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w),
the weighted arc set for H denotes A
(W )
H = {a ∈ A : w(a) > 0 and c(a) = i ∈
H.}.
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Note that a colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c) is a unit weighted colored
multidigraph if w(u, v) = 1 for any a ∈ A such that ψ(a) = (u, v).
Let l = |A| denote the cardinality of A in G. The weight matrix of a weighted
colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w) is defined as follows:
Definition 5.7. For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), let H ⊆ N
and wk denote the weight of arc ak ∈ A. The weight matrix for H is an l × l
diagonal matrix WH with (k, k) entry
WH(k, k) =
{
wk if c(ak) = i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.
It should be pointed out that if H = N , then WN is expressed as W ; if H = {i},
then WH = Wi. A weighted line digraph L
(W )(G) = (A,LA,w) is a set of vertices
A together with a set of oriented edges LA, and a map w : A → R+0 . In traditional
graph coloring problems, such as vertex coloring and edge coloring, colors are
assigned to vertices or edges such that adjacent vertices or consecutive edges have
different colors, and the number of colors needed is minimized [13]. In this research,
the edge-weighted, colored graph problem is not concerned with coloring edges,
but aims at searching edge-weighted, colored paths in a given weighted colored
multidigraph.
Important matrices associated with a digraph include the adjacency matrix
J and the incidence matrix B [24]. J and B can be extended to the weighted
adjacency and incidence matrices. Let m = |V | denote the cardinality of V in G.
Definition 5.8. Let H ⊆ N . For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w),
the weighted adjacency matrix for H is the m × m matrix J (W )H with (s, q) entry
J
(W )
H (s, q) =
{
1 if there exists a ∈ A(W )H such that ψ(a) = (s, q) for s, q ∈ V,
0 otherwise.
Definition 5.9. For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), wa denotes
the weight of arc a ∈ A. The weighted incidence matrix for H is the m × l




−wa if a = (v, x) for some x ∈ V and c(a) = i ∈ H,
wa if a = (x, v) for some x ∈ V and c(a) = i ∈ H,
0 otherwise,
where v ∈ V .
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According to the signed entries, the weighted incidence matrix can be separated
into the weighted in-incidence matrix and the weighted out-incidence matrix.
Definition 5.10. For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), let H ⊆ N
and wa denote the weight of arc a ∈ A. The weighted in-incidence matrix





out with (v, a) entries
B
(WH)
in (v, a) =
{





out (v, a) =
{
wa if a = (v, x) for some x ∈ V and c(a) = i ∈ H,
0 otherwise,
where v ∈ V .








where abs(B(WH)) denotes the matrix in which each entry equals the absolute value
of the corresponding entry of B(WH). Let I denote the identity matrix. If WH = I,
then B(WH) = B, B
(WH)
in = Bin, and B
(WH)
out = Bout.
A reachability by the weighted colored paths for H matrix is called a
reachability matrix by H in this research. Its formal definition is given as follows.
Definition 5.11. Let H ⊆ N . For a weighted colored multidigraph
(V,A,N, ψ, c, w), the weighted reachability matrix by H is the m × m matrix
M
(W )
H with (s, q) entry
M
(W )
H (s, q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if q is reachable from vertex s by a weighted
colored path PA
(W )




H = |A(W )H | denote the number of arcs in A(W )H . Since all arcs are distinct
on a path, the length of any path in PA
(W )
H is less than l
(W )
H .
The following result can be obtained by Definition 2.2, on the line digraph
L(G), and Definition 2.4, on the adjacency matrix J .
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For a weighted colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), the adjacency
matrix of the line graph of G is the l × l matrix LJ with (a, b) entry
LJ(a, b) =
{
1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab in the graph G,
0 otherwise.
In this research, LJ matrix is called an edge consecutive matrix.
Definition 5.12. For a weighted colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), let
H ⊆ N and wa and wb denote the weights of arcs a, b ∈ A. The weighted edge
consecutive matrix for H is the l × l matrix LJ (WH)with (a, b) entry
LJ (WH)(a, b) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
wa · wb if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab
and c(a) = i and c(b) = j for i, j ∈ H,
0 otherwise.
Definition 5.13. For a weighted colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), the
reduced weighted edge consecutive matrix for H is the l× l matrix LJ (WH)r
with (a, b) entry
LJ (WH)r (a, b) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
wa · wb if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and
c(a) = i and c(b) = j such that i, j ∈ H and i 	= j,
0 otherwise.
Let ci denote the cardinality of the arc set in color i. Ici is defined as a ci × ci
identity matrix with each diagonal entry being set to 1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Let Ii
















For H ⊆ N, H 	= ∅, and IH =
∨
i∈H
Ii, WH = W ◦ IH . (“ ◦ ” denotes the
Hadamard product.)
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5.2 The Proposed Rule of Priority to Label
Colored Arcs
An incidence matrix can represent a multidigraph if all edges are labeled. The
proposed algebraic approach for colored multidigraphs starts with a unique edge-
labeling rule.
A colored multidigraph may contain several arcs with the same initial and
terminal vertices, but each arc in this case must be assigned a different color. To
work with the set of all arcs, we must label them carefully. Assuming that all
colors and nodes are pre-numbered. Therefore, the vertex set V and the color set
N in G = (V,A,N, ψ, c) are numbered as V = {1, 2, · · ·,m} and N = {1, 2, · · ·, n},
respectively. Let ci denote the cardinality of arc set assigned color i, i.e., ci = |Ai|,
where Ai = {x ∈ A : c(x) = i} for each i ∈ N .




cj for i ∈ N , and note that l = εn =
n∑
i=1
ci is the cardinality of A in G. The
arcs, a1, a2, . . . , al, will be labeled according to the color order; within each color,
according to the sequence of initial nodes; and within each color and initial node,
according to the sequence of terminal nodes. The ordering, referred to as the Rule
of Priority, has the following properties:
1. If εi−1 < k ≤ εi, then c(ak) = i, i.e., ak has color i;
2. For k < h, if ak and ah both have color i for some i ∈ N , and if ψ(ak) =
(vx, vy) and ψ(ah) = (vz, vw), then x ≤ z and, if x = z, then y < w.
If all arcs in a colored multidigraph have been labeled according to the Rule
of Priority, then the index of an arc uniquely determines its color. Therefore,














Figure 5.1: The colored multidigraph G.
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Example 1. Fig 5.1 shows a colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c). The labels
on the arcs of the graph indicate that the corresponding arcs are colored in red
(R), blue (B), green (G), and pink (P), respectively. Assume that the vertex set
V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6}. According to the Rule of Priority, label all edges to
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 
Figure 5.2: Labeling edges for the graph G.
First number red 1, blue 2, green 3, and pink 4 so that N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The
cardinalities of the arc sets A1, A2, A3, and A4 are 2, 2, 2, and 1, respectively. Then,
according to the Rule of Priority, the process to label all colored edges is presented
in Fig. 5.2. Recall that ak = di(u, v) for i ∈ N and ψ(ak) = (u, v). Obviously,
a1 = d1(v1, v2); a2 = d1(v2, v3); a3 = d2(v2, v3); a4 = d2(v3, v6); a5 = d3(v3, v4);
a6 = d3(v4, v5); and a7 = d4(v4, v2). Therefore, the edge labeled graph is expressed
as 〈V, {Ai, i ∈ N}〉, where A1 = {a1, a2}, A2 = {a3, a4}, A3 = {a5, a6}, and
A4 = {a7}.
5.3 New Algebraic Approach
5.3.1 A Conversion Function for Finding Colored Paths
Lemma 5.1. For a weighted colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), the weighted
incidence matrix B(WH) for H and the incidence matrix B have the following
relation
B(WH) = B · WH = B · (W ◦ IH).
Lemma 5.1 shows a conversion function to transform an original colored
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multidigraph in the color set N to a reduced weighted colored multidigraph in
the color set H ⊆ N .
Now let W be a weight matrix and let L(W )(G) denote the weighted line digraph
of G. The following theorem is obtained based on Definition 5.10, on the weighted




out , and Definition 5.12, on
the weighted adjacency matrix LJ (W ) of the digraph L(W )(G).
Theorem 5.1. For a weighted colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), W
is the weight matrix, B
(W )
in is the weighted in-incidence matrix, and B
(W )
out is the
weighted out-incidence matrix of the graph G. Then, the weighted edge consecutive
matrix LJ (W ) satisfies LJ (W ) = (B
(W )
in )
T · (B(W )out ).
Proof: Let M = (B
(W )
in )
T · (B(W )out ). Any (k, h) entry of matrix M can be
expressed as M(k, h) = eTk ·M · eh = [(B(W )in ) · ek]T · [(B(W )out ) · eh], where eTk denotes
the transpose of the kth standard basis vector of the l-dimensional Euclidean space.
The qth nonzero element of the row vector eTk · (B(W )in )T is equal to the weight
wk of edge ak = di(s, q) for some s ∈ V . Similarly, the qth nonzero element of the
column vector (B
(W )
out ) · eh is equal to the weight wh of edge ah = dj(q, r) for some
r ∈ V . Hence, M(k, h) = wk · wh 	= 0 iff ak and ah are consecutive from ak to ah
(See Fig. 5.3). Then, by Definition 5.12, B
(W )





Figure 5.3: ak and ah are consecutive in order akah.





T · (B(WH)out ).
Let T1(B
(W )) = (B
(W )
in )
T · (B(W )out ) = LJ (W ) denote a conversion function. The
conversion function, T1(B
(W )), maps the weighted incidence matrix B(W ) to the
weighted edge consecutive matrix LJ (W ) of the graph G. It shows that this
conversion function transforms the original edge-weighted, colored multidigraph
G to a simple vertex-weighted-colored line digraph L(G). When W = I,
LJ = (Bin)
T · (Bout). This matrix captures the adjacency relation between pairs
of consecutive edges without considering the color(s) of the consecutive edges.
Another conversion function is thus presented next to transform the original
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problem of searching edge-colored paths in a colored multidigraph to the
standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph without color constraints.
Recall that ci denotes the cardinality of the arc set in color i and let Eci denote
a ci × ci matrix with each entry being set to 1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Then, D is




Ec1 0 · · · 0





0 0 · · · Ecn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (5.1)
It is obvious that this matrix D encodes the color scheme in the graph G, where
the dimension of each diagonal block Eci depends on the number of edges in color
i. More specifically, recall that εi =
i∑
j=1
cj for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. According to the Rule of
Priority for labeling edges, for any ak ∈ A and εi−1 < k ≤ εi, the edge ak has color
i. Hence, for any ak, ah ∈ A, if there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that k, h ∈ (εi−1, εi],
then edges ak and ah have the same color i, and D(k, h) = 1. Also, D(k, h) = 0 iff
edges ak and ah have different colors.
The conversion function can now be obtained in matrix form by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.2. For the weighted colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), let
El be the l × l matrix with each entry equal to 1. Then the reduced matrix LJ (W )r
satisfies LJ
(W )
r = LJ (W ) ◦ (El − D), where “ ◦ ” denotes the Hadamard product.
Proof: Let LJ (W )(k, h) and (El−D)(k, h) denote the (k, h) entries of matrices
LJ (W ) and El − D, respectively. Then, LJ (W )(k, h) · (El − D)(k, h) = wk · wh 	= 0
iff LJ (W )(k, h) = wk ·wh 	= 0 and D(k, h) = 0. Based on the definitions of matrices
LJ (W ) and D, LJ (W )(k, h) 	= 0 iff edges ak and ah are consecutive in order akah.
D(k, h) = 0 iff edges ak and ah have different colors. Obviously, based on the




r = LJ (W ) ◦ (El − D). 
Obviously, when W is reduced to WH , LJ
(WH)
r = LJ (WH) ◦ (El − D) satisfies
that
LJ (WH)r (a, b) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
wa · wb if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and




From Theorem 5.2, T2(LJ
(W )) = LJ (W ) ◦ (El − D) = LJ (W )r . The conversion
function, T2(LJ
(W )), maps the weighted adjacency matrix LJ (W ) of the weighted
line digraph L(W )(G) to its reduced matrix LJ
(W )
r . It reveals that this conversion
function T2 converts the simple vertex-weighted, colored line digraph L
(W )(G) to
its reduced subgraph L
(W )
r (G), called reduced weighted line digraph, which is a
simple digraph with no color constraints.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 together present a conversion function F (B(W )) such that
F (B(W )) = [(B
(W )
in )




(W )+abs(B(W )))/2 and B
(W )
out = (abs(B
(W ))−B(W ))/2. Therefore,
F (B(W )) transforms a problem of searching weighted colored paths in an edge-
weighted, colored multidigraph to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple
digraph with no color constraints. Note that the incident relations between vertices
and edges of a graph can uniquely characterize the graph. Therefore, the incidence
matrix is treated as the original graph and used for computer implementation.
Example 2. Fig. 5.1 shows a colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c). If G is
associated with a map w : A → R+0 , then G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w) is a weighted
colored multidigraph. Construct conversion functions to determine the vertex
labeled weighted line digraph L(W )(G) and its reduced line digraph L
(W )
r (G).
By Example 1, the colored multidigraph is labeled using the Rule of Priority.











0 0 0 0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 0 0 0 w7
0 w2 w3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 w5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 w6 0









w1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 w2 w3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 w4 w5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 w6 w7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .






0 w1w2 w1w3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 w2w4 w2w5 0 0
0 0 0 w3w4 w3w5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 w5w6 w5w7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0








0 0 w1w3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 w2w4 w2w5 0 0
0 0 0 0 w3w5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 w5w7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0




The weight matrix designed here is convenient, since edge-weighted (0 or 1) can
be used to flexibly control any move between any two vertices in G. For instance, if
w4 = 0, then the original graph will be reduced to a new graph with no edge a4. If
W = I, then the conversion function T1 transforms the edge-labeled multidigraph
G portrayed in Fig. 5.4 (1) to the vertex-labeled line digraph L(G) shown in Fig.
5.4 (2). Then, the reduced line digraph Lr(G) presented in Fig. 5.4 (3) for finding
colored paths is obtained by using the conversion function T2. The conversion
process is illustrated in Fig. 5.4.
5.3.2 Computer Implementation
Many well-known algorithms have been developed to solve the shortest path
problems in digraphs, such as Dijkstra’s algorithm [14] and Johnson’s
algorithm [38]. Some other algorithms are available for searching for all paths in
undirected graphs, such as the algorithm presented by Migliore et al [50].
Although finding path problems in general graph classes has been extensively
investigated, searching colored paths in weighted colored multidigraphs is still a
novel topic.
Let AS = {a ∈ A : B(W )out (s, a) 	= 0} and AE = {b ∈ A : B(W )in (q, b) 	= 0} for
s, q ∈ V . Here, matrices W , B(W )out , and B(W )in have been introduced by Definitions
5.7 and 5.10. AS is the set of arcs starting from vertex s and AE is the arc set ending
at vertex q. The matrix LJ
(W )
r provided by Theorem 5.2 is used to search the edge-
weighted, colored paths between any two arcs in a weighted colored multidigraph.



































Figure 5.4: Transformed graphs of G.
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a and b. The weighted colored paths between two vertices s and q for s, q ∈ V are
expressed as PA(W )(s, q). A vertex-by-vertex path between any two vertices in the
graph G can be obtained by tracing arc-by-arc paths between two appropriate arcs
in the line graph L(G). Specifically, the paths between s and q can be expressed
as PA(W )(s, q) = {PA(W )(a, b) : a ∈ AS, b ∈ AE}.
The proposed algebraic method is convenient for computer implementation. A
pseudo code for the proposed algorithm is presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Pseudo code of the proposed algorithm for finding colored
paths
Step 0: Input the starting arc set AS, the ending arc set AE, and the reduced
weighted edge consecutive matrix LJ
(W )
r .
Step 1: For each arc as ∈ AS and each arc ae ∈ AE, set as as the starting arc
and ae as the ending arc. For each pair of as and ae, repeat the steps from
Step 2 to Step 5.
Step 2: Put as into Path-Recorder as the last arc al(1) of the first path.
Step 3: In Path-Recorder, for each path i, e.g., PA(W )(i), check its last arc al(i).
Obtain all the new arcs starting from al(i) based on matrix LJ
(W )
r .
Case 1: If there is no arc starting from al(i), path PA
(W )(i) ends.
Eliminate PA(W )(i) from Path-Recorder;
Case 2: If a new arc has appeared in the path, which means that the path
forms a cycle, do not record the new path. If all the new arcs have
appeared, eliminate PA(W )(i) from Path-Recorder;
Case 3: If the new arc is the end arc ae, add ae to the path PA
(W )(i) to form
a new path. Reserve the path into Path-Recorder and set an end-mark
at the end of the path;
Otherwise: Add each new arc to path PA(W )(i), respectively, to form
several new paths.
Reserve these paths into Path-Recorder, and eliminate the original path
PA(W )(i) from Path-Recorder.
Step 4: Repeat Step 3 until all the paths in Path-Recorder have the end-mark at the end.
Step 5: Output Path-Recorder, which records all paths starting from as and ending at ae.
Because the algebraic expressions are explicitly given, the proposed method
facilitates the development of improved algorithms to search colored paths and is
easy to adapt to new path searching problems. For instance, a transportation
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network problem of finding the shortest path with specific constraints can be
solved by using the conversion function F (B(W )) = [(B
(W )
in )
T · B(W )out ] ◦ M , where
B(W ) denotes the original network and matrix M is designed to capture
constraint requirements, to transform the original problem to a general shortest
path searching problem without the constraints.
Note that in this research all arcs are distinct on a path but the restriction
that all nodes be distinct on a path is relaxed. The process that converts an edge-





Figure 5.5: The process of finding all colored paths or the shortest colored
path
5.3.3 Constructing Weighted Reachability Matrix using
Weighted Colored Paths





out denote the weighted in-incidence and out-incidence matrices for H. The
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out ) · (B(WH)in )T ]. (5.4)
From algebraic graph theory [24], Theorem 5.3 can easily follow.
Lemma 5.2. For a weighted colored multidigraph G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w), let t be
an integer, H ⊆ N , and (LJ (WH)r )t(a, b) be the (a, b) entry of matrix (LJ (WH)r )t.
Then, (LJ
(WH)
r )t(a, b) denotes the number of weighted colored paths by H in the G
from edge a to edge b with length t for a, b ∈ A. Moreover, if ψ(a) = (u, s) and
ψ(b) = (q, v) for u, s, q, v ∈ V , then, the number of the weighted colored paths by
H from vertex u to vertex v with length t + 1 is at least (LJ
(WH)
r )t(a, b).
Proof: This Lemma is proved using induction on t.
When t = 1, the result is obvious.
Assume that when t = k, the result holds. Then, when t = k + 1,
(LJ
(WH)





r )k(a, h) · LJ (WH)r (h, b)].
By the induction hypothesis, (LJ
(WH)
r )k(a, h) denotes the number of the
weighted colored paths by H from a to h with length k, and LJ
(WH)
r (h, b)
indicates the number of weighted colored paths by H from h to b with length 1.
Thus, (LJ
(WH)
r )k(a, h) · LJ (WH)r (h, b) denotes the number of weighted colored





r )k(a, h) · LJ (WH)r (h, b)] is the total number of weighted colored paths
by H from a to b with length k + 1. Thus, (LJ
(WH)
r )t(a, b) denotes the number of
weighted colored paths by H in the G from edge a to edge b with length t for
a, b ∈ A.
Obviously, if ψ(a) = (u, s) and ψ(b) = (q, v) for u, s, q, v ∈ V , then, the number
of the weighted colored paths by H from vertex u to vertex v with length t + 1 is
at least (LJ
(WH)
r )t(a, b). 
Note that, in Lemma 5.2, when calculating the length of an edge-by-edge path,
the edges in the path should be treated as vertices. i.e., edge-by-edge paths are
treated as state-by-state paths in the line graph L(G).
Theorem 5.4. Let l
(W )
H denote the number of arcs in A
(W )
H . For a weighted colored






out ) · (LJ (WH)r + I)l
(W )
H −1 · (B(WH)in )T ], (5.5)
where I is the identity matrix.
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r )0 = I. Using matrix theory, (LJ
(WH)
r + I)L−1 =
L−1∑
t=0
CtL−1 · (LJ (WH)r )t.
Let Q = sign[B
(WH)




CtL−1 · B(WH)out · (LJ (WH)r )t · (B(WH)in )T ]
= (B
(WH)





out · (LJ (WH)r )t · (B(WH)in )T )].







out · (LJ (WH)r )t · (B(WH)in )T )].
Then, Q(s, q) 	= 0 iff J (W )H (s, q) 	= 0 or for 1 ≤ t ≤ L − 1, there exist
(LJ
(WH)
r )t(a, b) 	= 0 such that a, b ∈ A(W )H , ψ(a) = (s, u), and ψ(b) = (v, q) for
s, q, u, v ∈ V . J (W )H (s, q) 	= 0 implies that vertex q is reachable from vertex s by
paths PA
(W )
H (s, q) with length 1. By Lemma 5.2, (LJ
(WH)
r )t(a, b) 	= 0 iff vertex q
is reachable from vertex s by the weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H (s, q) with length
t + 1. Therefore, Q(s, q) 	= 0 iff vertex q is reachable from vertex s by the
weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H (s, q) with length 1 or t + 1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ L − 1.
By Definition 5.11, M
(W )
H (s, q) 	= 0 iff vertex q is reachable from vertex s by
the weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H (s, q) with length k ≤ L. Then M (W )H (s, q) 	= 0
implies that Q(s, q) 	= 0. Q(s, q) 	= 0 implies that there exists an edge weighted
colored path PA
(W )
H (s, q) with length 1 ≤ t ≤ L, then M (W )H (s, q) 	= 0. Since M (W )H




out ) · (LJ (WH)r + I)L−1 · (B(WH)in )T ]. 
The algebraic method to search edge-weighted, colored paths in a colored
multidigraph can have many benefits presented as follows.
5.4 Applications
5.4.1 Application 1: Transportation Network
Because of the accelerating globalization trend, a major logistic challenge is to
design a reliable, efficient, and economical system for moving merchandise within
a multi-modal transportation network. Due to diverse geography and weather
conditions, cost and time constraints, as well as other factors, chartered
companies may have to switch their transport mode when passing through a
transfer station. In order to design a competitive transportation system, one
must analyze all possible paths from any initial station to a destination to make
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the best choice. This transportation problem can be conveniently modeled as a























   


Figure 5.6: A transportation network.
A hypothetical transportation network is shown in Fig. 5.6. The label on each
arc indicates its weight. Three different line styles, encoded in three colors, denote
three transportation modes: Color 1, Airline; Color 2, Highway; and Color 3,
Sea route, respectively. The numbers of airlines, highways, and sea routes are
c1 = 4, c2 = 12, and c3 = 8, respectively. Nine transfer stations are expressed using
vertices v1 to v9 as shown in the graph. According to the Rule of Priority, each
edge is labeled as shown in Fig. 5.6. Charter companies will move merchandise
from a starting station to some destinations. Assume also that this network is
consolidated in such a way that merchandise will have to be switched from one
transportation mode to another at any transfer station. In order to design a
competitive transportation system, one needs to search all possible colored paths
between any two vertices in the transportation network. Using Theorem 5.2, the
reduced weighted edge consecutive matrix LJ
(W )
r is calculated and its nonzero
entries are listed in Table 5.2. Using the algorithm presented in Table 5.1, all
colored paths in the network can be found based on the information in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: The nonzero entries of matrix LJr for the transportation
network
Status quo Nonzero entries of the reduced edge consecutive matrix LJr
v1 (a1, a7), (a1, a8), (a1, a18),(a5, a2) , (a5, a19), (a17, a3), (a17, a11), (a17, a12)
v2 (a7, a20), (a18, a13), (a18, a14)
v3 (a2, a10), (a2, a20), (a19, a4), (a19, a15)
v4 (a20, a16)
v5 (a3, a13), (a3, a14), (a3, a22), (a11, a4), (a11, a23), (a21, a1), (a21, a5), (a21, a6)
v6 (a13, a24), (a22, a7), (a22, a8)
v7 (a4, a16), (a4, a24), (a23, a2), (a23, a9)
v8 (a24, a10)
Fig. 5.7 shows that the colored multidigraph is mapped by the conversion
function F (·) designed by equation (5.3) to a simple digraph with no color
constraints. Note that the numbers labeled in circles shown in Fig. 5.7 denote
edge numbers. For the standard digraph, several well-known algorithms, such as
depth-first search algorithm [25] and Dijkstra algorithm [14], are available for
searching the shortest path on the reduced digraph.
For instance, if a firm wants to find the shortest path to move merchandise
from station v1 to station v8. Fig. 5.7 shows that there exist six colored paths
between vertexes v1 and v8 in terms of arcs:
a17 −→ a3 −→ a13
a17 −→ a11 −→ a4
a5 −→ a2 −→ a20
a1 −→ a7 −→ a20
a5 −→ a19 −→ a4
a1 −→ a18 −→ a13
Based on the Rule of Priority and the relation between state-by-state paths
and arc-by-arc paths, PA(W )(s, q) = {PA(W )(a, b) : a ∈ AS, b ∈ AE}, the above
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Figure 5.7: Graph transformation.
v1 −→ v5 −→ v6 −→ v8,
v1 −→ v5 −→ v7 −→ v8,
v1 −→ v3 −→ v4 −→ v8,
v1 −→ v2 −→ v4 −→ v8,
v1 −→ v3 −→ v7 −→ v8,
v1 −→ v2 −→ v6 −→ v8.
If the following weights are assigned, w1 = 13, w2 = 24, w3 = 10, w4 = 17, w5 =
14, w7 = 26, w11 = 15, w13 = 19, w17 = 20, w18 = 19, w19 = 18, and w20 = 17, then
the shortest colored path between vertices v1 and v8 is the path consisting of edges
a17, a3, and a13, or equivalently in terms of nodes, v1 −→ v5 −→ v6 −→ v8.
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5.4.2 Application 2: Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
This proposed algebraic approach can also be conveniently applied to solve
problems of stability and status quo analyses in the graph model for conflict
resolution. If the state set S is treated as a vertex set and DM i’s oriented arcs
are coded in color i, then a graph model of a conflict is equivalent to a colored
multidigraph with appropriate preference relations. Hence, a graph model can be
conveniently treated as an edge-weighted, colored multidigraph in which each arc
represents a legal unilateral move, distinct colors refer to different DMs, and the
weight along the arc identifies some preference attribute.
As a post-stability analysis in the graph model, status quo analysis examines
whether predicted equilibria (or potential resolutions) are reachable from a status
quo or an initial state by tracing the moves and countermoves among DMs. An
important restriction of a graph model is that no DM can move twice in succession
along any path [16]. Thus, tracing the evolution of a conflict in status quo analysis
is converted to searching all colored paths with some preference structure such
as simple preference [16], uncertain preference [46], or strength of preference [28].
The proposed algebraic approach also highlights a link between status quo analysis
and traditional stability analysis, thereby suggesting the possibility of an integrated
approach to stability and status quo analyses.
5.4.2.1 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Simple Preference
In the original information, the preference of DM i is coded by a pair of relations
{i,∼i} on S. This preference structure is called simple preference.
Definition 5.7 presents a weight matrix WH for a weighted colored multidigraph
G = (V,A,N, ψ, c, w). In a graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . By the proposed
Rule of Priority, the oriented arcs in the graph model are labeled according to the
DM order; within each DM, according to the sequence of initial states; and within
each DM and initial state, according to the sequence of terminal states. When an





Pw if v i u and i ∈ H,
Ew if u ∼i v and i ∈ H,
Nw if u i v and i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.
(5.6)
The weight matrix WH represents preference information of each edge in the graph
model for simple preference. Recall that notation UMs and UIs denote unilateral
movers and unilateral improvements, respectively. Based on the statement (5.6),
the UM weight matrix and the UI weight matrix for H are defined as follows.
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Definition 5.14. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N .
• when Pw = Ew = Nw = 1, the weight matrix WH is called the UM weight
matrix by H, denoted by W
(UM)
H ;
• when Pw = 1 and Ew = Nw = 0, the weight matrix WH is called the UI





Recall that each arc of Ai and A
+
i denotes that DM i can make a UM and a
UI (in one step) from the initial state to the terminal state of the arc,








A+i denote the UM and the
UI arcs associated with any DM in H. Based on Definition 5.6, on the weighted
arc set for H, the following result relative to the UM arc set and the UI arc set is
obvious for the graph model with simple preference.
Corollary 5.1. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N .
• If WH = W (UM)H , then the arc set A(W )H = AH ;
• If WH = W+H , the arc set A(W )H = A+H .
Note that when H = N , AH and A
+
H are denoted by A and A
+, respectively.
In a weighted colored multidigraph, the edge-weighted, colored paths by H
between two vertices u and v are described in Definition 5.4 which can represent
conflict evolution by the legal UMs and the legal UIs in a graph model for simple
preference.
Corollary 5.2. For the graph model G = (S,A), let u, v ∈ S and H ⊆ N .
• If WH = W (UM)H , the weighted colored paths between states u and v,
PA
(W )
H (u, v), give all paths from u to v where all legal UMs are allowed.
Then PA
(W )
H (u, v) are called legal UM paths from u to v by coalition H,
denoted by PAH(u, v);
• If WH = W+H , the weighted colored paths between states u and v, PA(W )H (u, v),
give all paths from u to v where only legal UIs are allowed. Then PA
(W )
H (u, v)
are called legal UI paths from u to v by coalition H, denoted by PA+H(u, v).
The weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H can be used to trace conflict evolution of status
quo analysis for simple preference. When u is selected as a status quo and v is an
equilibrium for some stability in a graph model, PAH(u, v) and PA
+
H(u, v) trace
conflict evolution to confirm that the equilibrium is in fact reachable from the
status quo and reveal how to reach it.
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Definition 5.15. In the graph model G = (S,A), the legal UM and the legal UI
edge consecutive matrices are two l×l matrices LJ (UM)r and LJ+r with (a, b) entries
LJ (UM)r (a, b) =
{
1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and
are controlled by difference DMs for a, b ∈ A,
0 otherwise,
LJ+r (a, b) =
{
1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and
are controlled by difference DMs for a, b ∈ A+,
0 otherwise.
Let LJHr and LJ
+
Hr
denote the legal UM and the legal UI edge consecutive
matrices in the graph model (S,AH). Based on Definition 5.13, on the reduced
weighted edge consecutive matrix by H, and Definition 5.15, the following result
is obvious.
Corollary 5.3. For the graph model G = (S,A), let W (UM) and W+ denote the




H be the UM and the UI weight





















As the proposed algorithm presented in Table 5.1 for searching weighted colored
paths in a weighted colored multidigraph, the legal UM and UI edge consecutive
matrices LJHr and LJ
+
Hr
are applied to find paths PAH and PA
+
H between any
two states for status quo analysis in a graph model. Specific applications for status
quo analysis using the algebraic approach are presented in Chapter 7.
For simple preference, the key inputs of stability analysis, RH(s) and R
+
H(s),
are the reachable lists by coalition H from state s ∈ S by the legal UMs and the
legal UIs. Algorithms are complicated to implement the key inputs of stability
analysis [16]. This research provides an algebraic approach to construct RH(s)
and R+H(s) using the weighted reachability matrix M
(W )
H shown by Definition 5.11.
The details are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.4.2.2 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Preference with Uncertainty
Preference information plays an important role in the decision analysis. To
incorporate preference uncertainty into the graph model methodology, Li et
al. [46] proposed a new preference structure in which DM i’s preferences are
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expressed by a triple of relations {i,∼i, Ui} on S, where s i q indicates strict
preference, s ∼i q indicates indifference, and sUiq means DM i may prefer state s
to state q, may prefer q to s, or may be indifferent between s and q.
The weight matrix WH can be employed to represent preference with
uncertainty. When an edge ak = di(u, v) for u, v ∈ S and i ∈ H ⊆ N , then its




Pw if v i u and i ∈ H,
Nw if u i v and i ∈ H,
Ew if u ∼i v and i ∈ H,
Uw if uUiv and i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.
(5.7)
Recall that notation UIUUMs denotes unilateral improvements or unilateral
uncertain moves. Based on the statement (5.7), the UIUUM weight matrix for H
is defined as follows.
Definition 5.16. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . When Pw = Uw = 1
and Ew = Nw = 0, the weight matrix WH is called the UIUUM weight matrix for





Each arc of arc set A+,Ui denotes that DM i can make a UIUUM from the initial




UIUUM arcs associated with any DM in H. By Definition 5.6 for the weighted
arc set A
(W )
H , the UIUUM arc set is obtained for a graph model with preference
uncertainty by the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.4. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . If WH = W+,UH ,





Note that when H = N , A+,UH is expressed by A
+,U .
The weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H can be applied to trace conflict evolution
by the legal UIUUMs for the graph model with preference uncertainty.
Corollary 5.5. For the graph model G = (S,A), let u, v ∈ S and H ⊆ N . If WH =
W+,UH , the weighted colored paths between states u and v, PA
(W )
H (u, v), give all paths
from u to v where only the legal UIUUMs are allowed. Then PA
(W )
H (u, v) are called
the legal UIUUM paths from u to v by coalition H, denoted by PA+,UH (u, v).
The conflict evolution by the legal UIUUMs can be tracked using the reduced
weighted edge consecutive matrix. The legal UIUUM edge consecutive matrix is
defined first.
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Definition 5.17. In the graph model G = (S,A), the legal UIUUM edge
consecutive matrix is an l × l matrix LJ+,Ur with (a, b) entry
LJ+,Ur (a, b) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and
are controlled by difference DMs for a, b ∈ A+,U ,
0 otherwise.
Let LJ+,UHr denote the legal UIUUM edge consecutive matrix for the graph model
(V,AH). Based on Definitions 5.13 and 5.17, the following result is obtained.
Corollary 5.6. For the graph model G = (S,A), let W+,U denote the UIUUM













The key input of stability analysis for the graph model with preference
uncertainty is the reachable list R+,UH (s) of coalition H ⊆ N from state s ∈ S by
the legal UIUUMs. The algebraic approach to searching weighted colored paths
can also be used to construct R+,UH (s). The details are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.4.2.3 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Strength of Preference
Another triplet relation {i, >i,∼i} on S that expresses strength of preference
(strong or mild preference) was developed by Hamouda et al. [27,28]. For s, q ∈ S,
s i q denotes DM i strongly prefers s to q, s >i q means DM i mildly prefers s to
q, and s ∼i q indicates that DM i is indifferent between states s and q. The weight
matrix WH can represent strength of preference. When an edge ak = di(u, v) for




Ps if v i u and i ∈ H,
Pm if v >i u and i ∈ H,
Ew if u ∼i v and i ∈ H,
Nw if u i v or u >i v and i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.
(5.8)
Recall that notation WIs denotes strong unilateral improvements or mild
unilateral improvements called weak improvements. Based on the statement
(5.8), the WI weight matrix for H is defined as follows.
Definition 5.18. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . When Ps = Pm = 1







Each arc of the arc set A+,++i denotes that DM i can make a WI from the initial




WI arcs associated with any DM in H. By Definition 5.6 for the weighted arc set
A
(W )
H , the WI arc set is obtained for a graph model with strength of preference by
the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.7. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . If WH = W+,++H ,





Note that when H = N , A+,++H is expressed by A
+,++.
The weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H can be applied to trace conflict evolution
by the legal WIs for the graph model with strength of preference.
Corollary 5.8. For the graph model G = (S,A), let u, v ∈ S and H ⊆ N . If
WH = W
+,++
H , the weighted colored paths between states u and v, PA
(W )
H (u, v),
give all paths from u to v where only the legal WIs are allowed. Then PA
(W )
H (u, v)
are called the legal WI paths from u to v by coalition H, denoted by PA+,++H (u, v).
Definition 5.19. In the graph model G = (S,A), the legal WI edge consecutive
matrix is an l × l matrix LJ+,++r with (a, b) entry
LJ+,++r (a, b) =
{
1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and
are controlled by difference DMs for a, b ∈ A+,++,
0 otherwise.
Let LJ+,++Hr denote the legal WI edge consecutive matrix for the graph model
(V,AH). Based on Definition 5.13, on the reduced weighted edge consecutive
matrix by H, and Definition 5.19, the following result can be easily obtained.
Corollary 5.9. For the graph model G = (S,A), let W+,++ denote the WI weight













The key input of stability analysis in the graph model with strength of
preference is state set R+,++H (s), the reachable list of coalition H ⊆ N from state
s ∈ S by the legal WIs. The algebraic approach provides a new method to
construct R+,++H (s). The details are discussed in Chapter 6.
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5.4.2.4 Weight Matrix for GMCR under Hybrid Preference
A hybrid preference framework is presented in Chapter 3 to combine preference
uncertainty and strength of preference using a quadruple relation {i, >i,∼i, Ui}
in a graph model for DM i. The weight matrix WH can also represent the combining
preference of uncertainty and strength. When an edge ak = di(u, v) for u, v ∈ S




Ps if v i u and i ∈ H,
Pm if v >i u and i ∈ H,
Ew if u ∼i v and i ∈ H,
Uw if uUiv and i ∈ H,
Nw if u i v or u >i v and i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.
(5.9)
Recall that notation WIUUMs denotes strong unilateral improvements, mild
unilateral improvements, or unilateral uncertain moves. By the statement (5.9),
the WIUUM weight matrix for H is defined as follows.
Definition 5.20. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . When Ps = Pm =
Uw = 1 and Ew = Nw = 0, the weight matrix WH is called the WIUUM weight





Each arc of the arc set A+,++,Ui denotes that DM i can make a WIUUM from




denotes the WI arcs associated with any DM in H. By Definition 5.6 for the
weighted arc set, the WIUUM arc set is obtained for a graph model with hybrid
preference by the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.10. For the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . If WH = W+,++,UH ,





Note that when H = N , A+,++,UH is expressed by A
+,++,U .
The weighted colored paths PA
(W )
H can be applied to trace conflict evolution
by the legal WIUUMs for the graph model with strength of preference.
Corollary 5.11. For the graph model G = (S,A), let u, v ∈ S and H ⊆ N . If
WH = W
+,++,U
H , the weighted colored paths between states u and v, PA
(W )
H (u, v),
give all paths from u to v where only the legal WIUUMs are allowed. Then
PA
(W )
H (u, v) are called the legal WI paths from u to v by coalition H, denoted by
PA+,++,UH (u, v).
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Definition 5.21. In the graph model G = (S,A), the legal WIUUM edge
consecutive matrix is an l × l matrix LJ+,++,Ur with (a, b) entry
LJ+,++,Ur (a, b) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab and
are controlled by difference DMs for a, b ∈ A+,++,U ,
0 otherwise.
Let LJ+,++,UHr denote the legal WIUUM edge consecutive matrix for the graph
model (V,AH). Based on Definition 5.13, on the reduced weighted edge consecutive
matrix for H, and Definition 5.21, the following result is obtained.
Corollary 5.12. For the graph model G = (S,A), let W+,++,U denote the WIUUM













The key input of stability analysis in the graph model with hybrid preference
is state set R+,++,UH (s), the reachable list of coalition H ⊆ N from state s ∈ S
by the legal WIUUMs. A logical method is presented in Chapter 3 to construct
R+,++,UH (s). An algebraic approach to obtain the state set will be addressed in
future research as mentioned in Section 8.2.
5.5 Summary
From the above discussions, we find that although many approaches and algorithms
for coloring vertices and edges have been developed in graph theory and computer
science [9], the edge-weighted, colored graph research here differs from previous
work in that it is not concerned with how to color edges. Instead, the fundamental
problem is to search edge-weighted, colored paths in a given colored multidigraph.
This research is also different from the well-known network analysis problem of
finding paths between two vertices due to the additional color restriction feature
that is not present in these problems. Therefore, it is difficult to use existing
methods or algorithms directly, including genetic algorithms [12], neural networks
[65], and reinforcement learning algorithms [45], to find the shortest colored path.
In this research, an adjacency matrix of an undirected line graph is extended to
a reduced weighted edge consecutive matrix to search all weighted colored paths,
thereby providing new insights into Algebraic Graph Theory [24]. Based on the
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matrix thus designed, a conversion function is proposed to transform a colored
multidigraph to a simple digraph so that the original complex problem of searching
edge-colored paths in a colored multidigraph is converted to a standard problem of
finding paths in a simple digraph with no color constraints [72]. In Chapters 6 and




Stability Analysis in the Graph
Model
Stability definitions in the graph model are traditionally defined logically, in terms
of the underlying graphs and preference relations. However, as was noted in the
development of the DSS GMCR II, the nature of logical representations makes
coding difficult. The new preference structures proposed by Li et al. [46] , Hamouda
et al. [28] and Xu et al. [70] to represent uncertainty, strength, and combining
uncertainty and strength in DMs’ preferences included some extensions of the four
basic stability definitions, but algorithms have not been developed for the three
structures. Table 1.1 shows the current state of development of effective algorithms
and codes to implement these solution concepts, which would be essential if they
are to be applied to practical problems [44].
In this chapter, matrix expressions are used to capture relative preferences,
reachable lists by a coalition from a status quo by legal sequences of UMs and UIs
for simple preference, legal sequence of UIUUMs for preference with uncertainty,
and legal sequence of WIs for preference with strength. An explicit algebraic form
conflict model is developed to facilitate stability calculations in two-DM and n-DM
(n > 2) models for simple preference, preference with uncertainty, and preference
with strength.
Note that if the state set S is treated as a vertex set and DM i’s oriented arcs
are coded in color i, then a graph model of a conflict is equivalent to a colored
multidigraph with appropriate preference relations. As shown in Chapter 5, the
weight matrix is convenient and flexible to represent preference information in
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the graph model. Therefore, the graph model is converted to a weighted colored
multidigraph. It is natural to use the results of Graph Theory to assist in analyzing
of a graph model. Hence, we will hereafter use the same notation as Chapter 5 to
represent a graph model for conflicts.
6.1 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts
for Simple Preference
In this section, a graph model and four graph model solution concepts are
formulated explicitly using matrices. More specifically, matrix expressions are
given for relative preferences and the reachable lists of a coalition from a status
quo state by the legal sequences of UMs and UIs in a multiple-decision-maker
model. Then it is shown how to calculate stability under each of the four solution
concepts using the matrix representation.
6.1.1 Matrix Representation of Essential Components for
Stabilities for Simple Preference
Important matrices associated with a digraph include the adjacency matrix and
the incidence matrix [24]. These matrices are extended to the graph model for
conflict resolution. Let i ∈ N and m = |S|. Recall that UMs and UIs represent
unilateral moves and unilateral improvements, respectively.
Definition 6.1. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UM adjacency matrix
Ji and UI adjacency matrix J
+




1 if (s, q) ∈ Ai,
0 otherwise,
and J+i (s, q) =
{
1 if (s, q) ∈ A+i ,
0 otherwise,
where s, q ∈ S and A+i = {(s, q) ∈ Ai : q i s}.
The reachable lists by DM i from state s defined in Section 2.2.2, Ri(s) and
R+i (s), are expressed as Ri(s) = {q : Ji(s, q) = 1} and R+i (s) = {q : J+i (s, q) = 1}.
The following result is obtained based on Definition 5.8, on the weighted adjacency
matrix by H, J
(W )
H , Theorem 5.3 for constructing matrix J
(W )
H , and Definition 6.1.
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Corollary 6.1. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UM and the UI adjacency






















Recall that RH(s) and R
+
H(s) are the reachable lists of coalition H from state
s by the legal sequences of UMs and UIs. Two essential matrices for stability
analysis are defined as follows.
Definition 6.2. Let H ⊆ N . For the graph model G = (S,A), the UM reachability
matrix and the UI reachability matrix of coalition H are two m×m matrices MH
and M+H with (s, q) entries
MH(s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ RH(s) for q ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
M+H (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ R+H(s) for q ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
The following result is obtained based on Definition 5.11, on the weighted
reachability matrix by H, M
(W )
H , Theorem 5.4 for constructing the weighted
reachability matrix and Corollary 5.3 for constructing the legal UM and UI edge
consecutive matrices LJr and LJ
+
r , and Definition 6.2.
Corollary 6.2. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UM reachability and the UI





















where l1 = |AH | and l2 = |A+H |.
Below, several m × m preference matrices, P+i , P−i , and P=i for DM i, are
respectively defined as
P+i (s, q) =
{
1 if q i s,
0 otherwise,
P−i (s, q) =
{




P=i (s, q) =
{




i ∨ P=i .
It follows that
P−,=i (s, q) =
{
1 − P+i (s, q) if s 	= q,
0 otherwise.
Based on the definitions of the UM adjacency matrix, Ji, the UI adjacency
matrix, J+i , and preference matrix, P
+
i , for DM i, the relationship among them is
J+i = Ji ◦ P+i .
6.1.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for
Two-DMs under Simple Preference
Matrix representation of Nash stability, GMR, SMR, and SEQ in two-DM conflict
models for simple preference is developed in this chapter. The system, called the
MRSC method, incorporated a set of m×m matrices, MGMRi , MSMRi , and MSEQi ,
to capture GMR, SMR, and SEQ for DM i ∈ N , where |N | = 2 and m = |S|.
Since the following results are special cases of those developed in the next
subsection, the details are not given here. Let N = {i, j}. Then
Theorem 6.1. State s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i iff eTs · J+i =
−→
0 T . (T denotes
matrix transpose and eTs is the transpose of the s
th standard basis vector of the
m-dimensional Euclidean space.)
A state s ∈ S is general metarational for DM i iff whenever DM i makes any




i · [E − sign
(
Jj · (P−,=i )T
)
], for j ∈ N\{i}.
Theorem 6.2. State s ∈ S is GMR for DM i iff MGMRi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m matrix MSMRi = J+i · [E − sign(G)] in which
G = Jj · [(P−,=i )T ◦
(
E − sign (Ji · (P+i )T ))], for j ∈ N\{i}.
Theorem 6.3. State s ∈ S is SMR for DM i iff MSMRi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m×m matrix MSEQi = J+i ·[E−sign
(
J+j · (P−,=i )T
)
], for j ∈ N\{i}.
Theorem 6.4. State s ∈ S is SEQ for DM i iff MSEQi (s, s) = 0.
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These theorems prove that the proposed matrix representation of solution
concepts are equivalent to the solution concepts for two DM conflicts defined by
Fang et al. [16]. The matrix representation can be extended to models including
more than two DMs, which is the objective of the next subsection.
6.1.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for n-
DMs under Simple Preference
Equivalent matrix representations of the logical definitions for Nash stability,
GMR, SMR, and SEQ can be determined directly by using the relationship that
has been established between matrix elements and the state set of a graph model,
and by using preference relation matrices among the states.
Let i ∈ N and |N | = n for the following theorems.
Theorem 6.5. State s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashi , iff
〈es, J+i e〉 = 0, where <,> denotes the inner product.
Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.5 are identical because Nash stability does not
consider opponents’ responses.
It should be pointed out that the following stability matrices for n-DMs use
the same notation as that presented in Subsection 6.1.2 for two-DMs. For general
metarationality, DM i will take into account the opponents’ possible responses,
which are the legal sequence of UMs by members of N\{i}. For i ∈ N , find the
UI adjacency matrix J+i and the UM reachability matrix MN\{i} using Corollary
6.1 and Corollary 6.2, for which H = N\{i}. Define the m×m matrix MGMRi by
MGMRi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−,=i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.6. State s ∈ S is GMR for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRi , iff
MGMRi (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since the diagonal element of matrix MGMRi
MGMRi (s, s) = 〈(J+i )T es,
(




J+i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(〈(MN\{i})T es1 , (P−,=i )T es〉)],
then MGMRi (s, s) = 0 iff
J+i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(〈(MN\{i})T es1 , (P−,=i )T es〉)] = 0,∀s1 ∈ S.
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This implies that MGMRi (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1MN\{i}) · (eTs P−,=i )T 	= 0,∀s1 ∈ R+i (s). (6.1)
Statement (6.1) means that, for any s1 ∈ R+i (s), there exists s2 ∈ S, such that the
m-dimensional row vector, eTs1 ·MN\{i}, with sth2 element 1 and the m-dimensional
column vector, (P−,=i )
T · es, with sth2 element 1.
Therefore, MGMRi (s, s) = 0 iff for any s1 ∈ R+i (s), there exists at least one
s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2. 
For symmetric metarationality, the n-DM model is similar to the two-DM
model. The only modification is that responses come from DM i ’s opponents
instead of from a single DM. Let
G = (P−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign(Ji · (P+i )T )],
then define the m × m matrix MSMRi by
MSMRi = J
+
i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · G)].
Theorem 6.7. State s ∈ S is SMR for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRi , iff
MSMRi (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since the diagonal element of matrix MSMRi
MSMRi (s, s) = 〈(J+i )T · es,
(






J+i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(〈(MN\{i})T · es1 , G · es〉)],
then MSMRi (s, s) = 0 iff
J+i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(〈(MN\{i})T · es1 , G · es〉)] = 0,∀s1 ∈ S.
This means that MSMRi (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1 · MN\{i}) · (G · es) 	= 0, ∀s1 ∈ R+i (s). (6.2)
Let G(s2, s) denote the (s2, s) entry of matrix G. Since
(eTs1MN\{i}) · (G · es) =
m∑
s2=1
MN\{i}(s1, s2) · G(s2, s),
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then (6.2) holds iff for any s1 ∈ R+i (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such that
G(s2, s) 	= 0.
Because G(s2, s) = P
−,=





i (s, s3))], then
G(s2, s) 	= 0 implies that for s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1),






i (s, s3) = 0. (6.4)
(6.3) is equivalent to the statement that, ∀s1 ∈ R+i (s), ∃s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such that
s i s2. (6.4) is the same as the statement that, ∀s1 ∈ R+i (s),∃s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1)
such that P+i (s, s3) = 0 for ∀s3 ∈ Ri(s2). Based on the definition of m×m matrix
P+i , one knows that P
+
i (s, s3) = 0 ⇐⇒ s i s3.
Therefore, we conclude the above discussion that MSMRi (s, s) = 0 iff for any
s1 ∈ R+i (s), there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2 and s i s3 for
all s3 ∈ Ri(s2). 
Sequential stability examines the credibility of the sanctions by DM i ’s
opponents. For i ∈ N , find the UI reachability matrix M+N\{i} using Corollary 6.2.
Define the m × m matrix MSEQi by
MSEQi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(
M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.8. State s ∈ S is SEQ for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQi , iff
MSEQi (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since the diagonal element of matrix MSEQi
MSEQi (s, s) = 〈(J+i )T · es,
(




J+i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(〈(M+N\{i})T · es1 , (P−,=i )T · es〉)],
then MSEQi · (s, s) = 0 iff J+i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(〈(M+N\{i})T · es1 , (P−,=i )T · es〉)] =
0, ∀s1 ∈ S. This implies that MSEQi (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1M
+
N\{i}) · (eTs · P−,=i )T 	= 0, ∀s1 ∈ R+i (s). (6.5)
Statement (6.5) means that, for any s1 ∈ R+i (s), there exists s2 ∈ S, such that the
m-dimensional row vector, eTs1 ·M+N−{i}, with sth2 element 1 and the m-dimensional
column vector, (P−,=i )
T · es, with sth2 element 1.
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Therefore, MSEQi (s, s) = 0 iff for any s1 ∈ R+i (s), there exists at least one
s2 ∈ R+N\{i}(s1) with s i s2. 
When n = 2, the DM set N becomes to {i, j} in Theorems 6.5 to 6.8, and
the reachable lists for H = N \ {i} by legal sequences of UMs and UIs from s1,
RN\{i}(s1) and R+N\{i}(s1), degenerate to Rj(s1) and R
+
j (s1), DM j’s corresponding
reachable lists from s1. Thus, Theorems 6.5 to 6.8 are reduced to those Theorems
6.1 to 6.4.
So far, the matrix representation of solution concepts has been established in
multiple decision maker graph models for simple preference. As shown below, the
matrix method for calculating the individual stability and equilibria is also
attractive from a computational point of view. Many researchers are now
attempting to develop faster algorithms for matrix operations. For example, for
the multiplication of two m × m matrices, the standard method requires O(m3)
arithmetic operations, but the Strassen algorithm [62] requires only O(m2.807)
operations. Coppersmith and Winograd’s work [11] shows that the
computational complexity of matrix multiplication was decreased to O(m2.376).
In fact, some researchers believe that an optimal algorithm for multiplying
m × m matrices will reduce the complexity to O(m2) [10]. Therefore, the
proposed matrix method not only is propitious for theoretical analysis, but also
has the potential to deal with large and complicated conflict problems.
6.1.4 Interrelationships among the Solution Concepts
In 1993, Fang et al. [16] established general relationships among Nash stability,





Figure 6.1: Interrelationships among the four solution concepts [16].
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Theorem 6.9. Let i ∈ N, | N |= n, and n ≥ 2. Then interrelationships among
the four solution concepts are
SNashi ⊆ SSMRi ⊆ SGMRi (6.6)
and
SNashi ⊆ SSEQi ⊆ SGMRi . (6.7)
As shown below, the interrelationships among four solution concepts formulated
explicitly using matrices are easy to verify.
Proof: If s ∈ SNashi , then eTs · J+i =
−→
0 T . Let
B = E − sign(MN\{i} · G)
and let G = (P−,=i )
T ◦ [E−sign(Ji ·(P+i )T )]. Since MSMRi (s, s) = (eTs ·J+i ) ·(B ·es),
it follows that MSMRi (s, s) = 0, when e
T
s · J+i =
−→
0 T . Hence, if s ∈ SNashi , then
s ∈ SSMRi , which implies SNashi ⊆ SSMRi .
Because G = (P−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign(Ji · (P+i )T )], it follows that for ∀s ∈ S,
eTs ·
(
MN\{i} · (P−,=i )T
) · es 	= 0,





if eTs · [E − sign(MN\{i} · G)] · es = 0. Therefore, if s ∈ SSMRi , then
MSMRi (s, s) = (e
T
s · J+i ) · [
(
E − sign(MN\{i} · G)
) · es] = 0,
which implies that
MGMRi (s, s) = (e
T
s · J+i ) · [
(
E − sign(MN\{i} · (P−,=i )T ))es] = 0.
Hence, SSMRi ⊆ SGMRi . Thus, relation (6.6) now follows. Relation (6.7) can be
verified, similarly.
There is no necessary inclusion relation between SSMRi and S
SEQ
i , i. e., it may
or may not be true that SSMRi ⊇ SSEQi , or that SSMRi ⊆ SSEQi . However, we can
take advantage of the algebraic characterization of MRSC to establish some facts
about their interrelationship.






]. Then, when (MN\{i} · G)
∨
[M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T ] = sign(MN\{i} · G),
SSMRi ⊇ SSEQi ; and (6.8)
when (MN\{i} · G)
∨
[M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T ] = sign[M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T ],
SSMRi ⊆ SSEQi . (6.9)
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Proof: If s ∈ SSEQi , then MSEQi (s, s) = 0, which is equivalent to
(eTs · J+i ) · [
(
E − sign(M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T )) · es] = 0,
so that eTs · J+i = (eTs · J+i ) ◦ [sign
(
M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T
) · es]T . Since
(MN\{i} · W )
∨
[M+N\{i} · (P−,=i )T ] = sign(MN\{i} · G),
it follows that eTs · J+i = (eTs · J+i ) ◦ [sign(MN\{i} · G) · es]T , and therefore
(eTs · J+i ) · [
(
E − sign(MN\{i} · G)
) · es] = 0,
which implies that MSMRi (s, s) = 0. Relation (6.8) now follows. Relation (6.9) can
be proved, similarly. 
6.1.5 Applications for Simple Preference
6.1.5.1 Superpower Nuclear Confrontation
In two-DM conflicts, a simplified model of a superpower nuclear confrontation,
including the “nuclear winter” possibility [16], is used to illustrate how stability
analysis is carried out using MRSC. This conflict is modeled using two DMs and
a total of six options. In the superpower nuclear confrontation conflict, the six
options together determine five feasible states as listed in Table 6.1, where a “Y”
indicates that an option is selected by the DM controlling it and an “N” means that
the option is not chosen. The graph model of the superpower nuclear confrontation
conflict is shown in Fig. 6.2. Note that state W is assumed to trigger a nuclear
winter. Given that the preferences are ordinal for DM 1 and DM 2 [16],
PP 1 CP 1 CC 1 PC 1 W,
and
PP 2 PC 2 CC 2 CP 2 W.
In order to carry out a stability analysis for each of the five states and each of
the two DMs, the MRSC method is used for the superpower nuclear confrontation
model.
Let the five states, PP, PC, CP, CC, and W, be numbered from 1 to 5,




0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ , J2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1




Table 6.1: Options and feasible states for the superpower nuclear
confrontation conflict [16]
DM 1
1. Peace (labeled P ) Y Y N N N
2. Conventional attack (labeled C) N N Y Y N
3. Full nuclear attack (labeled W) N N N N Y
DM 2
1. Peace (labeled P ) Y N Y N N
2. Conventional attack (labeled C) N Y N Y N
3. Full nuclear attack (labeled W) N N N N Y







(a) Graph model for DM 1 (b) Graph model for DM 2





0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ , P+2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0




J+i = Ji ◦ P+i , for i = 1, 2,
and
P−,=i = E − I − P+i , for i = 1, 2,
where I is a 5 × 5 identity matrix. Next, we can calculate the stabilities of Nash,
GMR, SMR, and SEQ, respectively, for the superpower nuclear confrontation
conflict, using MRSC for two-DM cases introduced by Theorems 6.1 to 6.4. The




this state is stable for DM 1 or DM 2 under the appropriate stability definitions,
and “Eq” means an equilibrium that is stable for the two DMs. States PP, CC,
and W are equilibria for four basic solution concepts.
Table 6.2: Stability results of the superpower nuclear confrontation
State Number Nash GMR SMR SEQ
DM 1DM 2EqDM 1DM 2EqDM 1DM 2EqDM 1DM 2Eq
PP
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
PC
√ √ √ √ √ √
CP
√ √ √ √ √ √
CC
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
W
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
6.1.5.2 Rafferty-Alameda Dams Conflict
The Rafferty-Alameda dam, in the Souris River basin in southern Saskatchewan,
was planned for flood control, recreation and cooling the Shand generating
plant [55]. The province of Saskatchewan wanted to finish the project
promptly, seeking a license from the Environment Minister of the Federal
government. An environment group, the Canadian Wildlife Federation,
quickly petitioned against the license and argued that the provincial government
had not respected regulations. The federal court sided with the environment
group and ordered the suspension of the license, but later the license was reissued
by a new federal environment minister. The environment group petitioned again,
and this time the federal court ordered the suspension of the license and the
creation of a review panel to reevaluate the project. However, construction of
the dam continued during the review period, and the federal and provincial
governments even reached an agreement that the project would continue while
ten million dollars are set aside to alleviate any future environmental impacts. As
the province had hoped, the project moved ahead at full speed, and the review
panel resigned in protest. (See Hipel et al. [29] for details.)
This conflict is modeled using four DMs: DM 1, Federal (F); DM 2,
Saskatchewan (S); DM 3, Groups (G); and DM 4, Panel (P), each having
some options. The following is a summary of the four DMs and their options [29]:
• Federal Court (Federal): its options are to create a federal government
review panel (Court Order) or to lift the license (Lift),
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• Province of Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan): its option is to go ahead at full
speed (Full speed),
• Environmental Group (Group): its option is to threaten court action to halt
the project (Court action), and
• Federal Environmental Review Panel (Panel): its option is to resign
(Resign).
The five options are combined to form 32 possible states in this conflict. Only a
part of the combinations of the options create feasible states listed in Table 6.3,
where a “Y” indicates that an option is selected by the DM controlling it, an ”N”
means that the option is not chosen, and a dash “ − ”, means that the entry may
be “Y” or may be “N”. The graph model of the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict is
shown in Fig. 6.3 (1), where the labels on the arcs identify the DMs who control
the relevant moves. If DM i’s oriented arcs are coded in color i, then, according
to the Rule of Priority presented in Subsection 5.2, Fig. 6.3 (1) is converted to an
edge labeled multidigraph as shown in Fig. 6.3 (2).
Table 6.3: Feasible states for the Rafferty-Alameda dams Model [29]
Federal
1. Court Order - N Y N Y N Y N Y N
2. Lift - N N N N N N N N Y
Saskatchewan
3. Full speed N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y -
Groups
4. Court action - N N Y Y N N Y Y -
Panel
5. Resign - N N N N Y Y Y Y -
State number s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
Unilateral moves and preference information over the states are given in Table
6.4, where Ri(s), defined in Chapter 2, is DM i
′s reachable list from state s, and pi
denotes DM i′s preference function. For this function, DM i prefers a state with a
greater function value than a low one. For example, the Federal Government most
prefers state s1 and least prefers state s10. We calculate the stabilities of Nash,


















































Figure 6.3: The graph model of the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict.
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the set of four DMs. We use the Rafferty-Alameda
dams model as an example to show the procedures to carry out matrix
representation of the four solution concepts in the graph model.
• Construct preference matrices, P+i , and P−,=i , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, using
information provided by Table 6.4;
• Calculate the UM weight matrix and the UI weight matrix of coalition H
based on Definition 5.14, preference information presented in Table 6.4, and
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Table 6.4: Unilateral moves and preference functions for the Rafferty-
Alameda dams model [29]
State Number Federal Saskatchewan Groups Panel
R1 p1 R2 p2 R3 p3 R4 p4
s1 10 s2 1 9 10
s2 s3,s10 7 10 s4 1 s6 1
s3 s2,s10 9 6 s5 3 s7 3
s4 s5,s10 6 9 s2 5 s8 2
s5 s4,s10 8 5 s3 7 s9 4
s6 s7,s10 3 8 s8 2 6
s7 s6,s10 5 4 s9 4 8
s8 s9,s10 2 7 s6 6 7
s9 s8,s10 4 3 s7 8 9
s10 1 2 10 5




Pw if v i u and i ∈ H,
Ew if u ∼i v and i ∈ H,
Nw if u i v and i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.






Table 6.5: Weights of edges by N\{1} for Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict
Arc number a17 a18 a19 a20 a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26 a27 a28 a29
WN\{1} Pw Pw Pw Nw Nw Pw Pw Nw Nw Pw Pw Pw Pw
W
(UM)
N\{1} 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
W+N\{1} 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
• Construct weighted in-incidence matrix B(WH)in and out-incidence matrix
B
(WH)
out for coalition H, based on the graph model Fig. 6.3, Definition 5.10,
and Lemma 5.1;























for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by Corollary 6.1;







































out )] ◦ (El − D);
• Analyze the stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ by Theorems 6.5 to
6.8 for the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict.
In n-DM models, the UM and the UI reachability matrices of coalition H are
important components in MRSC. We have shown the construction of the
reachability matrices by a coalition. Next, we analyze the reachability matrices
by H presented in Table 6.6.
Let us use an example to analyze the UM reachability matrix by H, MH , and
the UI reachability matrix by H, M+H . Using Table 6.6 with H = N\{1}, we have
eT4 · MH = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0).
This means that the set of states, RH(s4) = {s2, s6, s8}, can be reached by any
legal UM sequence, by DMs in H = {2, 3, 4}, from the status quo s = s4. Similarly,
eT4 · M+H = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0),
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which denotes that R+H(s4) = {s8} can be reached using the legal UI sequences, by
H = {2, 3, 4}, from status quo s = s4. It is obvious that if RH(s) and R+H(s) are
written as 0-1 row vectors, respectively, then
RH(s) = e
T
s · MH , R+H(s) = eTs · M+H .
After determining all reachable matrices MN\{i} and M+N\{i} for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
stability results of the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict can be obtained using
Theorems 6.5 to 6.8. The stable states and equilibria under the four solution
concepts are summarized in Table 6.7, in which “
√
” for a given state means that
this state is stable for a DM, F, S, G, or P; and “Eq” is an equilibrium for a
appropriate solution concept. Additionally, Table 6.7 indicates that states s9 and
s10 are equilibria for the four basic solution concepts, so they are called ideal
equilibria and are better choices for decision analysis.
6.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts
for Preference with Uncertainty
Explicit matrix representations of solution concepts in a graph model of a multiple-
decision-maker conflict with preference uncertainty are developed in this section.
In a graph model, the relative preferences of each DM over the available states are
crucial in determining which states are stable according to any stability definition
(solution concept). Unfortunately, it is often difficult to obtain accurate preference
information in practical cases, so models that allow preference uncertainty can be
very useful. In this work, stability definitions are extended to apply to graph
models with this feature. The extension is easiest to implement using the matrix
representation of a conflict model, which was developed to ease the coding of
logically-defined stability definitions. Another benefit of matrix representation is
that it facilitates modification and extension of the definitions.
6.2.1 Matrix Representation of Essential Components for
Stabilities under Uncertain Preference
Recall that notation UUMs denotes unilateral uncertain moves and UIUUMs
means unilateral improvements or unilateral uncertain moves.
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Table 6.6: UM and UI reachability matrices by H = N\{i} for the
Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict
Matrix State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 Matrix State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
MN\{1} s1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 M+N\{1} s1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
s2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 s2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
s3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 s3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 s4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
s5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MN\{2} s1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M+N\{2} s1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 s2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
s3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 s3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 s4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
s5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MN\{3} s1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 M+N\{3} s1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
s2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 s2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
s3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 s3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
s4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 s4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
s5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MN\{4} s1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 M+N\{4} s1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 s2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
s3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 s3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
s4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 s4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
s5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 6.7: Stability results of the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict
State Number Nash GMR SMR SEQ
F S G P Eq F S G P Eq F S G P Eq F S G P Eq
s1
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s10
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Definition 6.3. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UUM adjacency matrix
J
(U)
i for DM i is an m × m matrix with (s, q) entry
J
(U)
i (s, q) =
{
1 if (s, q) ∈ AUi ,
0 otherwise,
where s, q ∈ S and AUi = {(s, q) ∈ Ai : sUiq}.
Note that J+,Ui = J
+
i ∨ JUi . Then, J+,Ui is called UIUUM adjacency matrix
for DM i. Recall that DM i’s reachable list R+,Ui (s) from state s by a UIUUM is
expressed as R+,Ui (s) = {q : J+,Ui (s, q) = 1}. From Theorem 5.3 and Definition
6.3, the following result is obtained.
Corollary 6.3. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UIUUM adjacency matrix of










Recall that R+,UH (s) denotes the reachable list of H from state s by the legal
sequence of UIUUMs.
Definition 6.4. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UIUUM reachability matrix
of coalition H ⊆ N is an m × m matrix M+,UH with (s, q) entry
M+,UH (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ R+,UH (s) for q ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
From Theorem 5.4, Corollary 5.6, and Definition 6.4, the following result is
obvious.
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Corollary 6.4. For the graph model G = (S,A), the UIUUM reachability matrix









where l3 = |A+,UH |.
The preference matrices P+i , P
−
i , and P
=
i , for DM i are defined in Subsection
6.1.1. Matrices PUi and P
+,U
i are defined next.




and P+,Ui = P
+
i ∨ PUi .
Then matrices P−,=i , P
+,U





i ∨ P=i , P+,Ui (s, q) = E − I − P−,=i , and P−,=,Ui (s, q) = E − I − P+i .
Consequently, the relations among the UM adjacency matrix, UI adjacency
matrix, UIUUM adjacency matrix, and preference matrices including uncertainty,
are established as follows:
J+i = Ji ◦ P+i , and J+,Ui = Ji ◦ P+,Ui .
Based on the extended preference structure (including uncertainty), Li et al. [46]
defined Nash stability, GMR, SMR, and SEQ to capture a DM’s incentives to leave
the status quo state and sensitivity to sanctions. Four types of stability definition
were proposed, indexed a, b, c, and d, according to whether the DM would move
to a state of uncertain preference and whether the DM would be sanctioned by a
responding move to a state of uncertain preference, relative to the status quo. This
range of extensions is needed, according to [46], to address the diversity of possible
risk profiles in face of uncertainty. A DM may be conservative or aggressive,
avoiding or accepting states of uncertain preference, depending on the level of
satisfaction with the current position.
Like all previous stability definitions in the graph model, the four extensions
were defined logically, in terms of the underlying graphs. Thus, as has been
observed previously, procedures to identify stable states based on these
definitions are difficult to code because of the nature of the logical
representations. To overcome this limitation, the four stability definitions in
multiple-decision-maker graph models with preference uncertainty are formulated
explicitly in terms of matrices in the next section.
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6.2.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for
Two-DMs with Preference Uncertainty
Matrix representation of the four extensions of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ
stability definitions with preference uncertainty (MRSCU) in 2-DM conflict
models is developed in this section. The system, called the MRSCU method,
incorporated a set of m × m stability matrices, MGMRli , MSMRli , and MSEQli , for
l ∈ Q = {a, b, c, d}, to capture GMRl , SMRl, and SEQl stability for DM i ∈ N ,
where |N | = 2, m = |S|, and DMs’ preferences may include uncertainty. Theses
stability matrices for two-DM models with preference uncertainty are
summarized in Table 6.8.
Since the following four theorems are special cases of the theorems developed in
the next subsection, the details are not given here. However, we note the following
theorems, proven in [66]. Let N = {i, j} and l ∈ Q. Then
Theorem 6.11. State s ∈ S is Nasha or Nashc stable for DM i iff es ·J+,Ui ·e = 0;
and state s ∈ S is Nashb or Nashd stable for DM i iff es · J+i · e = 0.
Theorem 6.12. State s ∈ S is GMRl for DM i iff MGMRli (s, s) = 0, l ∈ Q.
Theorem 6.13. State s ∈ S is SMRl for DM i iff MSMRli (s, s) = 0, l ∈ Q.
Theorem 6.14. State s ∈ S is SEQl for DM i iff MSEQli (s, s) = 0, l ∈ Q.
These theorems prove that the proposed matrix representation of solution
concepts are equivalent to the solution concepts for two DM conflicts defined by
Li et al. [46]. The matrix representation can be extended to models including
more than two DMs, which is the objective of the next subsection.
6.2.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for n-
DMs with Preference Uncertainty
In an n-DM model, where n > 2, the opponents of a DM can be thought of as a
coalition of two or more DMs. To calculate the stability of a state for DM i ∈ N ,
it is necessary to examine possible responses by all other DMs j ∈ N\{i}, which
may include sequential responses. To extend the graph model stability definitions
to stability definitions in n-DM models with preference uncertainty, the definitions
of a legal sequence of decisions [16] must first be extended to take preference
uncertainty into account [46].
129
Table 6.8: The construction of stability matrices for two-DMs with
preference uncertainty






i · [E − sign
(
Jj · (P−,=i )T
)
]
a MSMRai = J
+,U
i · [E − sign(Jj · G)], with
G = (P−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign(Ji · (P+,Ui )T )]
MSEQai = J
+,U
i · [E − sign
(








i · [E − sign
(
Jj · (P−,=i )T
)
]
b MSMRbi = J
+
i · [E − sign(Jj · G)], with
Including G = (P−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign(Ji · (P+i )T )]
uncertainty MSEQbi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(






c MGMRci = J
+,U
i · [E − sign
(





i · [E − sign(Jj · G)], with
G = (P−,=,Ui )
T ◦ [E − sign (Ji · (P+i )T )]
MSEQci = J
+,U
i · [E − sign
(








i · [E − sign
(
Jj · (P−,=,Ui )T
)
]
d MSMRdi = J
+
i · [E − sign(Jj · G)], with
G = (P−,=,Ui )
T ◦ [E − sign (Ji · (P+i )T )]
MSEQdi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(




The definitions of Nash stability, GMR, SMR, and SEQ in the graph model
for multiple-decision-maker conflict models with preference uncertainty are
described in [46]. They retain most features of the stability definitions in the
2-DM case, except that DM i’s opponents are a subset of N , N\{i}, instead of a
single opponent, j. It is obvious that in the n-DM case, the algebraic
characterizations of stabilities are similar to those presented in Section 6.2.2.
Consequently, matrix representation of solution concepts with preference
uncertainty for 2-DM cases is easy to extend to that for n-DM situations.
6.2.3.1 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index a, for Preference
with Uncertainty
In the definitions indexed a, DM i has an incentive to move to states with uncertain
preferences relative to the status quo, but, when assessing possible sanctions, will
not consider states with uncertain preferences [46]. Let i ∈ N and |N | = n in the
following theorems.
Theorem 6.15. State s ∈ S is Nasha stable for DM i iff es · J+,Ui · e = 0.
Theorem 6.15 implies that Nash stability definitions are identical for both 2-
DM and n-DM models with preference uncertainty because Nash stability does not
consider opponents’ responses.
For GMR, DM i considers the opponents’ responses, which are reachable states
RN\{i} of coalition H = N\{i} by the legal UM sequences. First, we find matrix




i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−,=i )T
)
].
Then the following theorem provides a matrix method to calculate GMRa stability.
Theorem 6.16. State s ∈ S is GMRa for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SGMRai , iff
MGMRai (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since the diagonal entry of matrix MGMRai
MGMRai (s, s) = (e
T
s · J+,Ui ) · [
(




J+,Ui (s, s1)[1 − sign
(




then MGMRai (s, s) = 0 iff J
+,U
i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(
(eTs1 · MN\{i}) · (eTs · P−,=i )T
)
] = 0
for any s1 ∈ S. This implies that MGMRai (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1 · MN\{i}) · (eTs · P−,=i )T 	= 0 for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s). (6.10)
By statement (6.10), for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s), there exists s2 ∈ S, such that the
m-dimensional row vector, eTs1 · MN\{i}, has sth2 element 1 and the m-dimensional
column vector, (P−,=i )
T · es, has sth2 element 1.
Therefore, MGMRai (s, s) = 0 iff for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s), there exists at least one
s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2. 
Symmetric metarationality in the n-DM model is similar to in the 2-DM model.
The only modification is that responses from DM i ’s opponents instead of a single
DM. Let D = (P−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign
(
Ji · (P+,Ui )T
)




i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · D)].
Thus, the following theorem provides a matrix method to calculate SMRa stability.
Theorem 6.17. State s ∈ S is SMRa for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSMRai , iff
MSMRai (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Let G = MN\{i} · D. Since the diagonal element of matrix MSMRai
MSMRai (s, s) = (e
T



















thus, MSMRai (s, s) = 0 holds iff G(s1, s) 	= 0 for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s), which is
equivalent to the statement that, for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1)
such that










Obviously, for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such that statement
(6.11) holds iff for every s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s) there exists s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such that s i s2
and s i s3 for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2). 
SEQ is similar to GMR, but includes only those sanctions that are “credible”
(unilaterally improved) or uncertain moves, i.e., SEQ examines the credibility and
uncertainty of the sanctions by DM i ’s opponents. First, we find matrix M+,UN\{i}
using Corollary 6.4. Define the m × m SEQa stability matrix MSEQai by
MSEQai = J
+,U
i · [E − sign
(
M+,UN\{i} · (P−,=i )T
)
].
Thus the following theorem provides a matrix method to calculate SEQa stability.
Theorem 6.18. State s ∈ S is SEQa for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SSEQai , iff
MSEQai (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since the diagonal element of matrix MSEQai
MSEQai (s, s) = (e
T










J+,Ui (s, s1)[1 − sign
(
(eTs1 · M+,UN\{i}) · (eTs · P−,=i )T
)
],
then MSEQai (s, s) = 0 iff J
+,U
i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(
(eTs1 · M+,UN\{i}) · (eTs · P−,=i )T
)
] = 0
for any s1 ∈ S. This implies that MSEQai (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1 · M+,UN\{i}) · (eTs · P−,=i )T 	= 0 for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s). (6.12)
By statement (6.12), for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s), there exists s2 ∈ S such that the
m-dimensional row vector, eTs1 · M+,UN\{i}, has sth2 element 1 and the m-dimensional
column vector, (P−,=i )
T · es, has sth2 element 1.
Therefore, MSEQai (s, s) = 0 iff for any s1 ∈ R+,Ui (s), there exists at least one
s2 ∈ R+,UN\{i}(s1) with s i s2. 
Nahsa stability means that the focal DM has no unilateral improvements or
unilateral uncertain moves (UIUUMs). GMRa denotes that the UIUUMs of the
focal DM are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral moves by the opponents of the
focal DM. SMRs is similar to GMRa, but the focal DM considers not only the
responses from his opponents but also his own counterresponses. SEQa indicts that
UIUUMs of the focal DM are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral improvements
or unilateral uncertain moves by the opponents of the focal DM.
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6.2.3.2 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index b, for Preference
with Uncertainty
For the next set of definitions indexed b, DM i considers leaving a state or
assessing sanctions, excluding uncertain preferences [46]. However, the definitions
are different from those for simple preference [16], since the current definitions
are utilized to analyze conflict models including preference uncertainty. The
following theorems can be similarly verified as the above theorems.
Theorem 6.19. State s ∈ S is Nashb stable for DM i iff es · J+i · e = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix MGMRbi by
MGMRbi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−,=i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.20. State s ∈ S is GMRb for DM i iff MGMRbi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix MSMRbi = J+i · [E − sign(G)], with




Ji · (P+,Ui )T
))
].
Theorem 6.21. State s ∈ S is SMRb for DM i iff MSMRbi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix MSEQbi by
MSEQbi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(
M+,UN\{i} · (P−,=i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.22. State s ∈ S is SEQb for DM i iff MSEQbi (s, s) = 0.
6.2.3.3 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index c, for Preference
with Uncertainty
For the extended definitions indexed c, DM i considers moving from a status quo
state or evaluating sanctions including uncertain preferences.
Theorem 6.23. State s ∈ S is Nashc stable for DM i iff es · J+,Ui · e = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix MGMRci by
MGMRci = J
+,U
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−,=,Ui )T
)
].
Theorem 6.24. State s ∈ S is GMRc for DM i iff MGMRci (s, s) = 0.
134
Define the m × m stability matrix MSMRci by
MSMRci = J
+,U
i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · D)],
in which
D = (P−,=,Ui )
T ◦ [E − sign (Ji · (P+i )T )].
Theorem 6.25. State s ∈ S is SMRc for DM i iff MSMRci (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix MSEQci by
MSEQci = J
+,U
i · [E − sign
(
M+,UN\{i} · (P−,=,Ui )T
)
].
Theorem 6.26. State s ∈ S is SEQc for DM i iff MSEQci (s, s) = 0.
6.2.3.4 Matrix Representation of Stabilities, Index d, for Preference
with Uncertainty
For the last definitions, indexed d, a DM is not motivated to leave the status quo
to move to states with uncertain preference, but will consider moving to states
with uncertain preference to be a sanction.
Theorem 6.27. State s ∈ S is Nashd stable for DM i iff es · J+i · e = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix
MGMRdi = J
+
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−,=,Ui )T
)
].
Theorem 6.28. State s ∈ S is GMRd for DM i iff MGMRdi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m stability matrix MSMRdi = J+i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · D)], in
which D = (P−,=,Ui )
T ◦ [E − sign (Ji · (P+i )T )].
Theorem 6.29. State s ∈ S is SMRd for DM i iff MSMRdi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m×m stability matrix MSEQdi = J+i ·[E−sign
(
M+,UN\{i} · (P−,=,Ui )T
)
].
Theorem 6.30. State s ∈ S is SEQd for DM i iff MSEQdi (s, s) = 0.
When n = 2, the DM set N becomes to {i, j} and Theorems 6.15 to 6.30 are
reduced to Theorems 6.11 to 6.14.
From the matrix representation of solution concepts indexed a, b, c, and d
presented above, it can be seen that a solution concept indexed a represents the
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stability for the most aggressive DMs. Firstly, the DM is aggressive in deciding
whether to move from the status quo, being willing to accept the risk associated
with moves to states of uncertain preference. In addition, when evaluating
possible moves, the DM is deterred only by sanctions to states that are less
preferred than the status quo and does not see states of uncertain preference
(relative to the status quo) as sanctions. For the definitions indexed b,
uncertainty in preferences is not considered by a DM. The definitions indexed c
incorporate a mixed attitude toward the risk associated with states of uncertain
preference. Specifically, the DM is aggressive in deciding whether to move from
the status quo, but is conservative when evaluating possible moves, being
deterred by sanctions to states that are less preferred or have uncertain
preference relative to the status quo. Finally, the definition indexed d represents
stability for the most conservative DMs, who would move only to preferred states
from a status quo, but would be deterred by responses that result in states of
uncertain preference.
6.2.4 Applications including Preference Uncertainty
6.2.4.1 Sustainable Development Game
Table 6.9: Options and feasible states for the sustainable development
conflict [31]
E: environmentalists
1. Proactive (labeled P ) Y Y N Y
2. Reactive (labeled R) N N Y Y
D: developers
3. Sustainable development (labeled S) Y N Y N
4. Unsustainable development (labeled U) N Y N Y
State number s1 s2 s3 s4
A two-DM conflict model with preference uncertainty is used to illustrate how
stability analysis is carried out by MRSCU. Hipel [31] developed a model for a
conflict over sustainable development game that was also studied by Li et al.
[46]. Specifically, the conflict consists of two DMs: environmental agencies
(DM 1: E) and developers (DM 2: D); and a total of four options: DM 1
controls the two options of being proactive (labeled P) and being reactive (labeled
R) in monitoring developers’ activities and their impacts on the environment,
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and DM 2 has the two options of practicing sustainable development (labeled
S) and practicing unsustainable development (labeled U) for properly treating the
environment. These options are combined to form four feasible states: s1: PS, s2:
PU, s3: RS, and s4: RU. The four feasible states are listed in Table 6.9, where
a “Y” indicates that an option is selected by the DM controlling it and an “N”













Figure 6.4: Graph model for the sustainable development conflict [46].
The graph model of the conflict is shown in Fig. 6.4. DM 1’s preference
information is provided by the cardinal preference function: P1 = (4, 2, 3, 1), but
DM 2’s preference includes uncertainty by s1U2s2, s1U2s4, s2U2s3, s3U2s4, s3 2 s1,
and s4 2 s2.
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2 ∨ PU2 , P−,=2 = E − I − P+,U2 ,
P−,=,U2 = P
−,=
2 ∨ PU2 .
Hence, we can calculate the extended stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ
using Theorems 6.11 to 6.14 for the sustainable development conflict including
preference uncertainty.
Table 6.10: Stability results of the sustainable development game with
uncertain preference
State Nash GMR SMR SEQ
1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq
s1
√ √ √ √
s2





√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √
s1
√ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √
c s3




√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √
Table 6.10 provides the stability results for the the sustainable development
game calculated by MRSCU method for two-DM situations. They are precisely
the same as the results presented in [46]. Obviously, states s1 and s2 are equilibria
for the four stabilities indexed b and indexed d in the sustainable development
conflict.
6.2.4.2 Lake Gisborne Conflict
The background of the Lake Gisborne conflict is described in Section 3.4. This
conflict is modeled using three DMs: DM 1, Federal (Fe); DM 2, Provincial
(Pr); and DM 3, Support (Su). The graph model of the Lake Gisborne conflict
is shown in Fig. 6.5 (1), where the labels on the arcs identify the DMs who control
the relevant moves. If DM i’s oriented arcs are coded in color i, then, according
to the Rule of Priority introduced in Section 5.2, Fig. 6.5 (1) is converted to an




















































Figure 6.5: Graph model for the Gisborne conflict.
Since several groups support the project, the economics-oriented provincial
government might consider supporting the project for the urgent need for cash.
However, the environment-oriented provincial government might oppose this
project because of the devastating consequences to the environment. The two
different attitudes of the provincial government result in uncertainty in
preferences for the Gisborne conflict model. The details can be found in [46].
Preference information over the states are given in Table 6.11, where 
represents the strict preference and is transitive. As shown in Table 6.11, DM
Federal’s and DM Support’s preference information is modeled to be known
completely without any uncertainty, but DM Provincial’s preference includes
uncertainty. What is known is that it prefers state s3 to state s7, state s4 to state
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Table 6.11: Preference information for the Gisborne conflict [46]
Colors DMs Certain preferences
Red Federal s2  s6  s4  s8  s1  s5  s3  s7
Blue Provincial s3  s7, s4  s8, s1  s5, s2  s6, only
Green Support s3  s4  s7  s8  s5  s6  s1  s2
s8, state s1 to state s5, and state s2 to state s6, but the relative preference across
these four groups is uncertain.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} denote the set of three DMs. We use the Gisborne conflict
as an example to show the procedures using the MRSCU method.
• Construct preference matrices, P+i , P+,Ui , and P−,=i , for i = 1, 2, 3, using
information provided by Table 6.11, as well as P−,=,U = E − I − P+i ;
• Calculate the UM weight matrix and the UIUUM weight matrix of coalition
H based on Definition 5.16, preference information presented in Table 6.11,




Pw if v i u and i ∈ H,
Nw if u i v and i ∈ H,
Ew if u ∼i v and i ∈ H,
Uw if uUiv and i ∈ H,
0 otherwise.





for H = N\{1};
• Construct weighted in-incidence matrix B(WH)in and out-incidence matrix
B
(WH)
out for coalition H, based on the graph model and Definition 5.9;























Table 6.12: Weight matrices for H = N\{1} for the Gisborne conflict




H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
W+,UH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
for i = 1, 2, 3, by Corollary 6.3;













































out )] ◦ (El − D);
• Analyze the stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ by Theorems 6.15 to
6.30 for the Gisborne conflict.
Let the state set S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8}. Tables 6.13 and 6.14 show
the results for the construction of the reachability matrices by H = N\{i} for
i = 1, 2, 3. It is clear that if RH(s) and R
+,U




s · MH , and R+,UH (s) = eTs · M+,UH for any s ∈ S.
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For example, using Table 6.14, we have eT2 · M+,UN\{1} = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1), which
indicates that the reachable list of N\{1} by the legal UIUUMs from state s2,
R+,UN\{1}(s2) = {s2, s4, s6, s8}, i.e., states s2, s4, s6, and s8 can be reached by any
legal UIUUM sequences, by the coalition consisting of DM Provincial and DM
Support, from the status quo s = s2. Consequently, the reachability matrices of
coalition H provides an algebraic method for constructing the reachable lists of H
by the legal UM and legal UIUUM sequences, RH(s) and R
+,U
H (s) for all s ∈ S.
Table 6.13: UM reachability matrices by N\{i} for i = 1, 2, 3 for the
Gisborne conflict
Matrix MN\{1} MN\{2} MN\{3}
State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
s3 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
s4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
s5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
s6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
s7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
s8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1







State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
s3 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
s4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
s6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
s8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Next, Theorems 6.15 to 6.30 are used to calculate the stabilities of the Gisborne
conflict. The stable states and equilibria under four distinct sets of definitions
(indexed a, b, c, and d) and four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ,
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are summarized in Table 6.15, in which “
√
” for a given state means that this state
is stable for a DM−Fe, Pr, or Su; and “Eq” is an equilibrium for a corresponding
solution concept. Additionally, Table 6.15 indicates that states s4 and s6 are
equilibria for the four solution concepts indexed by b and d. The stability results
confirm the calculations of [46]. If the provincial government is economics-oriented
and has complete preference information:
s3  s7  s4  s8  s1  s5  s2  s6,
then the likely resolution is state s4 by using DSS GMCR II [18, 19]. For an
environment-oriented provincial government, with preferences
s2  s6  s1  s5  s4  s8  s3  s7,
then state s6 is the likely resolution. From Table 3.3, we can analyze the two likely
resolutions. If the attitude of the provincial government is economics-oriented, then
the provincial government will lift the ban on bulk water export. On the other
hand, if the provincial government is strongly influenced by the federal government,
then it will not lift the ban.
6.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts
for Strength of Preference
In this section, an algebraic approach is developed to calculate stabilities in
two-DM and n-DM graph models with strength of preference [76, 77]. The
original graph model uses “simple preference” to represent a DM’s relative
preference between two states. This preference structure includes only a relative
preference relation and an indifference relation. Basic stability definitions, and
algorithms to calculate them, assume simple preference. Due to difficulties in
coding the algorithms, mainly because of their logical formulation, led to the
development of matrix representations of preference and explicit matrix
algorithms to calculate stability. Here, the algebraic approach is extended to
representation of a strength-of-preference graph models, which feature multiple
levels of preference, and stability analysis for such models.
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Table 6.15: Stability results of the Gisborne model
State Nash GMR SMR SEQ
Fe Pr Su Eq Fe Pr Su Eq Fe Pr Su Eq Fe Pr Su Eq
a
b




√ √ √ √
a
√ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2 c
√ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a
√ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3 c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4 c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a
√ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5 c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6 c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d




√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7 c
√ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8 c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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6.3.1 Matrix Representation of Essential Components for
Stabilities with Strength of Preference
Recall that WIs denotes strong improvements or mild improvements called weak
improvements.
Definition 6.5. For the graph model G = (S,A), the WI adjacency matrix
for DM i is an m × m matrix J+,++i with (s, q) entry
J+,++i (s, q) =
{
1 if (s, q) ∈ A+,++i ,
0 otherwise,
where s, q ∈ S and A+,++i = {(s, q) ∈ Ai : q >i s or q i s}.
DM i’s reachable list R+,++i (s) from state s by a WI can be expressed as
R+,++i (s) = {q : J+,++i (s, q) = 1}. From Theorem 5.3 and Definition 6.5, the
following result is obvious.











Recall that R+,++H (s) denotes the reachable list of coalition H from state s by
the legal sequence of WIs.
Definition 6.6. Let H ⊆ N . For the graph model G = (S,A), the WI reachability
matrix by H is an m × m matrix M+,++H with (s, q) entry
M+,++H (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ R+,++H (s) for q ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
The WI reachability matrix by H can be obtained from the following corollary
based on Theorem 5.4, Corollary 5.9, and Definition 6.6.
Corollary 6.6. For the graph model G = (S,A), the WI reachable matrix by









where l4 = |A+,++H |.
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To carry out stability analysis, a set of matrices corresponding to strength of
preference is constructed next. Below, several matrices representing strength of
preference for DM i are defined.
P++i (s, q) =
{
1 if q i s,
0 otherwise,
and
P−−i (s, q) =
{
1 if s i q,
0 otherwise.
Therefore, (P++i )
T = P−−i , where T denotes the transpose of a matrix.
P−−,−,=i (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ Φ−−,−,=i (s),
0 otherwise,
and
P+,++i (s, q) =
{
1 if q i s or q >i s,
0 otherwise.
It follows that P−−,−,=i (s, q) = 1 − P+,++i (s, q) for s, q ∈ S and s 	= q.
Based on the above definitions, for DM i, the UM matrix Ji, the WI matrix
J+,++i , and the preference matrix P
+,++
i have the relationship among them:
J+,++i = Ji ◦ P+,++i .
6.3.2 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for
Two-DMs with Strength of Preference
Stability definitions in the graph model are traditionally defined logically, in terms
of the underlying graphs and preference relations. However, as was noted in the
development of the DSS GMCR II, the nature of logical representations makes
coding difficult. The work of [27,28] integrated strength of preference information
into these four solution concepts but, again, proved difficult to code and was never
integrated into GMCR II.
Matrix representation of stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ with
strength of preference in two-DM conflicts is developed in this section. The
system, called the MRSCS method, incorporated a set of m × m stability
matrices, MGMRi , M
SMR
i , and M
SEQ
i , as well as strong stability matrices,
MSGMRi , M
SSMR
i , and M
SSEQ
i , to capture GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities, as
well as strong GMR, strong SMR, and strong SEQ stabilities for DM i ∈ N ,
where |N | = 2, m = |S|, and DMs’ preferences may include strength.
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Table 6.16: The construction of stability matrices for two-DM models
with strength of preference







i · [E − sign
(
Jj · (P−−,−,=i )T
)
]
Stabilities MSMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign(Jj · G)], with
G = (P−−,−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign (Ji · (P+,++i )T )]
MSEQi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(





i · [E − sign
(
Jj · (P−−i )T
)
]
Strong MSSMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign(Jj · G)], with
stabilities G = (P++i ) ◦ [E − sign
(





i · [E − sign
(
J+,++j · (P−−i )T
)
]
Let N = {i, j}. The stability matrices used by Theorems 6.31 to 6.37 are
summarized in Table 6.16, which are utilized to calculate the extended stabilities
of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, as well as the strong stabilities of SGMR, SSMR,
and SSEQ, in two-DM conflicts for strength of preference, respectively.
It should be pointed out that the stability matrices for strength of preference
use the same notation as the stability matrices for simple preference.
6.3.2.1 Matrix Representation of Stabilities
Theorem 6.31. State s is Nash stable for DM i iff es · J+,++i · e = 0, where e
denote the m-dimensional column vector with each element being set to 1.
Theorem 6.32. State s is GMR for DM i iff MGMRi (s, s) = 0.
Theorem 6.33. State s is SMR for DM i iff MSMRi (s, s) = 0.
Theorem 6.34. State s is SEQ for DM i iff MSEQi (s, s) = 0.
These theorems prove that the proposed matrix representation of solution
concepts are equivalent to the standard solution concepts for two DM conflicts
defined by Hamouda et al. [27].
6.3.2.2 Matrix Representation of Strong Stabilities
Theorem 6.35. State s ∈ S is strong GMR (SGMR) for DM i iff MSGMRi (s, s) =
0.
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Theorem 6.36. State s ∈ S is strongly SMR (SSMR) for DM i iff MSSMRi (s, s) =
0.
Theorem 6.37. State s ∈ S is strongly SEQ (SSEQ) for DM i iff MSSEQi (s, s) =
0.
Since the seven theorems are special cases of the theorems for n-DM models
developed in the next subsection, the details are not given here. These theorems
prove that the proposed matrix representation of solution concepts are equivalent
to logical representation of the strong stabilities for two DM conflicts [27]. The
matrix representation can be extended to models including more than two DMs,
which is the objective of the next subsection.
6.3.3 Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts for n-
DMs with Strength of Preference
In an n-DM model, where n > 2, the opponents of a DM can be thought of as a
coalition of two or more DMs. To calculate the stability of a state for DM i ∈ N ,
it is necessary to examine possible responses by all other DMs j ∈ N\{i}, which
may include responses by the legal sequences of UMs and WIs.
6.3.3.1 Matrix Representation of Stabilities
Four solution concepts are given below in which strength of preference is not
considered in sanctioning. However, they are different from stabilities defined by
Fang et al. [16], because the following stabilities can analyze conflict models
having strength of preference. Let i ∈ N and s ∈ S for next theorems. A
coalition is any subset H in DM set N . Let i ∈ N and |N | = n.
Theorem 6.38. State s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈ SNashi , iff
〈es, J+,++i e〉 = 0, where <,> denotes the inner product.
Theorem 6.38 implies that Nash stability definitions are identical for both
two-DM and n-DM models because Nash stability does not consider opponents’
responses.
Define the m × m matrix MGMRi by
MGMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−−,−,=i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.39. State s is GMR for DM i iff MGMRi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m matrix MSMRi by MSMRi = J+,++i · [E − sign(G)], with
G = MN\{i} · [(P−−,−,=i )T ◦
(
E − sign (Ji · (P+,++i )T ))].
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Theorem 6.40. State s is SMR for DM i iff MSMRi (s, s) = 0.
Define the m × m matrix MSEQi by
MSEQi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(
M+,++N\{i} · (P−−,−,=i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.41. State s is SEQ for DM i iff MSEQi (s, s) = 0.
The proofs of these theorems are similar to those for Theorems 6.5 to 6.8.
Theorems 6.38 to 6.41 prove that the proposed matrix representation of solution
concepts are equivalent to the standard stabilities for n-DM conflicts [28].
6.3.3.2 Matrix Representation of Strong Stabilities
With strength of preference introduced into the graph model, stability definitions
can be strong or weak, according to the level of sanctioning. Strong and weak
stabilities only include GMR, SMR, and SEQ because Nash stability does not
involve sanctions. Let i ∈ N and |N | = n in this subsection. First, find matrix
J+,++i by Corollary 6.5 and matrix MH using Corollary 6.2, for which H = N\{i}.
Define the m × m strong stability matrix MSGMRi for DM i by
MSGMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(




Theorem 6.42. State s ∈ S is strong GMR (SGMR) for DM i, denoted by s ∈
SSGMRi , iff M
SGMR
i (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since MSGMRi (s, s) = (e
T
s · J+,++i ) · [
(




J+,++i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(




MSGMRi (s, s) = 0 ⇔ J+,++i (s, s1)[1−sign
(
(eTs1 · MN\{i}) · (eTs · P−−i )T
)
] = 0,∀s1 ∈ S.
This implies that MSSGMi (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1 · MN\{i}) · (eTs · P−−i )T 	= 0, ∀s1 ∈ R+,++i (s). (6.13)
By (6.13), for any s1 ∈ R+,++i (s), there exists s2 ∈ S such that the m-dimensional
row vector, eTs1 · MN\{i}, has sth2 element 1 and the m-dimensional column vector,
(P−−i )
T · es, has sth2 element 1.
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Therefore, MSGMRi (s, s) = 0 iff for any s1 ∈ R+,++i (s), there exists at least one
s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2. 
For strong SMR, the n-DM model is similar to the two-DM model. The only
modification is that responses come from DM i ’s opponents instead of from a single
DM. If D = (P++i ) ◦ [E − sign
(
Ji · (E − P++i )
)
], then define the m × m strong
stability matrix MSSMRi for DM i by
MSSMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · D)].
Theorem 6.43. State s ∈ S is strongly SMR (SSMR) for DM i, denoted by
s ∈ SSSMRi , iff MSSMRi (s, s) = 0.




J+,++i (s, s1)[1 − sign(G(s1, s))]
then MSSMRi (s, s) = 0 iff J
+,++
i (s, s1)[1− sign(G(s1, s))] = 0, for any s1 ∈ S. This
means that MSSMRi (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1 · MN\{i}) · (D · es) 	= 0,∀s1 ∈ R+,++i (s). (6.14)
Since (eTs1 ·MN\{i}) · (D · es) =
m∑
s2=1
MN\{i}(s1, s2) ·D(s2, s), then (6.14) holds iff for
any s1 ∈ R+,++i (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such that D(s2, s) 	= 0.
Because D(s2, s) = P
++
i (s2, s) · [1 − sign(
m∑
s3=1
Ji(s2, s3)(1 − P++i (s3, s))],
D(s2, s) 	= 0 implies that for s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1),




Ji(s2, s3)(1 − P++i (s3, s)) = 0. (6.16)
(6.15) is equivalent to the statement that, ∀s1 ∈ R+,++i (s),∃s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) such
that s i s2. (6.16) is the same as the statement that, ∀s1 ∈ R+,++i (s),∃s2 ∈
RN\{i}(s1) such that P++i (s3, s) 	= 0 for ∀s3 ∈ Ri(s2). Based on the definition of
m × m matrix P++i , one knows that P++i (s3, s) 	= 0 ⇔ s i s3.
Therefore, we conclude the above discussion that MSMRi (s, s) = 0 iff for any
s1 ∈ R+,++i (s), there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN\{i}(s1) with s i s2 and s i s3
for all s3 ∈ Ri(s2). 
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Strongly sequential stability examines the credibility of the sanctions by DM i ’s
opponents. First, find matrix M+,++N\{i} using Corollary 6.6 for H = N\{i}. Define
the m × m strong stability matrix MSSEQi for DM i by
MSSEQi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(
M+,++N\{i} · (P−−i )T
)
].
Theorem 6.44. State s ∈ S is strongly SEQ (SSEQ) for DM i, denoted by s ∈
SSSEQi , iff M
SSEQ
i (s, s) = 0.
Proof: Since MSSEQi (s, s) = (e
T










J+,++i (s, s1)[1 − sign
(




MSSEQi (s, s) = 0 ⇔ J+,++i (s, s1)[1−sign
(
(eTs1 · M+,++N\{i}) · (eTs · P−−i )T
)
] = 0,∀s1 ∈ S.
This implies that MSSEQi (s, s) = 0 iff
(eTs1 · M+,++N\{i}) · (eTs · P−−i )T 	= 0, ∀s1 ∈ R+,++i (s). (6.17)
By (6.17), for any s1 ∈ R+,++i (s), there exists s2 ∈ S such that the m-dimensional
row vector, eTs1 · M+,++N\{i}, has sth2 element 1 and the m-dimensional column vector,
(P−−i )
T · es, has sth2 element 1.
Therefore, MSSEQi (s, s) = 0 iff for any s1 ∈ R+,++i (s), there exists at least one
s2 ∈ R+,++N\{i}(s1) with s i s2. 
In the n = 2 cases, Theorems 6.42 to 6.44 are reduced to those Theorems 6.35
to 6.37, so we use the same notation for two-DM and n-DM cases.
6.3.4 Weak Stabilities for Strength of Preference
Recall that GS denotes a solution concept, GMR, SMR, or SEQ. Then SGS refers
to the strong solution concept of GS, and WGS refers to the weak solution concept
of GS (defined below). The symbol s ∈ SGSi denotes that s ∈ S is stable for DM
i according to stability GS. Similarly, s ∈ SSGSi denotes that s ∈ S is strongly
stable for DM i according to strong stability SGS. A state is weakly stable iff it is
stable, but not strongly stable. The formal weak stability concept is defined next.
Definition 6.7. State s is weakly stable WGS for DM i according to stability GS,
denoted by s ∈ SWGSi , iff s ∈ SGSi and s /∈ SSGSi .
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6.3.5 Applications including Strength of Preference
6.3.5.1 Sustainable Development Conflict
The description of the sustainable development conflict is presented in Subsection
6.2.4. The graph model for each DM in this conflict is depicted in Fig. 6.4, where
vertices designate states and arcs represent movement between states. The letter
on a given arc indicates which DM controls the movement while the arrowhead
shows the direction of movement. The preference information for each DM is:
DM 1: s1 >1 s3 1 s2 ∼1 s4;
DM 2: s3 >2 s1 2 s4 ∼2 s2.
DM 1 and DM 2’s preference information includes strength. From the graph model,




0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ and J2 =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
⎞
⎟⎠ .




0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
⎞
⎟⎠ , P+,++1 =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0







0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
⎞
⎟⎠ , and P+,++2 =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Therefore, J+,++i = Ji ◦ P+,++i P−−,−,=i = E − I − P+,++i , P−−i = (P++i )T for
i = 1, 2.
The stability matrices used by Theorems 6.31 to 6.37 are included in Table 6.16,
which are employed to calculate the extended stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and
SEQ, as well as the strong stabilities of SGMR, SSMR, and SSEQ for two-DM
conflicts, respectively.
The stable states and equilibria for the sustainable development conflict are
summarized in Table 6.17, in which “
√
” for a given state means that this state is
stable for DM 1 or DM 2 and “Eq” is an equilibrium for an appropriate solution
concept.
The results provided by Table 6.17 shows that state s1 is strong equilibrium for
the four basic stabilities. State s3 is strongly stable for GMR and SMR. Hence, s1
and s3 are better choices for decision makers.
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Table 6.17: Stability results of the sustainable development conflict with
strength of preference
State Nash GMR SMR SEQ SGMR SSMR SSEQ WGMR WSMR WSEQ
1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq 1 2 Eq
s1
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
6.3.5.2 Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) Conflict
In this section, the proposed MRSCS method is employed to the Garrison
Diversion Unit (GDU) conflict to illustrate how the procedure works. The history
and background of this conflict are introduced in Section 4.3. The details of the
GDU conflict are described in the book [16]. Recall that the irrigation initiative
for the diversion called the Garrison Diversion Unit project concerns three DMs,
the United States Support (USS), the Canadian Opposition (CDO), and
the International Joint Commission (IJC). The graph model of the GDU
conflict is shown in Fig. 6.6 (1), where the labels on the arcs identify the DMs
who control the relevant moves. If DM i’s oriented arcs are coded in color i, then,
according to the Rule of Priority introduced in Section 5.2, Fig. 6.6 (1) is
converted to an edge labeled multidigraph as shown in Fig. 6.6 (2).
Table 6.18: Preferences for DMs in the GDU conflict [28]
DM Preference
USS s2 > s4 > s3 > s5 > s1 > s6 > s9 > s7  s8
CDO {s3 ∼ s7} > {s5 ∼ s9} > {s4 ∼ s8}  {s1 ∼ s2 ∼ s6}
IJC {s2 ∼ s3 ∼ s4 ∼ s5 ∼ s6 ∼ s7 ∼ s8 ∼ s9}  s1
The graph model introduced by Hamouda et al. [28] to have strength of
preference in the GDU conflict is used in this section. The preference information
for this conflict over the feasible states is given in Table 6.18 in which s8 is
strongly less preferred to all other states for USS, the DM, CDO considers states
s1, s2, and state s6 to be equally preferred and strongly less preferred relative to



































Figure 6.6: The labeled graph model for the GDU conflict.
states for IJC. Note that this representation of preference information presented
in Table 6.18 implies that the preferred relations, > and  are transitive. For
instance, since s9 > s7 and s7  s8, then s9  s8. However, in general, the
preference structure presented in this research does not require the transitivity of
preference, and hence can handle intransitive preferences.
The GDU conflict is used as an example to show the matrix representation of
solution concepts with strength of preference obtained by carrying out the following
steps. Let N = {1, 2, 3} denote the set of the three DMs in the GDU conflict, i ∈ N ,
and H = N\{i}.
• Construct preference matrices, P++i and P+,++i , for i = 1, 2, 3, using




P−−,−,=i = E − I − P+,++i ;
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• Calculate the UM weight matrix and the WI weight matrix of coalition H
based on Definition 5.18, preference information presented in Table 6.18,





H for H = N\{1};
Table 6.19: Weight matrix of coalition H = N\{1} by the legal UM and
WI sequences for the GDU conflict
Arc number a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a17 a18
Weight matrix W Nw Pm Nw Pm Nw Pm Ps Nw Ps Nw Nw Pm Ps Nw Nw Pm Ps Ps
Weight matrix WH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ps Nw Nw Pm Ps Nw Nw Pm Ps Ps
W
(UM)





H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
• Construct weighted in-incidence matrix B(WH)in and out-incidence matrix
B
(WH)
out for coalition H, based on the graph model and Definition 5.9;
• Calculate the UM adjacency matrix Ji = sign[(B(W
(UM)
i )





the WI adjacency matrix J+,++i = sign[(B
(W+,++i )





i = 1, 2, 3, by Corollary 6.5 and Theorem 5.3;










and WI reachability matrix of coalition H
M+,++H = sign[(B
(W+,++H )




























out )] ◦ (El − D);
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• Analyze the stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, as well as the strong
stabilities, SGMR, SSMR, and SSEQ, by Theorems 6.38 to 6.44 for the GDU
conflict using the stability matrices summarized in Table 6.20.
Table 6.20: Stability matrices for n-DM conflicts with strength of
preference





Standard MGMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−−,−,=i )T
)
]
stabilities MSMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · G)], with
G = (P−−,−,=i )
T ◦ [E − sign (Ji · (P+,++i )T )]
MSEQi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(
M+,++N\{i} · (P−−,−,=i )T
)
]
Strong MSGMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign
(
MN\{i} · (P−−i )T
)
]
stabilities MSSMRi = J
+,++
i · [E − sign(MN\{i} · D)], with
D = (P++i ) ◦ [E − sign
(





i · [E − sign
(
M+,++N\{i} · (P−−i )T
)
]
The stability results for the GDU conflict with strength of preference are
summarized in Table 6.21, in which “
√
” for a given state under a DM means
that this state is stable at a given level for the given DM; Note that U, C, and I
displayed in Table 6.21 denote the three DMs, USS, CDO, and IJC, respectively.
Obviously, state s4 is an equilibrium for Nash stability, and is strong GMR,
strong SMR, and strong SEQ. State s9 is a strong equilibrium for GMR and
SEQ.
6.4 Summary
An integrated algebraic method is developed to represent several graph model
stability definitions for various preference structures using explicit matrix
formulations instead of graphical or logical representations. Matrix
representations of solution concepts for simple preference (MRSC) [67, 69], for
preference with uncertainty (MRSCU) [66, 73], and for preference with strength
(MRSCS) [76,77] are provided for the four basic graph model stability definitions.
These explicit algebraic formulations allow algorithms to assess rapidly the
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Table 6.21: Stability results of the GDU conflict with strength of
preference
State Nash GMR SMR SEQ SGMR SSMR SSEQ WGMR WSMR WSEQ
U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq U C I Eq
s1
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
stabilities of states, and to be applied to large and complicated conflict models.
Because of the nature of these explicit expressions, the matrix representations
discussed here can be adapted to new solution concepts and contexts.
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Chapter 7
Matrix Representations for Status
Quo Analysis and Coalition
Analysis
The analysis system of GMCR consists of stability analysis and post-stability
analysis including status quo analysis and coalition analysis in a graph model.
Although pseudo-codes for status quo analysis [47, 48] and basic coalition
stability analysis [43] have been developed, they are not yet implemented into a
decision support system for use in practical applications. An innovative matrix
system to represent various preference structures and calculate corresponding
stabilities in a graph model has been presented in Chapter 6. The matrix
representation effectively converts the stability analysis from a logical structure
to an algebraic system. Due to the difficulty in integrating status quo analysis
and coalition stability analysis into the DSS GMCR II and the ease of
implementing the matrix representation of stability analysis, it is natural to
exploit the matrix approach to perform status quo analysis and coalition analysis.
7.1 Matrix Representation for Status Quo
Analysis
It is well-known that matrices can efficiently describe adjacency of vertices, and
incidence of arcs and vertices in a graph, thereby permitting tracking of paths
158
between any two vertices [24]. Matrices possess useful algebraic properties that
can be exploited to produce improved algorithms for solving graph problems. For
instance, extensive research has been conducted to design effective algorithms and
efficient search procedures by using relationships between matrices and paths [26,
33,60].
In a graph model of a conflict, status quo analysis is a form of follow-up analysis
designed to trace the evolution of the conflict from a status quo state to any stable
state. A legal path in the graph model has the usual restriction that any DM
may move more than once, but not twice consecutively. Moreover, Chapter 5
has shown that edge weights can be used to represent preference attributes. The
fundamental problem of status quo analysis is thus equivalent to search all weighted
colored paths from a given initial state to a desirable state within an edge-weighted,
colored multidigraph.
The traditional use of adjacency matrix to search paths is applicable in a simple
digraph. The proposed method based on the adjacency matrix will be presented
in Subsection 7.1.1 to show its advantages in tracking conflict evolution. However,
this method is based on searching state-by-state paths. If a graph model contains
two or more arcs between the same two states controlled by different DMs, the
adjacency matrix is unable to track all aspects of conflict evolution from a status
quo state. An incidence matrix can represent multidigraphs if all edges are labeled.
The proposed algebraic approach to searching for the colored paths in a colored
multidigraph presented in Chapter 5 starts with a unique edge-labeling rule and
then devises a conversion function based on the incidence matrix to transform
the colored multidigraph to a simple digraph. The proposed algebraic approach
to searching for edge-weighted, colored paths can have many applications, one of
which is a main theme of this section.
7.1.1 Status Quo Analysis: Adjacency Matrix
In this subsection, matrix representation is developed for conducting status quo
analysis in the graph model for conflict resolution. We now demonstrate how to
find matrices to trace conflict evolution by the legal sequences of UMs or UIs from
a status quo with the last mover DM i. First, define two m×m matrices M (t)i and
M
(t,+)
i with their (s, q) entries as follows:
Definition 7.1. In the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . For i ∈ H and
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t = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,
M
(t)
i (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ S is reachable by H from s ∈ S in exactly t legal





i (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ S is reachable by H from s ∈ S in exactly t legal
UIs with last mover i,
0 otherwise.
Based on Definition 7.1, we have





i can be expressed inductively by
M
(1)











i (s, q) = J
+







j ) · J+i ].
(7.2)
Proof : The verifications of (7.1) and (7.2) are similar. Now we verify the
statement (7.2). For t = 2, the definition of matrix multiplication shows that
G(s, q), the (s, q) entry of the matrix G = (
∨
j∈H\{i}
J+j ) · J+i , is nonzero iff state q
is reachable from state s by H in exactly two UIs, with last mover DM i. The
condition j ∈ H\{i} implies that DM i does not make two moves consecutively.










j ) · J+i ] = M (2,+)i .
Now suppose that t > 2. Since
M
(t−1,+)
j (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ S is reachable by H from s ∈ S in exactly t − 1 legal
UIs with last mover j,
0 otherwise,











1 if q ∈ S is reachable by H from s ∈ S in exactly t legal
UIs with last mover i,
0 otherwise,
which confirms (7.2). 




i to trace conflict
evolution from a status quo to any equilibrium by the legal sequences of UMs and
UIs as follows:
Definition 7.2. In the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N . For i ∈ H and
t = 1, 2, 3, · · · , the UM status quo matrix and the UI status quo matrix are two
m × m matrices with (s, q) entries
MSQ
(t)
i (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ S is reachable by H from s ∈ S in at most t legal UMs




i (s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ S is reachable by H from s ∈ S in at most t legal UIs




i (s, q) = 1 and M
SQ(t,+)
i (s, q) = 1 denote that state q is
reachable from status quo state s in at most t legal UMs and legal UIs by H,
respectively, with last mover i. Based on Definitions 7.1 and 7.2, Theorem 7.1 can
be derived.
Theorem 7.1. In the graph model G = (S,A), let H ⊆ N , i ∈ H and k ≥ 1 be





















Proof : The proofs of (7.3) and (7.4) are similar. We prove equation (7.4). Let
MSQ
(k,+)
i (s, q) denote the (s, q) entry of the matrix M
SQ(k,+)
i . Based on Definition
7.2, MSQ
(k,+)
i (s, q) = 1 iff q is reachable by H from SQ = s in at most k legal UIs,





















i (s, q) = 1. i.e., q is reachable by H from SQ = s in exactly t legal UIs, with
last mover i. It implies that q is reachable from SQ = s in at most k legal UIs,





i )(s, q) = 1 iff M
SQ(k,+)






















shows that the desired outcome state q is reachable from the status quo state s in
at most t legal UMs and t legal UIs, respectively, with last mover i.
7.1.2 Application: Status Quo Analysis using
State-by-State Approach to the Elmira Conflict
In this subsection, the proposed matrix approach to status quo analysis is applied
to the Elmira conflict to illustrate how the procedure works. As a small
agricultural town renowned for its annual maple syrup festival, Elmira is located
in southwestern Ontario, Canada. In 1989, the Ontario Ministry of
Environment (MoE) detected that the underground aquifer supplying water
for Elmira was polluted by N-nitroso demethylamine (NDMA). A local pesticide
and rubber manufacturer, Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (UR), was identified,
since the prime suspect as NDMA is a by-product of its production line. Hence, a
Control Order was issued by MoE, requiring that UR take expensive measures to
remedy the contamination. UR immediately appealed to repeal this control
order. The Local Government (LG) consisting of the Regional Municipality of
Waterloo and the Township of Woolwich, sided with MoE and sought legal
advice from independent consultants on its role to resolve this conflict
(see [29,43] for more details).
Hipel et al. [29] established a graph model for this conflict, comprised of three
DMs: 1.MoE, 2.UR, and 3.LG; and five options: 1.Modify−Modify the
Control Order to make it more acceptable to UR; 2.Delay−Lengthen the appeal
process; 3. Accept−Accept the current Control Order; 4.Abandon−Abandon
its Elmira operation; and 5.Insist−Insist that the original Control Order be
applied. Although there exist 32 mathematically possible states, given the five
options in this model, many of them are infeasible for a variety of reasons and
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Table 7.1: Options and feasible states for the Elmira model [29, 43]
MoE
1. Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y −
UR
2. Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N −
3. Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y −
4. Abandon N N N N N N N N Y
LG
5. Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y −
State number s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
   
   

Figure 7.1: A graph model for the Elmira conflict [29,43].
only 9 states are identified as being feasible and listed in Table 7.1 (where a “Y”
indicates that an option is selected by the DM controlling it, an “N” means that
the option is not chosen, and a dash “−” denotes that the entry may be “Y” or
“N”). The graph model of the Elmira conflict is shown in Fig. 7.1, in which
labels on the arcs indicate the DM who controls the move; and preference
information over the states is given in Table 7.2.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of three DMs (1=MoE, 2=UR, and 3=LG). To
carry out status quo analysis for the Elmira model by using the proposed matrix
approach, the following steps are needed:
• Construct matrices Ji and P+i for i = 1, 2, 3, using information provided by
Fig. 7.1 and Table 7.2;
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Table 7.2: Preferences for DMs in the Elmira conflict [29]
DM Preference
MoE s7  s3  s4  s8  s5  s1  s2  s6  s9
UR s1  s4  s8  s5 s9 s3  s7  s2  s6
LG s7  s3  s5  s1  s8  s6  s4  s2  s9
• Calculate the UI adjacency matrices J+i = Ji ◦ P+i for i = 1, 2, 3,;
• Determine the matrices M (t)i and M (t,+)i for i = 1, 2, 3, using inductive
formulations provided by Lemma 7.1; and
• Calculate the status quo analysis matrices MSQ(k)i and MSQ
(k,+)
i for i = 1, 2, 3,
using Theorem 7.1.
Status quo analysis is mainly concerned with the attainability of predicted
equilibria. Therefore, stability analysis is usually conducted first. Traditionally,
stability analysis is performed by using the DSS GMCR II. Here, to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the matrix approach, stability analyses are carried out by
using the matrix method developed in Section 6.1 for four basic solution concepts
consisting of Nash stability, general metarationality (GMR), symmetric
metarationality (SMR), and sequential stability (SEQ). The results are
summarized in Table 7.3, in which “
√
” for a given state under a DM means that
this state is stable for a given DM; and “
√
” for a state under Eq signifies that
this state is an equilibrium for a corresponding solution concept. It is trivial to
verify that the stability results for the four solution concepts are identical to the
findings generated by GMCR II. Table 7.3 identifies three states s5, s8, and s9 as
ideal equilibria because they are stable for all DMs and for the four solution
concepts.
Matrix manipulations generate the status quo analysis matrices given in Table
7.4 (with all UMs) and Table 7.5 (with UIs only). As the status quo state is s1,
we can assess the attainability of any state from the status quo by examining its
corresponding entry in the first row for each DM, where a value of 1 indicates
that the associated state is reachable from s1 and a value of 0 means that the
corresponding state is not reachable. Given the three matrices in Table 7.4, it
is obvious that the three ideal equilibria, s5, s8, and s9, are all attainable. For
instance, MSQ
(3)
MoE (1, 8) = 1, M
SQ(3)
UR (1, 8) = 1, and M
SQ(3)
LG (1, 8) = 1 demonstrate
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Table 7.3: Stability results of the Elmira conflict
State Number Nash GMR SMR SEQ
MoE UR LG Eq MoE UR LG Eq MoE UR LG Eq MoE UR LG Eq
s1
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
that the ideal equilibrium state s8 is reachable from s1 in at most three UMs with
the last mover being any of the three DMs, MoE, UR or LG. On the other hand,
as the only non-zero (1, 5) entry of the three matrices is MSQ
(3)
LG (1, 5), equilibrium
s5 can be reached from the status quo in at most three UMs with LG being the
unique last mover. Similarly, the ideal equilibrium s9 is reachable from s1 in at
most three UMs with a unique last mover UR.
When only UIs are allowed as shown in Table 7.5, only the ideal equilibrium
s5 can be reached from state s1 in at most three UIs with last mover LG, because
the unique non-zero entry in the first row of the three matrices is MSQ
(3,+)
LG (1, 5).
If a different state is selected as the status quo state, one can conveniently
examine the elements of the corresponding row in the relevant status quo analysis
matrices to evaluate the attainability of any state that is of interest.
By using the proposed inductive formulations in Theorem 7.1, the status quo
analysis result can also be presented in a tableau form as shown in Table 7.6 in
which number 1, 2, or 3 denotes DM 1, DM 2, or DM 3, as well as Ω(k) and
Ω(k,+) are the set of all last DMs in at most k legal sequences of UMs and UIs





) are sequentially selected as the status quo by the legal sequence of UMs
and UIs, respectively. It is easy to verify the equivalence of these results here and
those given by Li et al. [47], except for the difference in recording the last mover
information. This table offers a wealth of information, such as the specific DM(s)
as the last mover(s) and the shortest path(s) to reach a state. For example, the
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State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
s1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
s2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
s4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s5 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
s7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
shortest path to the ideal equilibrium s8 from s1 requires three legal UMs with any
of the three DMs being the last mover.
By taking status quo analysis into account, additional insights are revealed
about the attainability of any potential resolution and, if attainable, the dynamics
of conflict evolution from the status quo state is demonstrated. The results offered
by Table 7.6 are identical to those provided by Li et al. [47].
The novel matrix approach to status quo analysis designed here is convenient
for computer implementation and easy to employ, as is illustrated by an application
to a real-world conflict case: the Elmira conflict. However, the proposed approach
is based on the adjacency matrix to search state-by-state paths. If a graph model
contains multiple arcs between the same two states controlled by different DMs,
the state-by-state paths will not be able to track all aspects of the evolution of
a conflict from the status quo state, and an expanded model will be needed to
allow for searching arc-by-arc paths. The algebraic approach to searching the edge-
weighted, colored paths is developed in Chapter 5. The wide realm of applicabilities
is illustrated by a set of real-world conflict cases, which is the objective of the next
subsection.
7.1.3 Status Quo Analysis: Edge Consecutive Matrix
Usually, the status quo, or initial state, is specified when a graph model is
developed—the conflict is viewed as starting from the status quo and then
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State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
s1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
s2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
s4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
passing from state to state, according to moves and countermoves controlled by
individual DMs, until it stops, eventually, at some equilibrium. A graph model
may have many equilibria; some equilibria may be reachable from the status quo
by multiple paths, while others may not be reachable at all. Status quo analysis
aims to determine whether a particular equilibrium is reachable from the status
quo and, if so, how to reach it [47]. The proposed algebraic approach uses the
results of Graph Theory to assist in analyzing a graph model and conflict
evolution in the graph model by carrying out the following steps:
• The state set S is treated as a vertex set V and DM i’s oriented arcs
Ai ⊆ A are coded in color i ∈ N , then a graph model (S,A) of a conflict is
equivalent to a colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c) with appropriate
preference relations, where ψ and c are two functions with ψ : A → V × V
such that ψ(a) = (u, v) for a ∈ A and u, v ∈ V , and c : A → N such that
c(a) ∈ N is the color of a ∈ A;
• By the proposed Rule of Priority, the oriented arcs in the colored
multidigraph are labeled according to the color order; within each color,
according to the sequence of initial nodes; and within each color and initial
node, according to the sequence of terminal nodes;
• The incidence matrix B can represent the colored multidigraph after all edges
are labeled;
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Table 7.6: The results of status quo analysis for the Elmira conflict





s2 1 1 1,3 1,3 s4 2 2 2 2
s3 2 2 2,3 2,3 s6 3 3 3 3
s5 3 3 3 3 s9 2 2,3 2,3 2,3
s9 2 2 2 2 s8 2 2 2
s4 1,2 1,2 1,2 s1
s6 1,3 1,3 1,3 s3
s7 2,3 2,3 2,3 s5
s8 1,2,3 1,2,3 s7
• Based on preference structures such as simple preference, preference with
uncertainty, and strength of preference, weight matrix W is designed to
represent preference information for some preference framework (details
presented in equations (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8));
• A graph model is thus conveniently treated as an edge-weighted, colored
multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w) in which each arc represents a legal unilateral
move, distinct colors refer to different DMs, and the weight along the arc
identifies some preference attribute;
• Tracing the evolution of a conflict in status quo analysis is converted to
searching all weighted colored paths between a status quo and a possible
equilibrium for some preference structure;
• Let the weighted incidence matrix B(W ) represent an original edge-weighted,
colored multidigraph (V,A,N, ψ, c, w). Then the conversion function
F (B(W )) = [(B
(W )
in )
T · B(W )out ] ◦ (El − D)
transforms the problem of searching edge-weighted, colored paths in a
weighted colored multidigraph to a standard problem of finding paths in a
simple digraph with no color constraints;
• Using existing algorithms or the proposed algorithm presented in Table 5.1,
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Figure 7.2: The weighted colored graph for the Elmira conflict.
• If AS and AE are the two sets of arcs starting from vertex s and arcs ending
at vertex q with
AS = {a ∈ A : B(W )out (s, a) 	= 0} and AE = {b ∈ A : B(W )in (q, b) 	= 0},
then paths between any two vertices, PA(W )(s, q) for s, q ∈ V , can be
obtained by the paths between two appropriate arcs by
PA(W )(s, q) = {PA(W )(a, b) : a ∈ AS, b ∈ AE}.
7.1.3.1 Application: Status Quo Analysis of the Elmira Conflict for
Simple Preference
The background of the Elmira conflict is introduced in Subsection 7.1.2. If the
state set S = {s1, s2, · · ·, s9} is treated as a vertex set V = {v1, v2, · · ·, v9} and DM
i’s oriented arcs are coded in colors blue, red, and black for i = 1, 2, 3, respectively,
then the graph model of the Elmira conflict shown in Fig. 7.1 with preference
information is equivalent to a weighted colored multidigraph presented in Fig.
7.2, in which wk(u, v) denotes the weight of arc ak = (u, v). Although no DM
is explicitly shown in the labeled graph, the index number of an arc uniquely
determines the DM who controls it when all arcs have been numbered according to
the Rule of Priority. Recall that ci denotes the cardinality of arc set assigned color
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i, i.e., ci = |Ai|, where Ai = {x ∈ A : c(x) = i} for each i ∈ N . Specifically, based
on the number of arcs in i’s graph Gi for i = 1, 2, 3, c1 = |A1| = 4, c2 = |A2| = 12,
and c3 = |A3| = 8 provided by Fig. 7.1 for the graph model of the Elmira conflict,
arcs a1 to a4 are controlled by DM 1 or MoE, arcs a5 to a16 by DM 2 or UR, and
arcs a17 to a24 by DM 3 or LG. The weight of each arc in Fig. 7.2 is assigned based
on preference information
s7 1 s3 1 s4 1 s8 1 s5 1 s1 1 s2 1 s6 1 s9;
s1 2 s4 2 s8 2 s5 2 s9 2 s3 2 s7 2 s2 2 s6;
s7 3 s3 3 s5 3 s1 3 s8 3 s6 3 s4 3 s2 3 s9.
Therefore, the diagonal weight matrix, the UM weight matrix, and the UI weight
matrix of the Elmira conflict are constructed in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: UM and UI weight matrices for the Elmira conflict
Arc number a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10a11a12a13a14a15a16a17a18a19a20a21a22a23a24
W NwNwNwNwNwNwPwPwPwNwNwNwPwPwPwNwPwPwPwPwNwNwNwNw
W (UM) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1






T · (B(W (UM))out )] ◦ (El − D)
denote a conversion function. It transforms the labeled multidigraph by node-by-
node to the reduced weighted line digraph by arc-by-arc that is a simple digraph
with no color constraints to find all evolution of the Elmira conflict by allowing
all UMs. The conversion process is depicted in Fig. 7.3 in which each hexagon
denotes an arc. Status quo analysis is mainly concerned with the attainability of
predicted equilibria. Therefore, stability analysis is usually conducted first. Table
7.3 provides states s5, s8, and s9 are likely resolutions for the Elmira conflict. The
three ideal equilibria are reachable from status quo s = s1 by the legal UM paths
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Figure 7.4: Graph conversion for finding evolutionary UI paths for the
Elmira conflict.
Let B =⇒ B(W+), then the labeled graph is converted to the reduced colored





T · (B(W+)out )] ◦ (El − D).
The conversion function transforms the original problem of searching the legal UI
paths in an edge-colored graph with no repeated colors to the standard problem
finding the UI paths on a graph with no color constraints (See Fig. 7.4(2)). For
example, if status quo is selected as s2, then Fig. 7.5(a) shows the UI conflict
evolution by arc-by-arc from s2 for the Elmira conflict. Note that the single arc
a8 does not appear in Fig. 7.5(a) though it is a UI arc and states are denoted by
their indexes to make figures clear. Fig. 7.5(b) depicts all possible UI paths from
state s2 by state-by-state and includes the paths of length 1. Obviously, the ideal





















































Paths from state 2
DM2
DM3
(a)Arc-by-arc evolutionary paths by UIs (b)State-by-state evolutionary paths by UIs
with the initial state s2 from status quo state s2
Figure 7.5: Evolutionary paths by UIs with status quo state s2.
7.1.3.2 Application: Status Quo Analysis of the Gisborne Conflict for
Preference with Uncertainty
In this subsection, the proposed matrix method is applied to a case study — status
quo analysis of the Gisborne conflict including preference uncertainty. The history
and background of the Gisborne conflict is introduced in Subsection 3.4. The edge
labeled multidigraph is portrayed in Fig. 7.6 (1) equivalent to the graph model
shown in Fig. 6.5. The weight of each arc in Fig. 7.6 (1) is assigned based on
preference information
s2 1 s6 1 s4 1 s8 1 s1 1 s5 1 s3 1 s7;
s3 2 s7, s4 2 s8, s1 2 s5, s2 2 s6, only;
s3 3 s4 3 s7 3 s8 3 s5 3 s6 3 s1 3 s2.
Therefore, the diagonal weight matrix, the diagonal UM weight matrix, the
diagonal UI weight matrix, and the diagonal UIUUM weight matrix of the
Gisborne conflict are constructed in Table 7.8.
Based on the extended preference structure with uncertainty, Li et al. [46]
redefine Nash stability, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, and
sequential stability for graph models with preference uncertainty. According to
whether uncertain preferences are deemed as sufficient incentives to motivate the
focal DM leaving the current state and credible sanctions to deter the focal DM
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Table 7.8: UM, UI, and UIUUM Weight matrices for the Gisborne
conflict
Arc numbera1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10a11a12a13a14a15a16a17a18a19a20a21a22a23a24
W PwNwPwNwPwNwPwNwUwUwUwUwUwUwUwUwPwPwNwNwNwNwPwPw
W (UM) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
W+ 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
W+,U 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
from doing so, the aforesaid four types of stability are redefined in four different
manners and indexed a, b, c, and d. These four extensions are conceived to depict
DMs with distinct risk profiles in face of uncertainty. Li et al. [46] identify states s4,
s6 and s8 as equilibria under extension b and d for the Gisborne conflict using logical
stability definitions and the proposed algebraic approach presented in Subsection
6.2.4.2 obtain the same results by matrix representation of stabilities. Note that
for the stability definitions under extensions b and d, the focal DM is conservative
in deciding whether to move away from the current state, since it would only move
to preferred states (UIs). For details, one can refer to Subsection 6.2.4.
In parallel to extensions b and d that predict the three equilibria s4, s6, and s8,
we examine the evolution paths PA+ (allowing UIs only) from a status quo to the





T · (B(W+)out )] ◦ (El − D)
denote a conversion function that transforms the labeled multidigraph Fig. 7.6 (1)
to the reduced line digraph Fig. 7.6 (2) including UI arcs only that is a simple
digraph with no color constraints. Therefore, finding colored UI paths in Fig. 7.6
(1) is equivalent to searching paths in Fig. 7.6 (2) without constraints. If the
status quo is s1, it is obvious that the equilibria s4 and s8 can not be reached by
legal UIs and the equilibrium s6 is the only equilibrium that is attainable from
the status quo. Specifically, the evolutionary paths PA+(s1, s6) can be described
below:
a1 −→ a18 ⇐⇒ s1 −→ s2 −→ s6,





































Figure 7.6: The conversion graphs for finding the evolutionary UI paths
for the Gisborne conflict.
However, if UIUUMs are allowed, equilibrium s8 is attainable from the status
quo s1. The UIUUM weight matrix W
+,U is defined in Table 7.8. Using conversion
matrix B(W
+,U ), the labeled graph in Fig. 7.6 (1) is reduced to Fig. 7.7 (1) that
illustrates the evolution of the graph model for the Gisborne conflict with allowing
UIUUMs only. By the conversion function F (·), the colored multidigraph in Fig.
7.7 (1) is transformed to the reduced line digraph in Fig. 7.7 (2). Searching colored





+,U(a17, a14), and PA
+,U(a17, a7)
in Fig. 7.7 (2). Therefore, the evolution of the Gisborne conflict by the legal
UIUUMs from status quo state s1 to equilibrium s8 is illustrated as follows:
a1 −→ a18 −→ a14,
a9 −→ a3 −→ a12 −→ a18 −→ a14,
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a17 −→ a5 −→ a14,
a17 −→ a13 −→ a23 −→ a3 −→ a12 −→ a18 −→ a14,
a17 −→ a13 −→ a23 −→ a11 −→ a1 −→ a18 −→ a14,



































Figure 7.7: The conversion graphs for finding the evolutionary UIUUM
paths for the Gisborne conflict.
After transforming a colored multidigraph to a simple digraph under conversion
functions, existing algorithms such as those reported in [50] and [65] can be used
to find all paths or search for the shortest path.
7.1.3.3 Application: Status Quo Analysis of the GDU Conflict for
Strength of Preference
As post-stability analysis, the status quo analysis aims at assessing whether
predicted equilibria are reachable from the status quo or any other initial state.
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Hence, after the stability analysis for the GDU conflict is carried out in the graph
model with strength of preference in Subsection 6.3.5, status quo analysis as a
post-stability analysis is discussed in this subsection. The history and
background of the GDU conflict are introduced in Subsections 4.4 and 6.3.5. The
graph model for the GDU conflict Fig. 4.8 is equivalent to the labeled graph Fig.



































      
Figure 7.8: Transformation of the graph model for the GDU conflict.
s2 >1 s4 >1 s3 >1 s5 >1 s1 >1 s6 >1 s9 >1 s7 1 s8,
{s3 ∼2 s7} >2 {s5 ∼2 s9} >2 {s4 ∼2 s8} 2 {s1 ∼2 s2 ∼2 s6},
{s2 ∼3 s3 ∼3 s4 ∼3 s5 ∼3 s6 ∼3 s7 ∼3 s8 ∼3 s9} 3 s1,
the l× l diagonal weight matrix, the UM weight matrix, and the WI weight matrix
are constructed in Table 7.9.
By taking status quo analysis into account, additional insights are revealed
about the attainability of any potential resolution. Table 6.21 indicates that state
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Table 7.9: Weight matrix, UM weight matrix, and WI weight matrix for
the GDU conflict
Arc number a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a17 a18
Weight matrix W Nw Pm Nw Pm Nw Pm Ps Nw Ps Nw Nw Pm Ps Nw Nw Pm Ps Ps
UM weight matrix W (UM) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WI weight matrix W+,++ 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
s4 is a strong equilibrium for Nash stability, GMR, SMR, and SEQ. State s9 is a
strong equilibrium for GMR and SEQ. When state s1 is selected as a statu quo,
all possible UM evolutionary paths of the GDU conflict from s1 to the equilibrium
s4 are obtained using the following steps:






T · (B(W (UM))out )] ◦ (El − D);
• This conversion function transforms the labeled multidigraph Fig. 7.8 (1) to
the reduced line digraph Fig. 7.8 (2) including all UM arcs that is a simple
digraph with no color constraints;
• Searching the colored paths PA(s1, s4) between two vertices s1 and s4 in Fig.
7.8 (1) is equivalent to finding all paths PA(a, b) for a ∈ AS, b ∈ AE in Fig.
7.8 (2), where AS and AE are the two sets of arcs starting from vertex s1
and arcs ending at vertex s4;
• AS = {a17, a18} and AE = {a4, a9};
• Finding the legal UM paths PA(a17, a4), PA(a17, a9), PA(a18, a4), and
PA(a18, a9) in the simple digraph Fig. 7.8 (2);
• PA(a17, a4) : a17 → a1 → a10 → a4; PA(a17, a9) : a17 → a9;
• Find paths between two vertices, s1 and s4, using the paths between
corresponding two arcs:
a17 → a1 → a10 → a4 ⇔ s1 → s2 → s3 → s5 → s4,
a17 → a9 ⇔ s1 → s2 → s4.
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If a conversion function is designed by F (B) = B · W+,++, then the original
graph Fig. 7.8 (1) is reduced to the graph shown in Fig. 7.9 including WIs
only. The dynamics of the GDU conflict evolution from the status quo state s1
to the desirable equilibrium state s9 by the legal WIs is portrayed in Fig. 7.10.
Specifically, the evolution path PA+,++(s1, s9) of the GDU conflict from state s1
to state s9 is
s1 → s6 → s8 → s9.
Status quo analysis for the multiple levels of preference will be carried out in future
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Figure 7.9: The reduced graph allowing WIs only for the GDU conflict.
7.2 Matrix Representations for Coalition
Stability Analysis
Any subset H of DMs in the set N is called a coalition. If |H| > 0, then the
coalition H is non-empty. If |H| > 1, then the coalition H is non-trivial. If
H = {i} is trivial, the DM i’s reachable lists from a state s ∈ S by various moves
for appropriate preference structures are as follows [16,27,46]:
• Ri(s): DM i’s reachable list from state s by unilateral moves (UMs) in one
step;
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Figure 7.10: The GDU conflict evolution from the status quo s1 to state
s9.
• R+,Ui (s): DM i’s reachable list from state s by unilateral improvements or
unilateral uncertain moves (UIUUMs) in one step;
• R+,++i (s): DM i’s reachable list from state s by mild unilateral improvements
or strong unilateral improvements (WIs) in one step.
If |H| > 1 is non-trivial, the reachable lists of coalition H from state s ∈ S by
various moves for appropriate preference structures are as follows [16,28,46]:
• RH(s): the reachable list of coalition H from state s by the legal UMs;
• R+H(s): the reachable list of coalition H from state s by the legal UIs;
• R+,UH (s): the reachable list of coalition H from state s by the legal UIUUMs;
• R+,++H (s): the reachable list of coalition H from state s by the legal WIs.
Therefore, for |H| > 0, the reachable lists of coalition H from state s are the sets
of states attainable by adding states that are one-step moves from state s by some
DM in H or adding states that are group moves from status quo state s by some
or all DMs in H. Note that the DMs in H do not cooperate. They are assumed
to move in some order according to the usual restriction for the legal moves that
no decision maker can move twice in succession along any path.
A state that is not an equilibrium has no long-term stability because there
is at least one individual DM who has the incentive to move away to upset the
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temporarily stable state [43]. Therefore, a non-equilibrium state is not expected
to persist in any case, including coalition stability. The following discussions of
coalition stability are focused on the status quo states that are equilibria. The
coalition stability analysis within the graph model assesses whether states that
are stable from individual viewpoints may be unstable for coalitions. Therefore,
coalition analysis provides valuable guidance for decision analysts.
To date, coalition analysis is based on Nash stability [43], GMR, SMR, and
SEQ [36, 37] for simple preference. However, to make coding easier, these
stabilities are based on a transitive graph that allows the same DM to move twice
in succession, which is inconsistent with the standard restriction in the graph
model. The condition of a transitive graph for coalition analysis is relaxed and
coalition stabilities based on Nash stability are extended to models including
preference uncertainty and strength of preference, which are the objectives of the
next subsection. Additionally, the existing coalition stabilities are given in terms
of logical representations, which make coding and calculation difficult. To
implement coalition analysis in an algebraic system, matrix representation of
coalition stability analysis (MRCSA) is developed next.
7.2.1 Extension of Coalition Stability in the Graph Model
The original coalition analysis uses simple preference. To enhance GMCR
applicability, the graph model has recently been developed in two new
directions—preference uncertainty and preference strength. Therefore, coalition
stability analysis is expanded to models including preference uncertainty and
strength of preference in this research.
7.2.1.1 Coalition Stability in the Graph Model with Preference
Uncertainty
A DM may be conservative or aggressive, avoiding or accepting states of
uncertain preference, depending on the level of satisfaction with the current
position. Coalition stability is extended to consider conservative coalition
stability and aggressive coalition stability for the graph model with preference
uncertainty.
Definition 7.3. For s1 ∈ RH(s), s1 is a coalition improvement (CI) by H
from state s iff, for every i ∈ H, s1 i s.
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Although this definition has not concerned uncertain preference, it is different from
Definition 2.42 of a coalition improvement by H for simple preference, because
Definition 2.42 cannot be employed to analyze models with uncertain preference.
Definition 7.4. For s1 ∈ RH(s), s1 is a coalition improvement or uncertain
move (CIUM) by H from state s iff, for every i ∈ H, s1 i s or s1Uis.
A coalition improvement or uncertain move s1 by H is a threat, or potential threat,
to the stability of state s. A coalition improvement or uncertain move for H from
state s is a state s1 that is reachable by H from s and preferred or having uncertain
preference relative to s by every DM in H.
Definition 7.5. State s is unstable for coalition H iff there exists a coalition
improvement or uncertain move by H from s.
Note that even if s is stable for each DM i ∈ N , the instability of state s for a
coalition H makes it unlikely to survive as a resolution. We now define some forms
of stability for coalitions in a graph model including preference uncertainty.
Definition 7.6. Let H ⊆ N . State s ∈ S is conservatively stable for
coalition H iff, for every s1 ∈ RH(s), there exists i ∈ H with s i s1 or sUis1.
Coalition H is said to be conservative in deciding whether to move from the status
quo, because the coalition H is not willing to accept the risk associated with moves
from the status quo to states of uncertain preference.
Definition 7.7. Let H ⊆ N . State s ∈ S is conservatively coalitionally
stable iff s is conservatively stable for every coalition H.
Similarly, coalition H may be aggressive when considering whether to move
from a status quo, in that the coalition is deterred only by states that are strictly
less preferred than the status quo.
Definition 7.8. Let H ⊆ N . State s ∈ S is aggressively stable for coalition
H iff, for every s1 ∈ RH(s), there exists i ∈ H with s i s1.
Although Definition 7.8 excludes uncertainty in preferences when the focal DM
considers incentives to leave a state, they are different from Definitions 2.44 since
stability Definitions 2.44 cannot analyze conflicts including uncertain preferences.
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Definition 7.9. State s ∈ S is aggressively coalitionally stable iff s is
aggressively stable for every coalition H ⊆ N .
When coalition H is trivial with H = {i}, Definition 7.6 is reduced to the
following stability definition.
Definition 7.10. State s ∈ S is conservatively stable for DM i iff for every
s1 ∈ Ri(s), s i s1 or sUis1.
Obviously, Definition 7.10 is equivalent to Nashb and Nashd stabilities. Let us
recall Nashb and Nashd stabilities.
Definition 7.11. State s ∈ S is Nashb stable or Nashd stable for DM i iff
R+i (s) = ∅.
When coalition H = {i}, Definition 7.8 is reduced to the following stability
definition.
Definition 7.12. State s ∈ S is aggressively stable for DM i iff for every
s1 ∈ Ri(s), s i s1.
Definition 7.12 is equivalent to Nasha and Nashc stabilities. Recall them as
follows.
Definition 7.13. State s ∈ S is Nasha stable or Nashc stable for DM i iff
R+,Ui (s) = ∅.
7.2.1.2 Coalition Stability in the Graph Model with Strength of
Preference
Definition 7.14. For s1 ∈ RH(s), s1 is a coalition strong or mild
improvement by H from state s iff, for every i ∈ H, s1 i s or s1 >i s.
Definition 7.15. State s is unstable for coalition H iff there exists a coalition
strong or mild improvement by H from s.
It should be pointed out even if s is an equilibrium for DM set N , it is possible s
is unstable for a coalition H ⊆ N . If so, s cannot be selected as a resolution for a
conflict.
Definition 7.16. Let H ⊆ N . State s ∈ S is stable for coalition H iff, for
every s1 ∈ RH(s), there exists i ∈ H with s ≥i s1 or s i s1.
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Note that if H = {i} is trivial, then the stability for coalition H = {i} is identical
with Nash stability for DM i in the graph model with strength of preference. Recall
that Nash stability for strength of preference.
Definition 7.17. State s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i ∈ N iff R+,++H (s) = ∅.
Definition 7.18. State s ∈ S is coalitionally stable iff s is stable for every coalition
H ⊆ N .
7.2.2 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities
The explicit algebraic expressions are advantageous for calculating potential
resolutions and tracking conflict evolution. It is natural to exploit the matrix
approach to perform coalition stability analysis for simple preference, preference
with uncertainty, and strength of preference.
7.2.2.1 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities for Simple
Preference
Recall that E is the m × m matrix with each entry equal to 1 and eTs denotes the
transpose of the sth standard basis vector of the m-dimensional Euclidean space.
Let MH denote the UM reachability matrix by H ⊆ N and find it using Corollary
6.2. The preference matrix P−,=i denotes the m × m matrix with (s, q) entry
P−,=i (s, q) =
{
1 if s i q or s ∼i q,
0 otherwise.
Define the m × m coalition stability matrix by




Theorem 7.2. Let H ⊆ N and | H |≥ 2. State s ∈ S is stable for coalition H iff
eTs · MCH · es = 0.
Proof: Since
eTs · MCH · es = (eTs · MH) · [
(





MH(s, s1)[1 − P−,=H (s, s1)],
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then eTs · MCH · es = 0 iff P−,=H (s, s1) = 1 for any s1 ∈ RH(s). Clearly,
P−,=H (s, s1) = (
∨
i∈H
P−,=i )(s, s1) = 1
iff there exists i ∈ H such that P−,=i (s, s1) = 1, i.e., s i s1. Consequently, the
proof of the theorem follows by Definition 2.44. 
Theorem 7.3. State s ∈ S is coalitionally stable iff ∑
∀H⊆N,|H|≥2




eTs · MCH · es = 0 iff for any H ⊆ N with | H |≥ 2,




eTs · MCH · es = 0 iff s ∈ S is stable for any coalition
H ⊆ N with | H |≥ 2. The proof is completed by Definition 2.45. 
Theorems 7.2 and 7.3 prove the proposed matrix representation of coalition
stability analysis (MRCSA) equivalent to logical representations of coalition
stabilities (see Subsection 2.2.7) proposed by Kilgour et al. [43]. The matrix
representation can be extended to models including uncertain preference, which
is the objective of the next subsection.
7.2.2.2 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities for Preference
with Uncertainty
Let P−,=,Ui denote the m × m preference matrix with (s, q) entry
P−,=,Ui (s, q) =
{
1 if s i q, s ∼i q or sUiq,
0 otherwise.
Define the m × m conservative coalition stability matrix by




Theorem 7.4. Let H ⊆ N and | H |≥ 2. State s ∈ S is conservatively stable for
coalition H iff eTs · MCUcH · es = 0.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that for Theorem 7.2.
Let P−,=i denote the m × m preference matrix with (s, q) entry
P−,=i (s, q) =
{
1 if s i q or s ∼i q,
0 otherwise.
Define the m × m aggressive coalition stability matrix by





Theorem 7.5. Let H ⊆ N and | H |≥ 2. State s ∈ S is aggressively stable for
coalition H iff eTs · MCUaH · es = 0.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that for Theorem 7.2.
Theorems 7.4 and 7.5 prove the proposed matrix representation of coalition
stability analysis (MRCSA) for preference with uncertainty equivalent to logical
representations of coalition stabilities proposed by Definitions 7.6 and 7.8. The
matrix representation can also be extended to models including strength of
preference, which is the objective of the next subsection.
7.2.2.3 Matrix Representation of Coalition Stabilities for Preference
with Strength
Let P+,++i denote the m × m preference matrix with (s, q) entry
P+,++i (s, q) =
{
1 if q >i s or q i s,
0 otherwise.
Define the m × m coalition stability matrix in the graph model with strength of
preference by
MCSH = MH · (P+,++H )T , where E − P+,++H =
∨
i∈H
(E − P+,++i ).
Theorem 7.6. Let H ⊆ N and | H |≥ 2. State s ∈ S is stable for coalition H in
the graph model with strength of preference iff eTs · MCSH · es = 0.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that for Theorem 7.2. Based on Theorem
7.6, the following result can be easily obtained.




eTs · MCSH · es = 0.
Theorems 7.6 and 7.7 prove the proposed matrix representation of coalition
stability analysis (MRCSA) for strength of preference equivalent to the logical
representations of coalition stabilities proposed by Definitions 7.16 and 7.18. The
novel matrix approach to coalition stability analysis designed here is convenient
for computer implementation and easy to employ, as is illustrated by the following
applications to real-world conflict cases.
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7.2.3 Applications
7.2.3.1 Coalition Stability Analysis for the Elmira Conflict including
Simple Preference
The proposed algebraic method in this thesis has been employed to carry out
stability analysis and status quo analysis for the Elmira conflict (see Subsections
7.1.2 and 7.1.3.1). Stability results presented in Table 7.3 indicates that states s5,
s8 and s9 are ideal equilibria for the Elmira conflict because they are stable for all
DMs and the four basic solution concepts.
However, the story of the Elmira conflict does not end here. If DMs cooperate
to make some agreements, resolution selections for the Elmira conflict will be
impacted due to the cooperations among three DMs. For example, if MoE and
UR form a coalition, then the coalition prefers state s8 to state s5, though neither
MoE nor UR can make unilateral move from state s5 to state s8. In fact, state
s8 ∈ RH(s5), s8 1 s5, and s8 2 s5. Therefore, s8 is a coalition improvement for
coalition H = {MoE,UR} from state s5. Coalition stability matrices provided by
Table 7.10 using Theorem 7.2 demonstrate that the individual ideal equilibrium
s5 is unstable for the coalition H = {MoE,UR} = {1, 2}, because the diagonal
element at entry (5, 5) of the coalition stability matrix MCH is nonzero, i.e.,
MCH (5, 5) = e
T
5 · MCH · e5 	= 0. Therefore, under communication and cooperation,
the individual ideal equilibrium state s5 is vulnerable to coalition moves and the
instability of state s5 for the coalition H makes it unlikely to survive as a
resolution for the Elmira conflict. Since MCN\{i}(8, 8) = M
C
N\{i}(9, 9) = 0, for
i = 1, 2, 3, then states s8 and s9 are not only highly stable individually but also
coalitionally stable.
7.2.3.2 Coalition Stability Analysis for the Gisborne Conflict with
Preference Uncertainty
The history and background of the Gisborne conflict is introduced in Subsection
3.4. This conflict is modeled using three DMs: DM 1, Federal (Fe); DM 2,
Provincial (Pr); and DM 3, Support (Su). The Federal Government of Canada
sided with the opposing groups by introducing a policy to forbid bulk water export
from major drainage basins in Canada. The provincial government might restart
the project at an appropriate time in the future due to its urgent need for cash and
several support groups remain interested in the project [46]. Stability analysis and
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State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
s1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
s2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s5 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
s6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
s7 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
s8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
status quo analysis for the Gisborne conflict have been performed in Subsections
6.2.4.2 and 7.1.3.2 using the proposed algebraic method. Using the results provided
by Table 6.15, states s4 and s6 are equilibria for the four basic solution concepts
indexed b and d, so s4 and s6 are likely resolutions for the Gisborne conflict with
preference uncertainty.
If the provincial government prefers the suggestion of the support group, then
is called an economics-oriented provincial government, which implies that
Provincial and Support cooperate to form a coalition H = {Pr, Su}. The
graph model of the Gisborne conflict shows that neither Provincial nor
Support can make a unilateral move from state s6 to state s4, but s4 ∈ RH(s6).
We first use the logical coalition stability presented by Definition 7.8 to analyze
the coalition stabilities of states s4 and s6. Since s4U2s6 and s4 3 s6, state s4 is
a coalition improvement or uncertain move from s6 for H. Hence, s6 is unstable
for the aggressive stability of coalition H = {Pr, Su}. Similarly, we can analyze
the aggressive stability of coalition H = {Pr, Su} for state s4.
Using the proposed matrix representation for coalition stability analysis, the
conservative and aggressive stability matrices of coalition H = N\{i} for
i = 1, 2, 3, for the Gisborne conflict are presented in Table 7.11 and Table 7.12.
Using the information provided by Table 7.11, states s4 and s6 are conservatively
stable for the three coalitions, because conservative stability matrices of the
coalitions have entries (4, 4) and (6, 6) zeros, i.e., MCUcN\{i}(4, 4) = M
CUc
N\{i}(6, 6) = 0
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for i = 1, 2, 3. Therefore, states s4 and s6 are conservatively coalitionally stable.
However, from Table 7.12, the aggressive stability matrix of coalition
H = {Pr, Su} has (4, 4) entry 0, i.e., MCUaN\{1}(4, 4) = 0, but MCUaN\{1}(6, 6) 	= 0.
This means that s4 is a resolution for the Gisborne conflict when the provincial
government is economics-oriented. Similarly, since MCUaN\{3}(4, 4) 	= 0, but
MCUaN\{3}(6, 6) = 0, state s6 is a resolution for the Gisborne conflict when the
provincial government is environment-oriented to accept the federal government’s
suggestion. From the above discussions, we find that the selection of the conflict
resolution depends on the provincial government’s attitude. If the support group
convinces the provincial government of the urgent need for cash, state s4 is
selected as a resolution for resolving the Gisborne conflict. It means that the
economics-oriented provincial government will lift the ban on bulk water export.
On the other hand, for the environment-oriented provincial government, the
resolution for the Gisborne conflict is selected as state s6, which means that the
provincial government will not lift the ban.
Table 7.11: Conservative stability matrices of coalition H = N\{i} for






State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
s2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s3 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
s4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
s5 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
s6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
s7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
s8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
7.3 Summary
In the original graph model, stability analysis and status quo analysis are carried
out within a well-designed logical structure [16,47,48]. Nonetheless, the nature of
the logical representations makes coding difficult and reduces adaptability. The
algorithms for status quo analysis in the graph model for simple preference and
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Table 7.12: Aggressive stability matrices of coalition H = N\{i} for i =






State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s3 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s6 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
s7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s8 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
preference with uncertainty [47, 48], as well as coalition stability analysis in the
graph model for simple preference [43] have been outlined, but were never
integrated into GMCR II. Strength of preference was introduced into the graph
model for stability analysis [27, 28], but was never integrated into status quo
analysis.
To overcome these challenges and keep consistency with matrix
representations of stability analysis, the proposed algebraic approach is employed
with status quo analysis [71, 75, 80] and coalition analysis in this chapter.
Additionally, the algebraic approach also reveals a relationship between stability
analysis and post-stability analysis. This algebraic method facilitates the
development of improved algorithms to incorporate status quo analysis and
coalition stability analysis into a DSS.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Summary of Contributions
To enhance the applicability for the graph model for conflict resolution, GMCR
has been developed in this thesis in two new directions—hybrid preference and
multiple levels of preference. The hybrid preference framework is proposed to
integrate preference strength and preference uncertainty into the paradigm of
GMCR for multiple decision makers. This structure offers decision makers a
more flexible mechanism for preference expression, which can include not only
strong or mild preference of one state or scenario over another and equal
preference, but also uncertain preference between two states. The preference
framework is more general than existing models, which consider preference
strength and preference uncertainty separately. The new stability concepts for
hybrid preference expand the realm of applicability of GMCR and provide new
insights for strategic conflicts. Particular advantages along this direction of
research described in Chapter 3 are as follows:
• A new hybrid preference system combining strength and uncertainty for
preferences, {, >,∼, U}, is proposed in Section 3.1 to include simple
preference {,∼}, preference with uncertainty {,∼, U}, and strength of
preference {, >,∼} as special cases. Therefore, the new structure can be
used to model complex strategic conflicts arising in practical applications.
• Four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, are expanded in
Section 3.2 to take into account a wide range of preference frameworks.
The redefined solution concepts handle hybrid preference and provide new
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insights for conflict studies.
• The algorithms are developed in Section 3.3 to accommodate the essential
inputs of stability and status quo analyses efficiently. Specifically, the
algorithms to find the reachable lists R+,++H (s) and R
+,++,U
H (s) for coalition
H from any status quo s by legal sequences of WIs and WIUUMs are
developed. All aspects of conflict evolution from a status quo are tracked,
whether states changes occur by WIs or WIUUMs.
A multiple-level preference framework is developed and incorporated into
GMCR. In this structure, a decision maker may have multiple levels of preference
for one state over another; for example, if state s is preferred to state q, it may
be mildly preferred at level 1 or preferred at level r for any positive parameter r.
The multiple levels of preference relax the limitation of the current strength of
the preference which can only handle two or three levels to an unrestricted
degree. Then the extended definitions include extra degrees of stability, thereby
improving practicability and gaining better insights into strategic conflicts.
Specifically,
• A new multiple-level preference framework is devised in Section 4.1 to expand
two-level preference {,∼} and three-level preference {, >,∼} to a more
general multiple-level preference {>,, · · ·,
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
> · · · >,∼} for d = 1, 2, · · ·, r,
where the number of levels, r, is unrestricted.
• Four solution concepts are extended in Section 4.2 to handle multiple levels
of preference. Specifically, solution concepts at each level k are defined as
Nashk, GMRk, SMRk, and SEQk for k = 1, · · ·, r, where r is the maximum
number of levels of preference between two states.
Another contribution is to use Algebraic Graph Theory to analyze a graph
model. In this thesis, a graph model is treated as an edge-weighted, colored
multidigraph in which each arc represents a legal unilateral move, distinct colors
refer to different decision-makers, and the weight along the arc identifies some
preference attribute. An important restriction of a graph model is that no
decision maker can move twice in succession along any path. An algebraic
approach to finding all edge-weighted, colored paths within a weighted colored
multidigraph is developed in Chapter 5. The algebraic approach relieves the
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restriction imposed by the current graph model methodology on the behaviors of
the decision maker and establishes an integrated paradigm for stability analysis
and post-stability analysis, such as status quo analysis and coalition stability
analysis, by revealing the inherent links not only between status quo analysis and
the traditional stability analysis, but also among different preference structures
for GMCR. It is obvious that this algebraic structure is flexible and can be easily
modified to handle large-scale graph models. Specifically
• A reduced weighted edge consecutive matrix LJ (W )r is designed in Subsection
5.3.1 as a conversion function to transform a weighted colored multidigraph
to a simple digraph with no color constraints.
• This conversion function is used to transform the original problem of
searching edge-weighted, colored paths in a weighted colored multidigraph
to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph.
• Using this conversion function, the weighted reachability matrix is developed
to bridge the gap between status quo analysis and stability analysis.
• Utilizing the weight matrix to integrate all of the graph model preference
structures.
Useful links between matrix theory and GMCR are revealed in this thesis.
Previous stability definitions in the graph model were defined logically, in terms
of the underlying graphs and preference relations. Thus, as has been observed
previously, procedures to identify stable states based on these definitions are
difficult to code because of the nature of the logical representations. To overcome
this limitation, stability definitions in multiple-decision-maker graph models for
simple preference, preference with uncertainty, and strength of preference are
formulated explicitly in terms of matrices in Chapter 6. Specifically,
• Matrix representation of four basic solution concepts (MRSC) for simple
preference is developed and its potentially wide realm of applicability is
illustrated by two case studies: the Superpower Nuclear Confrontation
conflict and the Rafferty-Alameda dams conflict.
• The MRSC method is expanded to models with preference uncertainty
(MRSCU) for multiple decision makers and the two case studies of
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Sustainable Development game and the Lake Gisborne conflict are used to
show the applicability of this proposed matrix method.
• Strength of preference is proposed into the algebraic system to address
matrix representation of four basic solution concepts for strength of
preference (MRSCS). The developed MRSCS method is carried out using
two case studies: the Sustainable Development conflict and the Garrison
Diversion Unit (GDU) conflict.
The proposed matrix method is used for follow-up analyses such as status quo
analysis and coalition stability analysis in a graph model, as presented in Chapter
7. Specifically,
• Matrix representation of status quo analysis (MRSQA) by tracking state-by-
state conflict evolution for simple preference is developed and its applicability
is illustrated by the Elmira conflict, in Subsection 7.1.2.
• Matrix representations of status quo analysis are addressed by tracking
arc-by-arc conflict evolution for simple preference, preference with
uncertainty, and strength of preference. The applications of these methods
are illustrated by the Elmira conflict for simple preference, the Gisborne
conflict for preference with uncertainty, and the GDU conflict for strength
of preference, in Subsection 7.1.3.
• Coalition stability analysis based on Nash stability for simple preference is
expanded to models including preference with uncertainty and strength of
preference, in Subsection 7.2.1.
• Matrix representations of coalition stability analysis (MRCSA) are explored
for simple preference, preference with uncertainty, and strength of
preference in Subsection 7.2.2 and their potentials are revealed using two
case studies: the Elmira conflict for simple preference and the Gisborne
conflict for preference with uncertainty, in Subsection 7.2.3.
8.2 Future Work
To expand the realm of applicability of the algebraic approach, a conversion
function will be designed for searching more general paths. To apply the
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proposed matrix methods to large conflict models, a decision support system
MRCRDSS for carrying out individual stability analysis, status quo analysis, and
coalition stability analysis would be very useful. The system based on algebraic
characterization of MRCR can facilitate the development of a software package
for conflict analysis. The following steps will be completed in the future.
• Inohara and Hipel’s work [36,37] for coalition stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR,
and SEQ will be improved and expanded to generalized metarationalities in
the graph model for conflict resolution;
• Matrix representations of solution concepts for hybrid preference and for
multiple levels of preference will be explored;
• Matrix representations of status quo analysis for hybrid preference and for
multiple levels of preference will be developed;
• A computer implementation of MRSC, MRSQA, and MRCSA in the graph
model with various preference structures will be completed; and
• An integrated decision support system MRCR-DSS with the algebraic























































Figure 8.1: Future objectives.
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